This is a Second Edition of the work, revised, enlarged, and re-elaborated by the Author, the First Edition having appeared in the SOR, No. XI, published by ISMEO (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente), Rome 1956.
ABHINAVAGUPTA seems to have given the final shape to the philosophy of beauty in India. His name is familiar to all students of Sanskrit poetics and Indian Aesthetics. His fame is still alive and his poetical and philosophical theories hold ground even today. It is no wonder that the aesthetic thought of Abhinavagupta, one of the most profound and keenest minds that India has ever known, captured the imagination of Prof Raniero Gnoli who, besides being an erudite scholar, well-known editor and able translator of various Sanskrit Texts, is a Sahādaya to the true sense of the term. His thorough understanding and scholarly but lucid exposition of the Rasa-theory of Abhinavagupta in particular and the aesthetic theories of other thinkers in general, are simply wonderful. In the present work, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA, he has edited and translated the Commentary by Abhinavagupta on the famous sūtra of Bharata, Vibhāva-nabhavavabhicārisanyogādrasanispatiḥ (Nāṭya śāstra) which constitutes the most important text in the whole of Indian aesthetic thought, and explained it in the light of the views of prominent rhetors and philosophers—both ancient and modern. The theory of Abhinavagupta has actually been presented here in a garb which can very easily appeal to the modern mind.

The first edition of this work was issued some ten years back by the ISMEO of Rome in the SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA (No. XI) under the direction of Giuseppe Tucci, and was much welcomed by the lovers
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

A.Bh. = Abhinavagupta’s Abhinavabhāratī cf. Preface, p. XIII.
A.G. = Abhinavagupta,
Dh.Ā. = Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka with the Locana and Balaprijā commentaries by Abhinavagupta and Rāmaśāraka, ed. by Pandit Paṭṭābhīrāma Śāstri, Chowkhamba, Benares 1940.
Dh.Ā.L. = Abhinavagupta’s commentary (locana) on the Dhvanyāloka by Ānandavardhana.
Hc. = Hemacandra’s Kavyāmusāsana, cf. Preface, p XIII.
I.P.V.V. = Abhinavagupta’s Īsvarapratyabhijñāvimarsim, K. S. T. S., 3 vols, Śrīnagar 1938-1943.
J. = Jayaratha, the commentator of the Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka
JBU = Journal of Bombay University.
K. Ad. = Dandin’s Kavyādarsa, edited and translated by O Bohthingk, Leipzig 1890.
Kane, S.D.V. = Kane, P. V., The Sahityadarpana of Visvanātha (Paricchedas I, II, Arthālankāras ), with exhaustive Notes and the History of Sanskrit Poetics, Bombay 1951.
K.M. = Rājaśekhara’s Kavyamāmsā, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda 1916.
ABBREVIATIONS


Mahimabhaṭṭa, = The Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa, ed. with a comm. of Vyaktiviveka Ruyyaka and the Madhusūdana comm. by Madhusūdana Miśra, Chowkamba, Benares 1936.

M.C. = Māṇikyacandra, cf. Preface, p. XIII.


N.Ś. = Nāṭya Śāstra, cf. Preface, p. XIII.


Pandey = Pandey, Kanti Chandra, Indian Aesthetics, Chowkamba, Banaras 1950.


P.T.V. = Abhinavagupta’s Parātrimśikāvivaraṇa, K. S. T. S., Śrīnagar 1918.


P.V., svavṛtti = MS. of the commentary by Dharmakīrti on the ch. I (svārthānumānapariccheda) of his Pramāṇavārtika. This MS. belongs to Prof. Giuseppe Tucci.

R.T. = Kalhaṇa’s Rājatarāṅgiṇī, ed. by M. A. Stein, Bombay 1892.

S. Kā. = The Sāṅkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Sāṅkhya Tattvakaumudi of Vāchaspati Miśra, Bombay 1940.

Somānanda, = Somānanda’s Śivadṛṣṭi with the vṛtti of Utpaladeva, Śrīnagar 1934.

Spanḍanirṇaya = Kṣemarāja’s Spanḍanirṇaya, K.S.T.S., Śrīnagar 1925.

Stavacintāmaṇi = The Stava-Chintāmaṇi of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa with commentary by Kṣemarāja, K.S.T.S., Śrīnagar 1918.

TĀ. = Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka, with the commentary of Jayaratha, K.S.T.S., 12 vols., Śrīnagar 1918-1938.

Vijñānabhairava = The Vijñānabhairava with comm. partly by Kṣemarāja and partly by Śivopādhyāya, K.S.T.S., Śrīnagar 1918.

V.P. = Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya ed. by Cārudeva Śāstrī Lahore 1939.

ZDMG = Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA
PREFACE

This book was first printed in 1956. Since then I have never relinquished my researches in the fields of Indian Rhetoric and Aesthetics. Some misinterpretations and mistakes occurring in the first edition have already been corrected by myself in 1957, in the paper Further Observations on the Abhinavabhārati, East and West, year VIII, N. 1.—April, 1957 pp. 100-103. This new edition represents, I trust, a great improvement in regard to the first one. The Introduction, the critical apparatus, the translation and the notes have been completely revised. The basic text of Abhinavagupta, i.e. the commentary to the famous sûtra by Bharata, VI, after st. 31, vibhāvānu bhāvavabhāvibhārisamyogād rasanispattib, has been supplemented by three new texts, viz. the Commentaries on Nātyaśāstra, I, st. 107, on Dhvanyāloka, I, st. 18, and II, st. 4.

As to the text I have directly compared the MS of Abhinavabhārati preserved in the library of Madras (M). References to the Kavi's edition of the Abhinavabhārati are to the second edition of it. The letters Hc and M. C refer to the viveka of Hemacandra and to the samketa of Māṇikyacandra respectively. Although the additions and explanations of Hc do not alter in any way the thought of AG., I have not reproduced them in the text, which I have tried to set forth such as it was before the exegetical activity of the great jaina scholar.

In so many changes, one thing has remained unchanged in these ten years: I mean the profound debt of gratitude I owe to Prof. Giuseppe Tucci, to whom, now as then, this book is dedicated.
INTRODUCTION

The Nātyaśāstra

1. In India, the study of aesthetics—which was at first restricted to the drama—draws its origin from no abstract or disinterested desire for knowledge but from motives of a purely empirical order. The most ancient text that has come down to us is the Nātyaśāstra (4th or 5th Century A. D. ?), ascribed to the mythical Bharata. This is a voluminous collection of observations and rules concerned in the main with the production of drama and the training of actors and poets. The author, or the authors, with a certain sententiousness and pedantry typical of Indian thought, classify the various mental states or emotions of the human soul and treat of their transition from the practical to the aesthetic plane. The Nātyaśāstra is a work of deep psychological insight. Drama appeals to sight and hearing at the same time (the only senses that are capable, according to some Indian thinkers, of rising above the boundaries of the limited “I”) and is then considered the highest form of art. In it both sight and hearing collaborate in arousing in the spectator, more easily and forcibly than by any other form of art, a state of consciousness sui generis, conceived intuitively and concretely as a juice or flavour, called Rasa. This typically Indian conception of aesthetic experience as a juice or a taste savoured by the reader or spectator should not surprise us. In India, and elsewhere, sensations proper to the senses of taste and touch, almost devoid of any noetic representation, are easily taken to designate states of consciousness more intimate and removed from abstract representations
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than the ordinary one—that is the aesthetic experience and various forms of religious ones.

This Rasa, when tasted by the spectator, pervades and enchants him. Aesthetic experience is, therefore, the act of tasting this Rasa, of immersing oneself in it to the exclusion of all else. Bharata, in a famous aphorism which, interpreted and elaborated in various ways, forms the point of departure of all later Indian aesthetic thoughts, says, in essence, that Rasa is born from the union of the play with the performance of the actors. “Out of the union of the Determinants—he says literally—the Consequents and the Transitory Mental States, the birth of Rasa takes place”. What is then the nature of Rasa? What are its relations with the other emotions and states of consciousness? And how are we to understand this word “birth”? The whole of Indian aesthetics hinges on such questions, which have been an inexhaustible source of polemic material to generations of rhetors and thinkers, down to our own days. But, before undertaking an examination of their various interpretations, let us briefly expound here the essentials of the empirical psychology of Bharata.

According to the Nātyaśāstra, eight fundamental feelings, instincts, emotions or mental states called bhāva or sthāyibhāva, can be distinguished in the human soul: Delight (rati), Laughter (bāsa), Sorrow (soka), Anger (krodha), Heroism (utsāha), Fear (bhaya), Disgust (jugupsa), and Wonder (vismaya). These

1) The word bhāva is made to derive by Bharata, VII, 342-346, from the causative of bhū, to be, which may be intended in two different meanings, that is “to cause to be” (viz. bring about, create, etc.) and “to pervade”. According to the first meaning, that which is brought about are the purposes of poetry, kāvyārtha, that is, the Rasas (cf. below, p. 50, n. 2a). According to the second meaning these are so called because they pervade, as a smell, the minds of the spectators. The meaning of sthāyin is permanent, basic, etc.
eight states are inborn in man's heart. They permanently exist in the mind of every man, in the form of latent impressions (vāsaṇā) derived from actual experiences in the present life or from inherited instincts, and, as such, they are ready to emerge into his consciousness on any occasion. In ordinary life each feeling is manifested and accompanied by three elements, causes (kāraṇa), effects (kārya) and concomitant elements (Saḥakārin). The causes are the various situations and encounters of life, by which it is excited; the effects, the visible reactions caused by it and expressed by our face, our gestures and so on; and the concomitant elements, the accessory and temporary mental states accompanying it. These eight bhāvas, indeed, do not appear in a pure form. The various modulations of our mental states are extremely complex, and each of the fundamental or permanent states appears in association with other concomitant mental states, as Discouragement, Weakness, Apprehension and so on. These occasional, transitory, impermanent states are, according to Bharata, thirty six. These same causes, etc., being acted on the stage or described in poetry, not lived in real life, give spectators the particular pleasure to which Bharata gives the name of Rasa. The fundamental mental states being eight in number, there are also eight Rāsas, i.e., the Erotic (śṛṅgāra), the Comic (ḥāsyā), the Pathetic (kāruṇa), the Furious (raudra), the Heroic (vīra), the Terrible (bhayānaka), the Odious (bibhatsa) and the Marvellous (adbhuta). Later speculation generally admits a ninth permanent feeling, Serenity (śāma); the corresponding Rasa is the Quietistic (śānta). When they are not part of real life but are elements of poetical expression, even the causes, effects and concomitant elements, just as the permanent mental states, take another name and are called respectively Determinants (vibhāva), Consequences (anubbāva) and Transitory Mental States
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(vyabhicāribhāva). Of course, from the spectator's point of view, the consequents do not follow the feeling, as they do in the ordinary life, but they act as a sort of causes which intensify and prolong the feeling, brought about by the determinants.

2. Dandin and Bhaṭṭa Lollata. Bharata's text and the aforesaid aphorism in particular became, as we have said, the subject of study and analysis for a whole series of thinkers, each of whom was anxious to contribute to a clearer understanding of the words of the Master. The earliest of these were, so far as is known, Dandin (7th century) and Bhaṭṭa Lollata (9th Cent.),

1) There is no need to insist upon the fact that all these English renderings are far from being satisfying. According to Bharata, VII, 346, the term vibhāva has the meaning of cognition, vyjnāna. They are so called, because words, gestures and the representation of the temperament are determined, vibbhavyate (that is, known, according to AG) by them. The anubhāva, on their turn, are so called because the representation, in its three aspects, that is, voice, vāc, gestures, anga, and physical reactions, sattva, causes (the spectators) to experience (the correspondent feeling). I have followed here the reading accepted by AG (yad ayam anubhāvayati vāgāngasattvakrtō bhinayāḥ tasmād anubhāvah). The commentary of AG on this part of the Nāṭyaśāstra is, however, not available, and there are, of this passage, many different readings.

2) Dandin (7th century ?) wrote the Kavyādarśa (this work may be consulted also in the translation of O. Bohthlingk, Leipzig 1890). Bhaṭṭa Lollata flourished in Kashmir in the 9th or 10th century. He wrote a commentary, now lost, on the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata. Kṣemaraṭa (Span-danirnaya, p. 34) and A.G. (M.V.V., v. 778) quote a Bhaṭṭa Lollata who wrote a commentary (vrtti) to the Spandakārikā of Vasugupta. In my opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhaṭṭa Lollatas are one and the same person; Bhaṭṭa Lollata would, in that case, have lived in the reign of Avantivarman (856-83 A.D.; Vasugupta lived under Avantivarman) or in the reign of his successor, Śaṅkaravarman. This change, also, involves a change in the dates of Śankuka (cf. infra, p. 32, n. 4), who could then no longer be identified with the poet Śankuka, who was a contemporary of Ajitāpiḍa (early 9th century).

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who like his great successor, was a Kashmiri and probably a follower of one of the Sivaite mystical schools flourishing in Kashmir. According to them, Rasa is simply the permanent mental state (anger, fear, etc.) raised to its highest pitch by the combined effect of the Determinants, Consequents and Transitory Mental States. Bhatta Lollata maintains that Rasa lies both in the represented personage and in the imitating actor. The actor he says, feels the different bhāvas and rasas as though they belonged truly, or rather personally, to him. To the objection that, being it so, the actor would fail to maintain or follow the tempo and the other dramatical conventions, Bhaṭṭa Lollata answers that, on the contrary, the actor can manage very well with them by virtue of anusamṛdhī or anusamṛdhāna. Anusamṛdhī—that literally signifies recollection, memory and even something more than this, i.e., consciousness, awareness, reflection, etc. and I have tentatively rendered by “realisation”—is at the same time the power thanks to which the actor “becomes” for the time being the represented or imitated personage (e.g. Rāma), feels himself as Rāma, and the faculty through which he nevertheless does not forget his real

1) Cf A Bh., I, p 264 : rasabhāvāṇām api vāsanāteśavaṇā nate sambhavād anusamṛdhibalāc ca līyādyanusaranāt ; cf also Dh Ā L., infra p. 109 ; and, on all this, K. M. Varma, Seven Words in Bharata, Calcutta 1958, pp 37, 38. An opposit view to that of Lollata was maintained by the followers of Udbhata (a Kashmiri poet and writer at the court of King Jayāpīda (779-813), according to whom our perception of the actor as having really bhāvas and Rasas is an illusion (drstas tu tatpratyayo nate bhramah , A.Bh., I, 264).

2) Cf f 1. A Bh I, 43, where niranusamṛdhī means uncontrolled, thoughtless.

3) According to some later commentators, the meaning of anusamṛdhāna is visualization or something like that ; cf. f 1. Prabhākara, Rasaprādīpa, Benares 1925, p 23 : anusamṛdhānam ca kavivivaksitasyārthasya vāsanāpā- tavasāt sāksād tvā karanam ||
nature of actor. Seemingly, Bhaṭṭa Lollata's theory does not concern the problem of how the spectators do relish Rasa.

3. Sankuka.—Sankuka, a Kashmiri who lived a little later than Lollata, disagrees with this view. According to him, Rasa is not as the "ancients" put it, an intensified state but an imitated mental state. In ordinary life, the mental state of a man is revealed by the causes which excite it, i.e. the determinants; by the visible effects of his feeling, i.e., the consequents; and by his concomitant feelings, i.e., the transitory mental states. The successful imitation by the actor of the characters and their experiences is no doubt, Sankuka says, artificial and unreal, but is not realized to be so by the spectators, who forget the difference between the actors and the characters, and inferentially experience the mental state of the characters themselves. This experience—which is actually a peculiar form of inference—is, to Sankuka, different from any other kind of knowledge. A horse, imitated by a painter, Hemacandra observes, hinting at Sankuka's theory, seems to onlookers neither real nor false, and is nothing but an image which precedes any judgement of reality or unreality. So far, so good. According to Abhinavagupta, the weak point of Sankuka's theory is his premise that the aesthetic state of consciousness or Rasa is nothing but the perception of an imitated mental state.

1) Sankuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhatta Lollata. It is doubtful whether he should be identified with the poet Sankuka, author of a poem called Bhuvanabhyyudaya, who according to Kalhana (R T, IV, 705) lived under the reign of Ajitāpīda (about 830 A.D.). In this case, his predecessor, Bhatta Lollata, can no longer be identified with the commentator of the same name on the Spandakārikā, and so his period should be brought back to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th. Cf. above, p. XVII, n. 1. Sankuka wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A G. On Sankuka, see De, S P, I, p. 38; Pandey, A.G., p. 128.
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This concept of imitation was refuted by Abhinavagupta, as it had been before him by his master Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the author of the Kāvyakantuka, an important work on poetics, now lost. Their reasoning is painstaking and acute: the effect of imitation (as when a clown imitates the son of a king) is in fact laughter and mockery and has no connection with the aesthetic experience. The imitation theory is also clearly contradicted by certain arts—dancing, for example—which obviously do not imitate anything in real life.

4. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.—A third thinker who is very important in the history of the doctrine of Rasa is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, a Kashmiri of about the first half of the 10th century, author of the lost Sahṛdayadarpaṇa. His critique deals first of all

1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka flourished in Kashmir after Ānandavardhana (who was a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A. D.), the author of the Dhvanyāloka, whom he refutes. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is, therefore, to be placed around 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with the Brāhmaṇa Nāyaka, who lived during the reign of Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 A.D.), and who is mentioned by Kalhaṇa (R.T., V., 159). In the l.P.V.V., III, p. 96, A.G. quotes a stanza of śaiva inspiration, which he attributes to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, to whom he gives the title of mīmāṁsakāgrāṇīḥ (the same title is given by A.G., elsewhere, to Kumārila, mīmāṁsakāpāravā). Another stanza of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (taken from a stotra) is quoted by Kṣemarāja (Spandanirṇaya, p. 18). I am inclined to think that these two Bhaṭṭa Nāyakas were one and the same person. The poetic work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was the Hṛdayadarpaṇa (or Sahṛdayadarpaṇa) which has not yet come to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains an invocation to Śiva, has been preserved in the A.Bb., I, p. 5. The fragments of the poetic work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka have been collected by T.R. Chintamani, J.O.R.M., Vol. I, pp. 267-276. On the poetic doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and the confutation of the dhvani, cf. T. R. Chintamani, J.B.U., vol. 17, part 2, pp. 267-276. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory is also stated with few variations in the Db.Ā.L., pp. 180 ff. (infra, p. 107). On Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in general, see Sankaran, op. cit., pp. 86-88, 102-4; Kane, S.D.V., pp. 212-215; Pandey, A.G., pp. 128-130.
with the word “birth”, used by Bharata; in what sense, he asks, should the word be understood? Perception, production, and manifestation are facts of everyday life; they have nothing to do with the aesthetic fact, with Rasa. Hence the real meaning of “birth”, as used by Bharata, cannot be perception, or production, or manifestation. Theatrical performance (the actions of actors) or poetry (the words of a poet) does not make Rasa perceptible, produce it, or manifest it. The relation between the practical, or literal meaning, and the poetic meaning lies in none of these; rather, it lies in something entirely different from these three facts of everyday life, namely in “revelation” (bhāvanā). This revelation, as Abhinavagupta says in his paraphrase of the Sahṛdayadarpana is a special power, different from the power of denoting, that words assume in poetry and drama. The specific task of this power, which as Nāyaka says, “has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor occupying our consciousness”, is generalization or universalization of the things represented or described. “The Rasa, revealed by this power is then enjoyed (bhuj) through a sort of enjoyment different from direct experience, from memory etc.” The core of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s doctrine is precisely this concept of generalization—one of the main contributions of Indian aesthetics. The aesthetic state of consciousness—whether its material be anger, love, pain, etc.—does not insert itself into the texture of everyday life but is

1) During the aesthetic experience, the consciousness of the spectator is free from all practical desires. The spectacle is no longer felt in connexion with the empirical “I” of the spectator nor in connexion with any other particular individual; it has the power of abolishing the limited personality of the spectator, who regains, momentarily, his immaculate being not yet overshadowed by māyā. Moha, stupor, is the specific state aroused by tamah.
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seen and lived in complete independence of any individual interest. The images contemplated on the stage or read in poetry are seen by the man of aesthetic sensibility independently of any relationship with his ordinary life or with the life of the actor or of the hero of the play or poem, and appear, therefore, in a generalized (sādhāranīkṛtta, sādhāraṇa) way, that is to say, universally and released from individuality.

The drama performed or the poem recited has the power to raise the spectator, for the moment, above his limited ego, his practical interests, which in everyday life, like "a thick layer of mental stupor", limit and dim his consciousness. Things and events that in practical life when associated with "I", with "mine", repel or grieve us, are felt as a source of pleasure—the aesthetical pleasure or Rasa—when they are described or represented aesthetically, that is, when they are generalized or contemplated universally¹. This conversion of pain into

1) Generality (sādhāranya) is the principal character of aesthetic experience. The events and facts of which the determinants, etc., consist are independent of any relation with any particular individual and of any particular association. The situation represented, says Mammaṭa, is independent of the following specifications: "This concerns me"; "This concerns my enemy"; "This concerns a person who is indifferent to me"; "This does not concern me"; "This does not concern my enemy"; "This does not concern a person who is indifferent to me". Generality is thus a state of self-identification with the imagined situation, devoid of any practical interest and, from this point of view, of any relation whatsoever with the limited Self, and as it were impersonal. The determinants and consequents differ from ordinary causes and effects just on account of this state of generality. The same feelings of delight, sorrow and anger which pervade ordinary life appear in a completely different manner in the aesthetic state of consciousness. The witnessing of a scene of ordinary life (e.g., a love scene) necessarily arouses in the spectator a certain series of feelings (anger, envy, disgust, etc.) proportionate to the closeness of the

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a sort of pleasure is proved, Näyaka holds, by the fact that, as depicted on the stage, sights and events painful in themselves do not repel us; on the contrary, we enjoy them. Rasa, the aesthetic experience revealed by the power of revelation (bhāvāna), is not noetic in character, is not a perception, but an experience, a fruition (bhoga). This fruition is characterized by a state of lysis (laya), of rest into our own consciousness,

ties which bind him to the protagonists of the scene in question. It may be that he is completely indifferent to the actors in the scene and also to the act which they perform; in this case he will be in a state of indifference (tāptaśthya), which also is at the very opposite pole of the aesthetic experience, which is characterized by just an active participation (anupraveśa) of the cognizing subject in the event represented. The same scene represented on the stage is, on the contrary, devoid of all particular associations and free from any extraneous interference (vighna)—anger, disgust, etc. The spectator is without any pragmatic requirement, any of the interests (desire for gain, etc.), by which ordinary life is characterized. He is immersed in the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of everything else; the task of generalization carried out by the poetic expression breaks the barrier of the limited “I” and eliminates in this way the interests, demands and aims associated with it.

1) Vistrānti, rest, denotes the fact of our being absorbed in something, immersed in it, to the exclusion of every other thing (vigalitavedyāntarotayā), without, that is, having any mental movement, any extraneous desire (in other words no obstacle, vighna), which comes to break into that state of consciousness. In aesthetic language, vistrānti denotes, at the same time, the fact of being absorbed in the aesthetic object, and the sensation of pleasure sui generis which accompanies that state of consciousness. In the saiva metaphysics vistrānti denotes the repose of everything that exists in the “I” (everything that exists is reposing in the consciousness, but the consciousness does not repose in any other thing different from itself, it is reposed in itself) and, implicitly, the repose of the limited “I” in the consciousness in its original fullness. The terms “solution” (nirvṛti), “lysis” (laya), concentration (samāpatti) etc., express the same concept (cf infra, p. 62). They
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the pervasion of consciousness by bliss and light: it belongs to the same order as the enjoyment of the supreme brahman. This last conception is very interesting, and even at first glance clearly reveals its kinship with certain religious schools of India, which must have influenced him, if only indirectly. Brahman—Bhartṛhari said more than four centuries before Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka—is nothing but the overcoming of the knots of "I" and of "mine". Not enough. The same idea of a conversion of the things of reality (according to Nāyaka, in the aesthetic moment they appear, as it were, under another aspect) is to be found, applied to the mystical rather than to the aesthetic experience in some Buddhist schools. In religious experience the world of reality is not suppressed but is seen otherwise. "If it be true (the Buddhist Vasubandhu says) that things are unreal, lacking that substantial reality consisting in their own nature as imagined by the ignorant, it cannot nevertheless be denied that they do exist in that ineffable way of being, which Buddhas perceive" (Vimśatikā, 10). The nature of things is inexhaustible and they reveal more and more modes of being, corresponding to the beholder's varying states of consciousness. Reality, in this sense, may be the matter of a revulsion (parāvṛtti), of a sort of sudden reinterpretation through which it is revealed under a new aspect: the painful and restless flow of history, the samsāra, appears to the saint as ineffable quiescence, nirvāna. This conception, as will be seen, will recur frequently in the works of the satva schools of Kashmir. Consciousness manifests and illuminates everything. The appearing of all things presupposes the existence of Consciousness, which is, in this sense, light (prakāśa).

On the concept of beatitude (ānanda), see infra p. XLII-XLV.

1) Vākyapadiya, I, 5 (comm.), ed. e.f.: mamāham ity abamkāragranthi-samatikramamātram brahmanah prāptib.
be criticized and at the same time developed by Abhinavagupta. The final transfiguration of pain, it is true, is as if anticipated and foreshadowed in the aesthetic experience (this, like the mystical experience, transforms reality, converts the very language, which magically reveals a new sense that exists side by side with the practical meaning), but one must not forget that, while the mystical experience is perfect fullness, in which the knots of "I" and "mine" are already completely undone, in the aesthetic experience the process of undoing has only just begun. In it, the history, the pain has not yet entirely lost its weight; it is still present, ready to break out in all its violence. The poet's fullness is not that of the saint. "That fresh outlook of poets—declares Ānandavardhana—whose activity succeeds in enjoying Rasas all, and that learned outlook which proceeds towards probing the truth of objects verily—both of them we have tried to utilize in figuring out the world, so long that have become exhausted in the attempt. O Lord sleeping on the sea, we never obtained in any of these, Happiness comparable to devotion for Thee." Aesthetic enjoyment itself is veined by an obscure unrest. "Often a man", says Kālidāsa in a stanza quoted by Abhinavagupta, "in the act of admiring in happiness beautiful shapes or listening to sweet sounds, feels in himself a keen disquiet. Does he, perhaps, recall, in his soul, affections of past lives, deep within his spirit without his knowledge?" The disquiet to which Kālidāsa alludes, is, observes Abhinavagupta, an unobjectified desire; it corresponds to what is, metaphysically, the desire which induces consciousness to deny its original fullness and to crumble in time and space.

1) Dh.Ā., III, 43 (comm.). I have reproduced here the translation of Krishnamoorthy.
2) See below, p. 60.
3) See below, p. 60, n. 4.
The religious and the aesthetic experience spring from the same source. This is the tenor of two stanzas, almost certainly by Nāyaka, quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa, a rhetor of the 11th century: “Dramatic performances and the music accompanying them feed the Rasa in all its fullness; hence the spectator, absorbed in the tasting of this, turning inward, feels pleasure through the whole performance. Sunk into his own being, he forgets everything (pertaining to practical life). There is manifested in him that flow of inborn pleasure, from which the yogins draw their satisfaction”.

Another problem explored by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is the didactic value of poetry. Differing from the current opinion that drama and poetry should instruct while they entertain, Nāyaka maintains that instruction is completely secondary and that what really matters is the intrinsic value of the work. The two approaches are reconciled by Abhinavagupta, who says, in brief, that the aesthetic experience in so far as it nourishes our sensitivity has also a didactic value.

5. Ānandavardhana. These are the outlines of the development of Indian aesthetics toward the end of the 10th century, as Abhinavagupta, who was one of India’s greatest thinkers, has transmitted them. A Kashmiri like his fore-runners, Abhinavagupta unified the scattered voices of earlier philosophers into a masterful synthesis, embracing philosophical speculation and mysticism as well as aesthetics. But, before turning to him, we ought to go back in time and precisely at the epoch of Avantivarman (855-83), king of Kashmir. At the court of this king, there lived a great rhetor and phi-

1) See below, p. 48.
sopher indeed, by the name of Ānandavardhana. In a justly famous book, on which Abhinavagupta was to comment a century and half later, called the Dhvanyāloka ("Light of Resonance"), Ānandavardhana reached certain conclusions which were accepted, with some rare exceptions, by all later Indian rhetors. The starting point of his speculation is the difference between ordinary and poetical language. The philosophy of language has very ancient roots in India, and in various epochs its problems have been dealt with by diverse and radically differing schools; yet Indian thinkers, both Buddhist and Hindu, are in substantial agreement on one point—the instrumental and transitive nature of ordinary speech. Language is essentially pragmatic: the words we use exist in so far as they serve some purpose, and after we have used them they cease to be. They, Buddhists hold, are powerless to grasp the living reality of things; they deal with the general, which is simply an image of things, an image out of focus, so to speak, and ultimately unreal. What is then this new nature or dimension, that speech assumes in poetry? And from what is it derived? According to another Kashmiri rhetor, Udbhaṭa, flourished in the 8th century, the essence of poetical language was the secondary or metaphorical function of the words¹. The poetical speech—he must have thought—at the very expense of the practical value, enriches itself with various proceedings—rhymes, figures, inversion—conceived as useless in a purely functional language, but essential in the poetical one. One of the most important elements of these figures of speech, differing from the modes of practical language dominated by a direct way of expression, is undoubtedly the secondary function of words.

¹) See, on all that, R. Gnoli, Udbhata’s Commentary on the Kāvyālaṃkāra of Bhāmaha, Roma 1962, of which I have reproduced here some passages.
This and nothing but this will then be the very life of poetical language, in antithesis with the practical one. Ānandavardhana disagrees. The secondary function does not necessarily imply poetry. Actually, all language is metaphorical. The source of poetry must then be another sense or value that is assured by words, altogether different from the primary (i.e., historical or literal) and the secondary one. "Poetical meaning is different from conventional meaning. In the words of great poets it shines out and towers above the beauty of the well-known outer parts even as charm does in ladies" (Dhvanyāloka, I, 4). This new sense—the poetical sense—irreducible, as it is, to the literary one, cannot however do without it, but is, as it were, supported by it. "The poetic meaning", he says, "is not understood by a mere learning in Grammar and Dictionary. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true essence of poetry. This meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, these two must be studied carefully by those who wish to become true poets. Just as a man interested in perceiving objects (in the dark) directs his efforts towards securing the flame of a lamp since this is a means to realise his end, so also does one who is ultimately interested in the poetic meaning first evince interest in the conventional meaning. Just as the purport of a sentence is grasped only through the sense of individual words, the knowledge of the poetic sense is attained only through the medium of the literal sense. Though by its own power the word-import conveys the sentence-import, just as it escapes notice once its purpose is served, so also does that poetic meaning flash suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of cultured critics, when they are indifferent towards the conventional meaning. To conclude, connoisseurs give the name of
"resonance" (dbhvani) to that particular sort of poetry in which both the conventional meaning and the conventional word are subordinate" (Dhvanyāloka, I, 7-13).

A truly poetical word or expression is that which cannot be replaced by other words, without losing its value. Poetry knows no synonyms. This poetic meaning of words, which coexists, paradoxically, with the historical or literal meaning—as Maheśvarānanda, a philosopher of the 13th century, points out—stands in relation to the other powers of words just as freedom does to men's other capacities and activities. The name by which it is known, is resonance (dbhvani) or suggested, manifested sense (vyāngya). Rasa is nothing but it. Poetic words make manifest, suggest it unexpectedly and without any noticeable bridge. The theory of Ānandavardhana, which we

1) I have quoted here the transl. of K. Krishnamoorthy.

2) When we read a poem we become, as it were, simultaneously aware of the Rasas, viz. the sentiments not practically experienced but aesthetically contemplated, that it suggests. The temporal sequence between the cognitions of the expressed and the suggested sense would be noticeable only in case the suggested sense were opposed to the expressed one or similar to it, that is, on the same footing. See Db. A., III, 33: "But this temporal sequence in the two function of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments (i.e., Rasas) are suggested; because sentiments are neither opposed to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other senses; they are not capable of being conveyed by aught else and all their accessories work together with lightning—quickness" (transl. cited above). The concept of alakṣya-krama and the necessity of admitting it has been expounded at length by Ānandavardhana himself, Db. A., III, 33. I cite here some words of P. Valéry (Variété, Première Leçon du Cours de Poétique, ed. cit., p. 1356): "J’expliquerai un jour comment cette altération se marque dans le language des poètes, et qu’il y a un langage poétique dans lequel les mots ne sont plus le mots de l’usage pratique et libre. Ils ne s’associent plus selon les mêmes attractions; il sont chargés de deux valeurs simultanément engagée et d’importance equivalente: leur son et leur effet psychique instantané".
have expounded in its essentials here, is one of the greatest contributions of India to the aesthetic problem, and it deserves even now all our attention. One of the most sensitive critics of our times, Paul Valéry, more than ten centuries later, ideally connects himself to him. "La poésie", he says,

"est un art du langage. Le langage, cependant, est une création de la pratique. Remarquons d'abord que toute communication entre les hommes n'a quelque certitude que dans la pratique, et par la vérification que nous donne la pratique. Je vous demande du feu. Vous me donnez du feu: vous m'avez compris.

Mais, en me demandant du feu, vous avez pu prononcer ces quelques mots sans importance, avec un certain ton, et dans un certain timbre de voix—avec une certaine inflexion et une certaine lenteur ou une certaine précipitation que j'ai pu remarquer. J'ai compris vos paroles, puisque, sans même y penser, je vous ai tendu ce que vous demandiez, ce peu de feu.

Et voici cependant que l'affaire n'est pas finie. Chose étrange: le son, et comme la figure de votre petite phrase, revient en moi, se répète en moi; comme si elle se plaisait en moi; et moi, j'aime à m'entendre la redire, cette petite phrase qui a presque perdu son sens, qui a cessé de servir, et qui pourtant veut vivre encore, mais d'une tout autre vie. Elle a pris une valeur; et elle l'a prise aux dépens de sa signification finie. Elle a créé le besoin d'être encore entendue... Nous voici sur le bord même de l'état de poésie. Cette expérience minuscule va nous suffire à découvrir plus d'une vérité."  

1) P. Valéry, Variété, Poésie et Pensée Abstraite, pp. 1324-25 (La Pleiade, Paris 1957)
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And again:

"La poésie n'a pas le moins du monde pour object de communiquer à quelqu'un quelque notion déterminée,—à quoi la prose doit suffire. Observez seulement le destin de la prose, comme elle expire à peine entendue, et expire de l'être,—c'est-à-dire d'être remplacée dans l'esprit attentif par une idée ou figure finie. Cette idée, dont la prose vient d'exciter les conditions nécessaries et suffisantes, s'étant produite, aussitôt les moyens sont dissous, le langage s'évanouit devant elle. C'est un phénomène constant dont voici un double contrôle; notre mémoire nous répète le discours que nous n'avons pas compris. La répétition répond à l'incompréhension. Elle nous signifie que l'acte du langage n'a pu s'accomplir. Mais au contraire, et comme par symétrie, si nous avons compris, nous sommes en possession d'exprimer sous d'autres formes l'idée que le discours avait composée en nous. L'acte du langage accompli nous a rendus maîtres du point central qui commande la multiplicité des expressions possibles d'une idée acquise. En somme, le sens, qui est la tendance à une substitution mentale uniforme, unique, résolutoire, est l'objet, la loi, la limite d'existence de la prose pure.

Toute autre est la fonction de la poésie. Tandis que le fond unique est exigible de la prose, c'est ici la forme unique qui ordonne et survit. C'est le son, c'est le rythme, ce sont les rapprochements physiques des mots, leurs effets d'induction ou leur influences mutuelles qui dominent, aux dépens de leur propriété de se consommer en un sens défini et certain. Il faut donc que dans un poème le sens ne puisse l'emporter sur la forme et la détruire sans retour; c'est au contraire le retour, la forme conservée, ou plutôt exactement reproduite comme unique et nécessaire expression de l'état ou de la pensée qu'elle vient d'engendrer au lecteur, qui est le ressort

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de la puissance poétique. *Un beau vers renait indéfiniment de ses cendres*, il redevient,—comme l'effet de son effet,—cause harmonique de soi-même”

Let us now listen to some lines of the great commentator of the *Dhvanyāloka*, Abhinavagupta:

“Aesthetical experience takes place, as everyone can notice, by virtue, as it were, of the squeezing out of the poetical word. Persons aesthetically sensitive, indeed, read and taste many times over the same poem. In contradiction to practical means of perception, that, their task being accomplished, are no more of any use and must then be abandoned, a poem, indeed, does not lose its value after it has been comprehended. The words, in poetry, must therefore have an additional power, that of suggestion, and for this very reason the transition from the conventional meaning to the poetic one is unnoticeable.

“What some people say, namely that a phrase would then come to have many different meanings, is due solely to their ignorance. A sentence—they say referring to ordinary instrumental language—which has been pronounced once and the meaning of which has already been perceived by force of convention, cannot lead one to perceive two different meanings. The subject, indeed, cannot remember, at the same time, several mutually contrasting conventions; and if, on the other hand, these conventions are not contrasting, the meaning of the sentence remains, then, one. Nor can it be admitted that the different

1) *Variété, Commentaire de Charmy*, p. 1510 (ed. cit.).

2) This is a quotation from the *Vākyapadiya*, II, 38. Apart from Bhattṛhari, the practical purpose of language has been discussed at length and with an admirable penetration by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, especially I, 92 ff. Dharmakīrti’s work was well-known to Abhinavagupta, who cites it frequently. See, f.i., *Locana*, pp. 444 and 542 (Benares ed.).

3) See above, p. XXIX, n. 2.
meanings are perceived one after the other, because the words, after they have made one meaning perceptible and have thus ceased to be efficacious, have no longer any power to render perceptible any other meaning. And even if the phrase is pronounced a second time, the meaning remains invariably the same, the convention and the context being the same. Should someone object that a sentence can lead one to perceive another meaning, independently of the one perceived through convention and context, it can be replied that, then, there is no longer any fixed relation between word and meaning; and that one falls thus into the countersense, described in the stanza:

"Therefore, what reason can one adduce for the fact that, on hearing the phrase: 'He who desires Heaven, must offer the fire-sacrifice', one does not perceive the meaning 'he must eat dog-flesh'?" Moreover, there would be no limit to the number of possible meanings and a general state of uncertainty would exist. The fact of admitting that a sentence can have several meanings is thus a fallacy.

"The case of the poetical word is however different. Here, indeed, the aesthetical expression, etc., once perceived, tends to become itself an object of aesthetic experience and one has therefore no ulterior application of conventions. Aesthetic cognition is not, in fact, the same as the forms of perception proper to a didactic work, namely "I am commanded to do this", "I want to do this", and "I have done what I had to do". Such forms of perception tend, in fact, to an extrinsic end, successive to them in time, and are thus of an ordinary, practical nature. In aesthetic experience, what happens is, instead, the birth of the aesthetic tasting of the artistic expression. Such an experience, just as a flower born of magic, has, as its essence,

1) This is Pramāṇavārttika, I, 318 (ed. cit.).
solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came before nor with what comes after. This experience is therefore different both from the ordinary experience and from the religious one."

Apart from some modern intuitions, of which Paul Valéry is perhaps the most penetrating and brilliant interpreter, in order to find something similar in the western linguistic exegesis, one must turn to the conception—in the West connected with the holy scriptures—of a *sensus historicus vel literalis*, different from the *sensus spiritualis*, qui, however, *super litteralem fundatur et eum supponit.* Some passages of the Scriptures, if literally taken, are absurd and meaningless. They must therefore have another sense. Every word of the Scriptures has, as a point of fact, a hidden or spiritual sense. The main difference between India and the West is based on the fact that with us this conception—which goes back to the Alexandrine school and especially to Origines—has remained restricted to the theological speculation. Had it been developed in a literary direction, we would have had a sort of counterpart to the conception of Ānandavardhana. Notwithstanding the undeniable differences, these two conceptions have, however, as a common foundation, the intuition that both the poetical language, and, in another sense, the religious one, do not exhaust themselves in their transitive value, but, using the very words of Paul Valéry, survive to comprehension.

2) St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1, 1, 10.
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6. *Abhinavagupta*. With the only exception of the *Dhvanyāloka*, the theories put forward by Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Nāyaka are known to us through the pen of Abhinavagupta. Abhinavagupta, son of Narasimhagupta, alias Cukhula, was born in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th century, of an illustrious brahmin family. His works in the field of aesthetics are two, namely, the *Abhinavabhāratī*, which is a commentary on the *Nātyaśāstra* and a commentary on Anandavardhana’s *Dhvanyāloka*. The commentary on the *Kāvyakautuka* of Bhaṭṭa Tota, who was his direct master in poetics is now lost. The *Kāvyakautuka* itself has not come down to us. The commentary on Anandavardhana’s *Dhvanyāloka* constitutes one of the most important works of the dhvam school, which Abhinava played a leading role in developing. He accepts and elaborates the core of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s aesthetic ideas, that is, the concept of generalization, but he rejects Nāyaka’s concepts of the aesthetic experience as fruition rather than as knowledge, and of assumption by poetic words of the power of revelation. According to Abhinavagupta, in whose view the dhvam and the Rasa schools are indissolubly merged, Rasa is not revealed, but suggested, or manifested, as Ānandavardhana was wont to say. Aesthetic gustation is nothing but a perception *sui generis*, differing from all others.

Rasa is unique. The division into eight or nine Rasas corresponding to the permanent mental states (according to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta there is indeed a ninth

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1) See below, pp. 49-51.
mental state, Quiet, and then a ninth Rasa, the Quietistic) has only an empirical value. "We think", he says, "that what is enjoyed is consciousness itself, all full of bliss. What suspicion of pain may be here? The feelings of delight, sorrow, etc., deep within our spirit, have only one function, to vary it, and the representation's function is to awake them."

"The aesthetic experience", we have seen in a passage previously quoted, "just as a flower born of magic, has, as its essence, solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came before nor with what comes after". These lines are very important. The state of universality required by Bhatta Nāyaka not only implies the elimination of any measure of time or space, but even of any particular knowing subject. Bhatta Lollâta's question, where lies the Rasa, whether in the actor or in the represented character, for Abhinava is quite nonsensical.

"The Rasa", he says, "does not lie in the actor. But where then? You have all forgotten and I remind you again (of what I have already said). Indeed, I have said that: Rasa is not limited by any difference of space, time and knowing subject. Your doubt is then devoid of sense. But what is the actor? The actor, I say, is the means of the tasting, and hence he is called by the name of "vessel". The taste of wine, indeed, does not stay in the vessel, which is only a means necessary to the tasting of it. The actor then is necessary and useful only in the beginning." This elimination of the

1) A.Bh., I, 292 : asmanmata samvedanam evânandaghanam āsvādyate | tatra kā duhkhaśāṅkā | kevalam tasyaiva citrākārane ratiṣokādiśasanā-nyāpārah | tadubodhane cābhīnayādiśuyāpārah |

2) A.Bh., I, 291 : ata eva-naţe na rasah | kutra tarhi | vismrṭiśilō na(na) bodhyate | uktam hi deśakālapramātrabhedāniyantrito rasa iii | keyaṃ āśāṅkā | naţe tarhi kim | āsvādanaopāyah | ata eva ca pātram ity ucyate |

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singular knowing subjects—that is, of the “practical” personalities of the spectators, different each from the other—is succeeded by a state of consciousness, a “knowing subject” which is, unique, “generalized”, not circumscribed by any determination of space, time, etc. This conception goes deep into the doctrines of the philosophical school, followed by Abhinava. According to it, the differences between the various “ego” are illusory. Actually the “I” or consciousness is unique. The so-called Buddhist Idealism (vijñānavāda), according to which reality is consciousness, but the various individualities or “mental series”, samtāna, are different each from the other, is, to the Śaiva, clearly contradicted by the fact that a thing appears in the same way to more subjects that see it in the same place and time. In other words, two or more subjects that see the same thing are in the same psychic condition, that is, they form a single knowing subject. “When more subjects—said Utpaladeva in a work now lost—are aware of a given thing, f.e., a vessel, in the same place and time, then about this thing, they come to make up an unity”. This state of unity, of course, is not permanent, and, at a certain point, the various limited “I’s”, that came to constitute an unique “I”, again separate themselves. The responsible element of these unions and separations is nothing but the Lord, the liberty of consciousness itself.

This state of unity, which, in various degrees, occurs in
ordinary life also, is specially evident when we are assisting, f. i., to a performance or during certain religious ceremonies (f. i., the tantric cakras), which must be celebrated in common. In these assemblies, the distinction between one’s own Self and the Self of other people, which is founded on the multiplicity of bodies, minds and so on, ceases for the moment to exist, and, beyond them, takes rise a psychological unity, correctly realized as a subject unique and more powerful than the preceding separated individualities. “The consciousness”, says Abhinavagupta in the Tantrāloka, which consists of, and is animated by, all things, on account of the difference of bodies, enters into a state of contraction. But, in public celebrations, it returns to a state of expansion—since all the components are reflected in each other. The radiance of one’s own consciousness in ebullition (i.e., when it is tending to pour out of itself) is reflected in the consciousness of all the bystanders, as if in so many mirrors, and, inflamed by these, it abandons without effort its state of individual contraction. For this very reason, in meetings of many people (at a performance of dancers, singers, etc.), fullness of joy occurs when every bystander, not only one of them, is identified with the spectacle. The consciousness, which, considered separately also, is innately made up of beatitude, attains, in these circumstances—during the execution of dances, etc.—a state of unity, and so enters into a state of beatitude which is full and perfect. In virtue of the absence of any cause for contraction, jealousy, envy, etc. the consciousness finds itself, in these circumstances, in a state of expansion, free of obstacles, and pervaded by beatitude. When, on the other hand, even one only of the bystanders does not concentrate on the spectacle he is looking at, and does not share, therefore, the form of consciousness in which the
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other spectators are immersed, this consciousness is disturbed, as at the touch of an uneven surface. This is the reason why, during the celebration of the cakra, etc., no individual must be allowed to enter who does not identify himself with the ceremonies and thus does not share the state of consciousness of the celebrants; this would cause, in fact, a contraction of the consciousness\(^1\).

These conceptions pose again a problem, namely, which is the relation between the aesthetic and the mystical experience. We have seen that Bhatta Nāyaka likened them each to other. Abhinava, while accepting, on the one hand, the solution put forward by Bhatta Nāyaka, did not fail, on the other, to show up clearly the boundary lines which separate the state of mystical consciousness from that of aesthetic consciousness. Religious experience, he argued, marks the complete disappearance of all polarity, the lysis of all dialexis in the dissolving fire of God: Sun, Moon, day and night, good and evil are consumed in the

1) \textit{Tantrāloka, XXVIII, vv. 373 ff.}:

\begin{verbatim}
samvit sarvātmikā dehabhedād yā samkucet tu sā |
melake 'nyonyasaṅghaṃ praphibimbād vikasvarā || 
ucchalannijaraśmyogah saṃwitsu pratibimbitaḥ |
bahudarpaṇavad diptaḥ sarvāyātāpy ayatnatah ||
ata eva nṛtaṭaprabhītau bahuparśadī |
yah sarvatanmayibhave blādo na tu ekakasya saḥ ||
ānandairbhārā saṃvit pratyekam sā tathākatām |
nṛtaḍau viṣaye prāptā pūrṇānandatvam aṁnute ||
irsyāśūyādisaṃkocakāraṇābhāvato 'tra sā |
vikasvarā niśpratigham samvid ānandayogini ||
atamaye tu kāsimīcit tatrasthe pratibhavyate |
sthapūtasparsavat samvid viṣātyayā sthite ||
ataś cakrārcanādyesu viṣātyam atamayam |
naiya praveśayet saṃvītsaṃkocananibandhanam ||
\end{verbatim}

See below, pp. 56, 57. 

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ardent flame of consciousness. The knots of “I” and “mine” are, in it, completely undone. The yogin remains, as it were, isolated in the compact solitude of his consciousness, far beyond any form of discursive thought. In the aesthetic experience, however, the feelings and the facts of everyday life, even if they are transfigured, are always present. In respect of its proper and irreducible character, therefore, which distinguishes it from any form of ordinary consciousness, the aesthetic experience is not of a discursive order. On the other hand, as regards its content—which is nothing but ordinary life purified and freed from every individual relationship—the aesthetic consciousness is no different from any other form of discursive consciousness. Art is not absence of life—every element of life appears in the aesthetic experience—but it is life itself, pacified and detached from all passions.

Further devotion (which is a preliminary and unavoidable moment of religious experience) postulates the complete abandon of the subject to the object of worship, God, Paramesvara, who, although being immanent and consubstantial, according to Abhinavagupta, with the thought which thinks Him, becomes in the religious moment as if transcendent to it and separate from it.

1) See below, pp. 56 and 82; and I.P.V.V., III, pp. 350-1.
3) The bhakti, religious devotion, is paramesvaravisayavaivaivasamā-teṣarūpā (I.P.V.V., I, p. 25). Cf. p. 82, n. 4, below.
4) In the very moment that thought (vimarṣa, samvit, etc.), which, in reality, is nothing but subject, becomes the object of thought (i.e., when it is taught, meditated upon, etc.), it transforms itself into the images of Ego (aham), Self (atman), Consciousness (samvid), God (Iśvara, Paramesvara, Śiva), etc. This concept is fully developed and discussed in the I.P.V.V., and in the I.P.V., I, 5, sl. 15-17. Cf. also the I.P.V.V., I, pp. 55, 56.
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The purpose of the yogin is to identify himself with this transcendental object. Religious devotion implies therefore a constant drive towards an end which is outside it and, as such, is the very antithesis of the aesthetic experience, which is perfect self-sufficiency.

In every way, whatever the difference between them may be, they spring from the same source. Both are characterized by a state of consciousness self-centered, implying the suppression of any practical desire, and hence the merging of the subject into his object, to the exclusion of everything else. The appearance on the horizon of consciousness of desires, of practical needs, destroys ipso facto the unity of the aesthetic or of the mystical experience. Something is shattered, something cracks within us, and extraneous, dispersive elements penetrate— the so-called "obstacles", vighna, born of the ego's disturbing influence.¹ The aesthetical and mystical bliss, in this sense, is nothing but a state of independence, of liberty from any extraneous solicitation and hence of rest, of "lysis" in our own Self. On this hand, the concepts of rest "lysis", tasting, gustation and bliss, are strictly connected. But let us now listen to Abhinavagupta himself:

1) The vighna, obstacles, are all the extraneous elements which break the unity of a state of consciousness (desires for gain, worry of all kinds, etc.). The same conception is met with in connexion with religious experience. The vighna are defined in the I.P.V.V., I, p. 18: 

vighnantii vilumpanti kartavyam iti vighnah adhyatmikadayo' navadhhanadosadayas trividhopaghatah tadabhisthataras ca devatavisah | "The obstacles obstruct or hinder what one does, this is why they are called obstacles. They are of three kinds (inherent in the perceiving subject, etc.) : lack of attention, etc. The divinities which preside over them are also called obstacles". Their principal source is lack of attention (anavadbana), i.e., the absence of a total rest of the whole being on the object of perception.

2) See above, pp. XXXVIII, XXXIX.

[ XLI ]
"What we call bliss is nothing but a full illumination of one's own being, accompanied by a form of cogitation which pervades all one's own nature, one's own Self. Let us consider, for instance, a man limited by his particular incomplete ego, defiled and contracted by the body and so on, and let us suppose that he feels a sense of vacuity in his body and is then hungry. Longing for food, that is, for something distinguished from himself, will actually occupy all his mind; and therefore, since the self-cogitation of which we have spoken, does not occur in him in all its fullness, he is, as it were, devoid of bliss, bliss consisting in the self-cogitation. Now let us suppose that the belly of that very man becomes full of food. Obviously, in this case, the previous state of unfullness, consisting in the emergence of vacuity, will cease to exist. Soon after, however, he will begin to have new longings (he will desire to embrace women, etc.), that, until that moment, were in a state of latent impressions, because, as Patañjali has said, "the fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others", etc. Owing to this very contact with other desires, such a bliss is then incomplete and, therefore, it is not the supreme bliss. In fact, according to the principle that, 'in the union one fears the future separation', and 'one thing breeds the longing for another', how can it be a source of happiness?", the forms of bliss which we can enjoy in practical life are unable to cut off completely the desire of a thing distinguished from one's Self and this is why they are incomplete bliss. As to the part 'bliss' which is in them, its determinant element is, however, as before, the afore-said self-cogitation. In effect, because of this, Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa has said: 'Let us give a praise to Śiva! All the forms of bliss which may be found here in these three worlds, are only his drops, belonging to him, a very ocean of bliss. (Stavacintāmaṇī, [ XLII ]
Which are these kinds of bliss? One of them, for instance, arises while we are tasting a sweet flavour, etc. The man who is, as it is said, ‘enjoying’, is in a state of consciousness quite different from the one of a hungry man who eats up his food greedily. He rests within himself. In other words, what in such a state is predominant, is not the exterior reality, but the knowing subject. A further form of pleasure, different from the former and devoid of any extrinsic alteration, is tasted when one, either through a poem or a drama, etc., is plunged in some Rasa, as the Erotic one, and so on. Owing to the absence of any possible obstacle (longing for earning, etc.), this pleasure is different from the forms of bliss of practical life, and just because it is devoid of obstacles, it is called Tasting, Delibration, Lysis, Perception, Rest in the nature of the knowing subject. The so-called aesthetic sensibility, the fact of being possessed of heart is caused by this very predominance of the heart,¹ that is, of thought (which gives it its very

1) Not everybody, A.G. observes, has the intrinsic capacity to taste a poem. Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of heart, those who have the consent of the heart (sahṛdaya, hrdayasamvāda-bhāt). The fact of being possessed of heart is defined in the following way (Db.Ā.L., p. 38) : yeṣām kāvyānuśīlaḥ bhāṣyāṣa saḥ visātibhitāḥ manomuk-keśā varṇaṁyatanmayibhavanayogatā te svabhṛdayasamvādabhājāh sahṛdayāḥ | vathoktam (N.Ś., VII, v. 10)

yo 'rthoh hrdayasamvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavah |
śārīrāṁ vṛṣṭyate tena śūkṣmaṁ kāśtham āvāgninā ||

‘The faculty of self-identification with the events represented [the Determinants, etc.,] demands that the mirror of the mind should be made completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with and practice of poetry. The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, are they who have this faculty. For it has been said : ‘the tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart arouses the Rasa. The body is pervaded by it, as dry wood by fire’’. The mind and heart must be mirror-like (viśada, vimala), ready to receive all the images which are
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name), and, at the same time, by a sort of indifference to the part “light”, which consists and rests in the knowable—which however continues to exist. The mental movements that are made the matter of such a Tasting are the nine Rasas. They are devoid of obstacles and consist of a Sampling. The so-called supreme bliss, the lysis, the wonder, is therefore nothing but a tasting, that is, a cogitation in all its compact density, of our own liberty. This liberty is realissima (that is to say, not metaphorical) and inseparable from the very nature of consciousness. We must not, however, forget that in the tasting of a juice of sweet flavour, etc., there is, between this bliss and us, the separating screen, so to say, of the exterior reality. In

reflected in them. vimalamukurakalpibhūtanyakhrdayah, A Bh, p. 37. In the T Ā, III, 200, A G says:

\[
tāthaḥ hi madhure gīte sparśe vā candanaśike \\
maḍhyasthyavatgame yāsau hrdaye spandanānataḥ || \\
ānandaśaktib savōkta yatab sahrdayo janah |
\]

“When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal-wood, etc., the state of indifference (non-participation, impetuousness, etc.), disappears and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration (spandanānataḥ, for the significance of the term spanda, cf. p. 60, n 1) Such a state is precisely the so-called power of beatitude, thanks to which man is ‘gifted with heart’. According to the śaiva of Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc. / 

Elsewhere (A Bh, II, p 339), A G. says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kavibrdayatādāt-myāpattiyaṇayatā). Of course, people whose nature is “gentle (sukumāra)” will have a greater feeling for erotic poetry, people of bolder nature will heroic poetry, etc. Every individual has a particular nature (tendencies, innate instincts, beginningless root desires, vāsanā), according to which he will feel himself more drawn to some poets than to others. “Sensibility” (sahrdayātv.) also plays an important role in religious experience, but in this case we may not talk of aesthetic sensibility, the more correct term being religious sensibility, cf. P. T V., p. 45 ff.
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poetry, in drama, and so on, this screen is actually missing, but it remains in a latent state. Also in these forms of limited bliss, however, those people whose hearts are carefully devoted to cancel the part which performs the function of a screen, succeed in reaching the supreme bliss. "Supreme bliss", it has been said, "may even take place, disclosed by drinking and eating."

The aesthetic and the mystical state of consciousness are not only characterized by a particular bliss or repose. According to Abhinavagupta and his school, they are accompanied by a sense of wonder or surprise. The word expressing this wonder, i.e. *camatkāra* is frequently to be found, in its ordinary, non-technical sense of surprise, amazement, in Indian literature. "It appears to me"—observes V. Raghavan—"that originally the word *camatkāra* was an onomatopoeic word referring to the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste something snappy, and in the course of its semantic enlargements, *camatkāra* came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any feeling of a pleasurable type". The first to use this term in a

1) These last lines introduce us into the very core of the doctrines professed by a mystical school, the so-called Krama, highly esteemed by Abhinavagupta. According to this school the consciousness, the ‘I’ is conceived as a nucleus of energy, nourished by the images offered it by the senses. These must be, as it were, saturated and concentrated into a unique point. Saturation and concentration imply each other. They arise when the senses are absorbed in something, to the exclusion of every other thing. The objects which arouse this state may indifferently be a food, an alcoholic drink, a drug, a sexual contact, a song, a dance, and so on. See on all that my translation of the *Tentrasāra* (Abhinavagupta, *Essenza des Tantra*, Torino 1960), Introd, passim, and the Appendix No 3, wherein I have translated the pp. 45-52 of the *Parāśimskāññavāna*.

technical sense was probably Utpaladeva, who was the master of the master of Abhinavagupta.¹ This word is indeed unknown to the father of the Pratyabhijñā school, Somānanda, and in Ānandavardhana it occurs once only, used in its ordinary sense, without any technical connotation. Its occurrence both in the Yogavāsiṣṭha (cf. the expression cittacamatkāra, which Dasgupta HIPb, p. 236 translates ‘self-flashing of thought’) and in the Agnipurāṇa is of no great significance, because these works are both later than Utpala and may be even than Abhinava. The term camatkāra was used, no doubt, by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but probably, as appears from a passage of the Hṛdayadarpana quoted by Abhinava², not in its technical meaning; and anyhow, he was later than Utpala. In the Spanda School (Vasugupta, etc.) an idea very like to that expressed by camatkāra is conveyed by the word vismaya, astonishment. The yogin is penetrated by astonishment. The yogic stages are astonishment³. The general idea underlying these words (compare, in this connection, also the Pāli and buddhist term samvega) is that both the mystical and the aesthetic experience imply the cessation of a world—the ordinary, historical world, the samsāra—and its sudden replacement by a new dimension of reality. In this sense the two are wonder or surprise. A parallel of this idea of a kind of wonder which fills the soul in front of the beautiful or of the scared, exists in the western thought also. We find it in Plato and especially in Neoplatonismus. “Souls”, Plato says, “when they see here any likeness

¹) See, f.i., the commentary to the Śvadrṣṭi, I, 8, Śivastotrāvali, p. 41.
²) Locana, comm. on II, 1.
³) See Śivasūtra, I, 12: vismaya yogabhūmikā. According to the M.V.V., II, 99, the yogin is vismayaśvistab.
of the things of that other world, are stricken with wonder, 
κρατήριανται and can no longer control themselves” (Phaidros, 250a). According to Proclus, this sense of amazement, 
τρίχη, accompanies both the beautiful and the sacred. 
“The beautiful, he says in the Theologia Platonica, is 
appearing with wonder μετ' ἐκπλήξεως φαινόμενον, and incites 
all the things towards itself through desire and wonder.” In 
the same work we read eventually that “we are incited 
towards the beautiful with wonder and emotion” and that 
“the soul, seeing the invisible, as it were, rejoices itself, 
admires its appearing, and is astonished at it. And as the mys-
tics in the most saint religious rites, before the mystical visions, 
are stricken with wonder, so, among the intelligibles also, the 
beautiful appears in advance, before the communion with the 
good, and strikes with wonder them who are seeing.”

According to Abhinavagupta and his school, this wonder 
is present, in a broader sense, in every form of life, it is like 
consciousness itself, the element which distinguishes cons-
sciousness or spirit from inanimate matter. Aesthetic sensibi-
ity, as Abhinava says, is nothing but a capacity of wonder 
more elevated than the ordinary one. An opaque heart does 
not wonder, non obstupescit. The appearance of the beautiful 
does not arouse in it any shock (κσαβᾶ) or wonder.

1) Theologia Platonica, Frankfurt, 1608, p 51 :

2) Ibid, p 151 :

3) Parâtrimikâvanarana, p. 49.
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While the aesthetic experience, which concerns the spectator first of all, was receiving so much attention, Indian thought did not neglect to examine the creative moment, in which the poet gives life and breath to his work. The chief thinkers to study the nature of the birth of a work of poetry were Ānanda-vardhana and Bhaṭṭa Tota and later Abhinavagupta, his direct disciple.

"In the boundless samsāra of poetry"—writes Ānanda-vardhana—"the poet is the true and sole Creator (lit., Prajā-pati); as it pleases him to create, so the whole is transformed. If the poet is pervaded by Rasa in his poem, the whole world will be suffused by Rasa. But if he be void of emotion, the world too will be void of Rasa. A good poet, by virtue of his independence, freely designs even insentient objects to act as sentient ones and sentient objects to act as insentient ones."

The same comparison with the Creator, Prajāpati has also been reproduced by Abhinavagupta. "Like the Creator", he says in the Abhinavabhārati, 1, 4, "the poet creates for himself a world according to his wish. Indeed, he is amply endowed with the power of creating manifold, extraordinary things, originating thanks to the favour of the Deity, the Supreme Vocality, called pratibhā, and continually shining within his heart." The poet is at once he who sees (the seer, ṛṣi) and he who is able to express in words that which he sees. The famous stanzas by Bhaṭṭa Tota quoted by Hemacandra, Kāvyānvsāsana, p. 379, state very clearly that the poet must have this double quality and bear quotation. "It has been said that no non-seer can be deservingly called a poet, and one is a seer only by virtue of his

1) Db.Ā., III, 43.

2) On this term, see below, p. 49, n, 4 and J. Gonda, The Vision of the Vedic Poets. The Hague 1963, pp. 318-43,
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Vision is the power of disclosing intuitively the reality underlying the manifold materials in the world and their aspects. To be termed a "poet" in the authoritative texts it is enough to be possessed of this vision of reality. But in everyday speech the world accords that title to him alone who possesses vision as well as expression. Thus, though the first poet (i.e., Vālmīki) was highly gifted with enduring and clear vision, he was not hailed as a poet by people until he embodied it in a descriptive work." Rasa belongs, in reality, to the poet alone; it is nothing but his "generalized" consciousness. "The activity of the actor", says Abhinava in the Abhinavabhāratī, 1, 294", is depending on the poem and it is rooted in the generalized consciousness of the poet. Rasa, in reality, is nothing but this consciousness. The spectator also, in the beginning, is enchanted by this perception. The determinants, etc., are perceived by him only at a later time, thanks to a subsequent analysis. This is the purpose of Bharata. Thus, as regards the dramatic performance, the poem or the mind of the spectator, the root is only this, viz., the Rasa which lies within the poet. This is, as it were, the seed. The poet is, indeed, comparable to the spectator, for, as Ānandavardhana said, "if the poet is pervaded by Rasa, etc. (see above, p. XLVIII). The poem, for its part, is, so to say, the tree. The activity of the actor, that is, representation, etc., is, as it were, the flower, and the tasting of the spectators, the fruit. Therefore, all is pervaded by Rasa. Rasa fills the poet entirely with itself,

1) See also Gonda, op. cit., p. 338.
2) A.Bh., I, p. 294: kavigatasādhāryānīsūtatāmatvānāmūlaś ca kavyapurāś-
saro natavyāpārah [sava ca sanvit paramārthato rasah | sāmājikasya ca tatpra-
tityā vaśikrtasya pascād apoddhārabuddhyā vibhāvādirpratītir iti prayojanam | nāthe kāve sāmājikadhyāya ca tad eva mūlaṃ bijajātāya kavigato rasah | kavir hi sāmājikatulya eva | tata evoktam śṛngāti cet kavih ityādi ānandavardhanācāryena

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and is spontaneously translated into poetic expression, like a liquid which overflows a vase—"if a pot is not full, it cannot overflow"—or like the natural manifestation of a state of mind (interjections, exclamations, etc.)¹. In other words, artistic creation is the direct or unconventional expression of a feeling or passion "generalized", that is, freed from all distinctions in time and space, and therefore from all individual relationships and practical interest by an inner force within the poet himself, the creative or artistic intuition, pratibhā. This state of consciousness expressed in the poem, etc., is transferred to the actor or the reciter, and to the spectator. All three—poet, actor and spectator—, in the serene contemplation of the work of art, form in reality a single knowing subject, merged together by the same sensations and the same purified joy².

The use of the term pratibhā in Indian poetics is very old, and, before Abhinavagupta, we find it in various authors of treatises on poetics, as, f.i., Bhāmaha (7th century), Daṇḍin (7th century) and Vāmana (8th century). According to these authorities, pratibhā is, in brief, a sort of unborn genius, imagination or quick-wittedness, etc. conceived as the primary cause of excellence in literary art³, as the very seed of poetry⁴. This intuition, to Rājaśekhara (9th century) is not limited to the poet, kavi. According to him, the word pratibhā has the double sense of creative imagination, genius, inspiration, kārayitrī

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tato vrksasthānīyam kavyam | tatra puṣpādibhānyyo ’bhinayādiyāpārah | tatra phalasthānīyāḥ sāmāyikarasāvādāḥ | tena rasamayam eva viśvam |
1) Locana, comm. to I, 5.
2) Cf., f.i., the verse by Bhaṭṭa Tota, quoted by A.G., (Locana, comm. on I, 6) : nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuh samāno ’nubhavas tataḥ |
3) Cp. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālamkāra, 1, 5, and Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarsa, 1, 103.
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[ L ]
pratibhā, and of aesthetic sensibility, here conceived in the terms of an active power which permits the manifestation of Rasa, bhāvayitrī pratibhā. All these descriptions of pratibhā, however, were superseded by the definition laid down by the master of Abhinava, Bhaṭṭa Tota. “Intuition”, he says, “is a form of intuitive consciousness, prajñā, which is an inexhaustible source of new forms. It is by virtue of this intuition alone that one deserves the title of ‘poet’, of one, that is, who is skilful to express”. This definition of pratibhā came to be accepted and quoted in later times by almost all of the Indian rhetoricians. Abhinava himself did not add very much to it and limits himself to stress the fact that pratibhā does not exhaust itself in the poetical intuition, but is, in a broader sense, the same consciousness, the same Self.

In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns with a purified light—to shine out finally in all its fullness in the intuition of the saints.

2) This stanza was a part of the Kāvyakautuka, a work not extant now. It is quoted, with some variants, by many writers, either anonymously or mentioning the source by name. Cf. f.i. Hemacandra, p. 3; Māṇikya-candra, p. 7. The text runs as follows:

prajñā navanavollekaśālimi pratibhā mataḥ |
tadānuprāṇāṇājwadvānāṇātipuṣṭḥ kaviḥ

3) This concept is expressed in the T.Ā., XI, pp. 60-62 (cf. M.V.V., vv. 1031 onwards):

yathā yathā cākṛtakam tadrūpam atiricyate |
tathā tathā camatkāratāratamyaṃ vibhāvate ||
ādyāmayāyavarṇāntāntāmagnēcottarottare |
sanketa pūrvapūrvāmāmaye pratibhābhidaḥ ||
ādyodrekaṁbattve’pi pratibhātmanī nisthitāḥ ||
dhrvam kavitvavaktrtvāśālitām yānti sarvataḥ ||
yāvad dhāmau sanketānākārakalanajjhite |
viśrāntaś cinmaye kīṁ kīṁ na vetti na karoti ca ||
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In brief, artistic intuition is a particular hypostasis of universal or total intuition, that is to say, of consciousness as a force which creates and continually renews the Universe.\(^1\)

After Abhinavagupta, the study of aesthetics continued in India up to the present day, but without receiving much creative stimulus. Ānandavardhana, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Bhaṭṭa Tota and Abhinava are still the most characteristic exponents of this subject and their thought, although at times uncertain and ingenuous, reaches, with the latter, conclusions which are still valid today and even relatively novel to western thought. The conception of art as an activity and an independent spiritual experience, freed of practical interests, which the intuition of Kant perceived for the West, was already, in 10th century India, an object of study and controversy. Poetry, said Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta is inextinguishable: it exists and will exist for ever. Like love, it has kindled and will continue to kindle the hearts of men with new and pulsing life;\(^2\) it is an essential and independent part of human nature and the poets, who will never cease to tap its source, far from exhausting it, only purify and enrich it with new and ever-changing experiences.\(^3\)

1) Ānandavardhana (Dh.Ā, p. 91) says that poetic intuition is a particular form of pratibhā (pratibhāvisesam). A.G.'s comment (Dh.Ā.L., p. 92) is:

\[
\text{pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāyaksamā prajñā | tasya viśepo}
\]
\[
\text{rasāvesavasadyasaundaryam kāvyaksamatvam ||}
\]

The concept of pratibhā is identified in śāvda metaphysics with that of consciousness as creative emission (visarga); cf., p. es., T.Ā., V., p. 432:

\[
\ldots \text{visargānandabhārayā | siktam tad eva sad viśvam śaivad navaṉa-}
\]
\[
vāyate ||
\]

2) Dh.Ā.L., p. 540.

3) Dh.Ā, pp. 545-6.
TEXT

[A. Bh., I, pp. 274-287]
evam kramahetum abhidhāya rasaviṣayalakṣaṇasūtram āha
"vibhāvānubhāvavyahicārisamyogād rasanispattiḥ" | atra
bhatṭalollataprabhātayas tāvad evam vyācakhyuḥ | vibhā-
vādibhiḥ samyogo 'ṛthāt sthāyinah, tato rasanispattiḥ | tatra
vibhāvaś cittavṛtteḥ sthāyyātmikāyā utpattau kāraṇam | anu-
bhāvāś ca na rasajanyā atra vivakṣitāh, teṣām rasakāraṇatvena
ganānānaḥkhatvāt, api tu bhāvānām eva ye 'nubhāvāḥ | vyabhi-
cārīnaḥ ca cittavṛttyātmakatvād yady api na sahaṃbhāvinah
sthāyinā, tathāpi vāsanātmateha tasya vivakṣitā | dṛṣṭānte
'pi vyānjanānimadhye kasyacid vāsanātmakata sthāyivid anya-
syodbhūtatā vyabhicārīvat | tena sthāyy eva vibhāvānubhāvā-
dibhir upacito rasaḥ | sthāyī bhavatvānupacitāḥ | sa cobh-
hayor api anukārye 'nukartary api cānusamdhānabalād iti³
| cirantanānām cāyam eva pakṣāḥ | tathā hi danḍinā svālāṃ-
kāralakṣāne 'bhyaḍhāyī " ratīḥ śrīgāratām gataḥ rūpaṃbhulya-
yogena"³ ³ iti,
ity āruhyā⁴ parām koṭiṃ kopo raudrātmatām gataḥ | ityādi ca |
etan neti śrīśaṅkaukaḥ⁵ | vibhāvādyayoṣe sthāyino liṅgā-
ḥavenāvagatyanupapatteḥ, bhāvānāṃ pūrvaṃ abhidheyatā-
prasāṅgat, sthitadsāyām lakṣaṇāntaravaiyarthāt, mandatara-
tamāmadhyasthāyādyānanyāpatteḥ, hāsyarase śoḍhātvābhāva-

¹bhavatv G, M; tv Hc 13, ² sa cobhayor api anukārye 'nukartary
api cānusamdhānabalād iti G, M, the text of Hc is here somewhat enlarged,
sa cobhayor api mukhyaya vṛttyā rāmādāv anukārye 'nukartary ca nate rāmādirū-
pataṃsambhānabalād iti II 17, ³ KAD, II, v. 281, prāk pritiṃ darśītā sayam
ratīḥ śrīgāratām gataḥ | rūpāḥbhulya-yogena tad idam rasavād vacaḥ || ⁴ KAD.
II, v. 283 ity āruhya (Bohtlingk's ed.) : adhiruhyā G : āruhya M, corrected
in a second hand into adhiruhyā : āruhya ca Hc || ⁵ From this 1. to 1.14
the text has been freely paraphrased and enlarged by Hc ||
präpteḥ, kāmāvasthāsu daśasv asanākhyarasabhaśvādiprasaṅgāt, sokaṣya prathamaṃ tīrṇatvaṃ kālāt tu māndyadarśanaṃ, krodhottaratiṃhām amarṣasthairiyasevāviparyaye hrāsadarsaṃ iti viparyayasya drśyaṁānatvāc ca | tasmād dhetevhir vibhāvākhyaiḥ kāryaiḥ cānubhāvātmaḥbhīḥ sahacārīrūpiṣ ca vyabhicārībhīḥ prayatnārjitatayā kṛtrimair api tathānabhi-mānyamānaṃ anukṛtṛṣṭhatvena liṅgabalataḥ pratiyamānaḥ sthāyī bhāvo mukhyarāmadigasthāyyanukaraṇarūpaḥ, anu-karaṇarūpatvād eva ca nāmāntarena vyapadīṣto rasaḥ | vibhāva hi kāvyabalād anusaṃdheyaḥ, anubhāvaḥ sīkṣātaḥ, vyabhicārīṇaḥ kṛtrimaniṇīnuḥ bhāvārjanabalat | sthāyī tu kāvyabalād api nānusaṃdheyaḥ | ratīḥ soka ityādayo hi śabdā ratyādikam abhidheyyākurvantvābhisvaratvatvena, na tu vācikā-bhinayaśupatyāvgamayanti | na hi vāg eva vācikam api tu tayā nirvṛttam, āṅgār ivāṅgikam | tena |

vāḍaveneva jaladhiḥ sokaḥ krodhena piyate | iti | tathā |

sokaṇa kṛtastambhās

tathā sthito yo 'navasthitākrandaiḥ |

ityevamādau na soka 'bhineyo 'pi tv abhidheyaḥ |

bhāti patito likhantyā

1 kāvyabalād Hc : kāvyabalā G,M || 2 Untouched source; the first two pādas have been given by Hc and read as follows, vivṛddhātmāpy agādho 'pi duranto 'pi mabān api || 3 kṛtastambhas Hc : kṛtaḥ stambhah G, M || 4 yo 'navasthitākrandaiḥ G : yo 'vasthitākrandaiḥ M : yena vardhita-krandaiḥ Hc. The two last pādas of this stanza, whose source I have not succeeded in identifying, are given by Hc and read as follows, hṛdaya-sphutānabhāyārti roditum (a.l., orted arditum) abhyarthaye sacvāṣaḥ || 5 This is Harsa, Ratnavali, II, 11; the complete stanza runs as follows, bhāti patito likhantyās tayā bāṣpāmbuṣikaraṇaṇaṃbhāḥ | svedodgama va karatu lasamsparśād eṣa me vapusi ||
The Aesthetic Experience, Etc.

Ity anena tu vākyena svārtham abhidadhata udayanagataḥ sukhaṁma ratiḥ sthāyībhāvo 'bhīniyate na tūcyate | avagama-
naśaktir hy abhinayanām vācakatyād anyā | ata eva sthāyipa-
daṁ sūtre bhinnavighaktikam api munīnā noktam | tena tatār
ānukritiyamāṇā śringāra iti tadātmakatvām tatprabhavatvam ca
yuktam | arthakhriyāpi mithyājñānād drstā 1 | na cātra nartaka
eva sukhitī pratipattiḥ, nāpy ayam eva rāma iti, na cāpy
ayam na sukhitī, nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti, 2 na cāpi
tatsadṛśa iti 3 | yah sukhī rāma asāv ayam iti pratītir astīti |
tad 4 āha |

pratibhāti na samdeho na tattvam na viparyayah |
dhīr asāv ayam ity asti nāsāv evāyam ity api ||
viruddhabuddhyasambheded 5 avivecitasamplavaḥ 6 |
yuktyā paryānyyuyeta sṛbhūr annubhavah kāyā || iti |
tad idam aśpy antastattvāśūṇyam na vimardakṣamam ity
upādhyāyāḥ 7 | tathā hy anukaranarūpo rasa iti yad ucyeate tat
1) kim śāmājikapatītyaḥbhīpṛayena, 2) uta nāṭābhīpṛayena,
3) kim vā * vastuvṛttavivekacakavyākhyātibuddhisamavalamban-
ena yathāhur " vyākhyaṁ tāraḥ khalv evam vivecyanti 8 " iti,
4) atha bhāratamunivacanānuśānaṁ |

1) tatrādyah 9 pakṣo śaṁgataḥ | kimcid dhi pramāne-
nopaladbham tad anukaraṇam iti śakyaṁ vaktum | yathā
evam asau surām pibatīti suṛāpānānukaraṇatvena payalpaṁ
pratyakṣāvalokitam pratibhāti | iha ca nāṭagatam kim tad

1 Hc adds here one stanza of Dharmakīrti, PV, II, 57, manipradipa-
prabhayor manabuddhyābhīdāvatoḥ | mithyājñānāviśeṣe 'pi viśeṣo' rthakriyām
prati || 2 nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti G, Hc : omitted in M ||
3 After kim tu Hc adds samyamithyāsādāśyapratitibhyo vikalpanā
tīcāturaragādīnayena || 4 tad G,M ; ya'd Hc || 5 buddhiyasambheded Hc :
buddhisambheded G, M || 6 samplavaḥ G, M : 0vplavaḥ Hc ||
upādhyāyaḥ G : upādhyāyaḥ M : bhāttatotah Hc || 8 This is Dharmakīrti,
PV, Svavṛttī, p. 39 (ed. Gnoli) || 9 tatrādyah Hc, M : ādyah G ||
upalabdham yat sa ity anukaranatayāḥ bhātīti cintyam |
tacchārīram tanuṣṭham pratiṣṭrakādi romāṇacakagadgadikādiḥ |
 bhujākṣepacalanaprabhṛtaḥ bhrukṣepakatāksādikam ca na ratēs |
cittavṛttirūpatayāḥ nukāratvena kasyacit prathbhāti | jaçatvena |
 bhinnendriyagṛhayatvena bhinnadhikaranatvena ca tato |
*tivailaksāṇyāt | Mukhyāmukhyāvalokane ca tadanukarana- |
 pratibhāsah | na ca rāmagatām ratim upalabdhapūrvināh |
 kecit etena rāmānukārī na ta ity api nirastah pravādaḥ |
 atha na taçatā tattvātra samākṣaṃkataḥvena sa pratiyata iti | cintyam |
nanu pramadādibhiḥ kāranaih kāṭāksādibhiḥ kāryaiḥ |
dhṛtyādibhiṣ ca sahaçāribhir lingabhūtair yā laukikī kāryarūpā |
kāraṇarūpā sahaçāriśrūpā ca cittavṛttiḥ pratiyogyā tadāmat- |
kataḥvena sa nātacittavṛttiḥ prathbhātiḥ | hanta tarhi ratyākārenaiva |
sa pratipanetī duṇyata ratyanukaranaśvācobyuktāḥ | nanu vibhā- |
vādayo 'nukārye pāramārthikāḥ iha tv anukartā na tatheti |
viśeṣaḥ | astv evam, kim tu te vibhāvādayo tatāraṇātatakā- |
ryātatsahacararuṇa api kāvyāśikṣādibalopakalpitāḥ kṛtramāh |
santaḥ kim kṛtramātvena sāmājikair grhyante na vā | yadi |
grhyante, tādā tāḥ katham rater avagatiḥ | nanv ata eva tat |
pratīyamānaṃ ratyanukaranam | mugdhabuddhe kāraṇān- |
The aesthetic experience, etc.

Taraprabhava hi kārye suśikṣītena 1 tathājñāne vastvantarasyañumānaṁ tāvad yuktam | asuśikṣītena 2 tu tasyaiva prasiddhasya kāraṇasya | yathā 3 vṛścikaviśeṣād gomayasyaivānuṁānaṁ vṛścikasyaiva 4 tat param mithyājñānaṁ | yatrāpi liṅgajñānaṁ mithyā tatrāpi na tadābhāsānumānaṁ yuktam 5 | na hi bāspād dhūmatvena jñātād anukārapratibhāsamanād api liṅgāt tadanukārānumānaṁ yuktam | dhūmānukāratvena hi jñāyamānaṁ nīhārān nāgnyanukārajāpāpuṇjaṇapratītī 6 drṣṭā | *nanv akruddho *pi nataḥ kruddha iva bhāti | satyam, kruddhena sadṛśaḥ | sadṛśyaṁ ca bhru kutyādibhir gor 7 iva gavyena mukhādibhir iti naitāvatānukāraḥ kaścit | na cāpi sāmājikānāṁ sadṛśyamatir asti | sāmājikānāṁ ca na bhāvasūṇyā nartake pratipattir ity ucayate | atha ca tadanukārapratibhāsa iti rūktā vācoyuktīḥ | yac coktaṁ rāmo 'yam ity asti pratipattīḥ, tad api yadi tadātve 8 tiniścitam taduttarakālabhāvābhāśhakavedhuryābhāvē katham na tattva-jñānaṁ syāt | bādhkasadbhāve vā katham na mithyā-jñānaṁ | vāstavena ca vrīttena bādhakānudaye 'pi mithyā-jñānaṁ eva syāt | tena "viruddhabuddhyasambhedād 9" ity aṣat | nartakāṅtare 'pi ca 10 rāmo 'yam iti pratipattir asti | tataś ca rāmatvaṁ sāmānyarūpam ity āyātam | yac cocoṭe vibhāvāḥ kāvyād anusāṃdhīyante tad api na vidmaḥ | na hi nameyam sītā kācid iti svātmāyatvena pratipattir nāṭasya | atha sāmājikasya tathā pratītyogāḥ kriyanta ity

etad evānusāṃdhānam ucyate, tarhi sthāyini suṭarām anu-
sāṃdhānam syāt | tasyaiva hi mukhyatvena asminn ayam
iti sāmājikānāṃ pratipattiḥ | yas tu vāg vācikam ityādinā
bhedābhidhānasāṃrāmbhagarbho mahīyān abhinayarūpatā-
vivekaḥ kṛtaḥ sa uttaratra svāvasare carcayiṣyate | tasmāt
sāmājikapratītityanuṣāreṇa sthāyyanukaraṇāṃ rasa ity asat |

2) na cāpi nātasyetthām pratipattiḥ rāmaṃ taccittavṛttīṃ
vānukaromīti | sadṛśakaraṇām hi tāvad anukaraṇām anupala-
bdhaprakṛtīnaī na śakyaṃ kartum ] atha paścātkaṇaṃ anukaraṇām,
tal loke ṭy anukaraṇātmatatiprasaktā ] atha na niyatasya kasyacid anukāraḥ, api tuttamaprakṛteḥ śokam
anukaromīti, tarhi keneti cintyam ] na tāvac chokena tasa
tadbhāvāt ] na cāsrupātādīna śokasyānukāraḥ, tadvailak-
śanyād ity uktam | iyat tu ṭy, uttamaṇaprakṛteḥ ye śokā-
nubhāvās tān anukaromīti | tatrāpi kasyottamaprakṛteḥ |
yasya kasyacid iti cet, so'pi viśiṣṭatāṃ vinā katham buddhāv
āropayitum śakyaḥ ] ya evam roditi cet, svātmāpi madhye
nātasyānupraviṣṭa iti galito 'nukāryānukartṛbhāvaḥ | kim
ca nāṭaḥ sīksāvaśāt svavibhāvasmaranāc cittavṛttaśādharanī-
bhāvena hṛdayasāṃvādāt kevalam anubhāvān pradarśayan
kāvyam ucita kākuprabhṛtyupaskāreṇa paṭhaṃś ceṣṭata ity
etāvanmātre 'syā pratītir na tv anukāraṃ vedayate |
kāntaveśānukāravad dhi na rāmaceṣṭitasāyānukāraḥ | etac ca
prathamādhhyāye 'pi darśitam āsabhīḥ |

1 etad G,M : etāvad Hc || 2 yas tu : yat tu G,M || 3 garbbo :
0garbho G,M || 4 rasa G,M : rasā Hc || 5 prakṛtīna G,Hc :
0prakṛtīnaṃ M || 6 anukaromīti Hc : anukrota G,M || 7 iyat tu
G,M : yat tu Hc || 8 kevalam G,M : kevalān Hc || 9 ucita Hc,
M : upacita G || 10 etāvanmātre 'syā G,M : etāvanmātrasya Hc ||
11 pratītir G, Hc : pratītum M || 12 Cf. ABb, I, p. 37 (infra,
App. I, p. 98) ||
3) nāpi vastuvṛttānusārena¹ tadānukāratvam, asaṃvedya-
mānasasya² vastuvṛttatvānudpapatteḥ | yac ca vastuvṛttam tad
dārsayiṣyāmaḥ³ |

4) na ca munivacanam evaṃvidham asti kvacit sthā-
yanukaraṇam rasā iti | * nāpi liṅgam atrārthe muner upala-
bhaye | prayuta dhruvāgānatālavacitryalāśyāṅgopajīvanam
nirūpanādi viparyaye liṅgam iti samdhyaṅgādhyāyānte vita-
niṣyāmaḥ⁴ | “saptadvipānukaraṇam⁵” ityādi tv anyathāpi
śākyagamanikam iti | tadānukāre ’pi ca kva nāṃtaram
kāntavesagatyanukaraṇād⁶ |

yac cocyate varṇakair haritālādibhīḥ saṃyuyamāna eva
gaur ityādi, tatra yady abhivyajyamāna ity artho 'bhipretas
tad asat | na hi sindūradibhīḥ pāramārthikho gaur abhivyajyate
pradīpādibhir iva, kiṃ tu tatsadṛśaḥ samūhaviśeṣo nirvartyate|
ta eva⁷ hi sindūradayō gavāvayavasanniveṣapradṛśena saṃni-
vesaviśeṣenāsvasthitā gosādṛg iti pratibhāsaya viṣayō naivam
vibhāvādisamūhō ratisadṛṣatāpratipattigrāhyāḥ | tasmāt bhā-
vānukaraṇāṃ rasā ity asat |

yena tv abhyadhāyī sukhaduḥkhajanaṇaśaktiyyuktā viṣaya-
āsāmārā bāhyāviva sāmkhyadṛśā sukhaduḥkhavabhāvo rasāḥ |
tasyaṃ ca sāmargyāṃ dalasthānīyā vibhāvāḥ, sāṃskārākā
anubhāvavyabhicārīṇāḥ, sthāyīnas tu tatsāmāgrījanyā āntarāḥ
sukhaduḥkhavabhāvā iti | tena “sthāyibhāvān rasatvam
upaneṣyāma⁸” ityādāv upacāram aṅgikurvata granthaviro-
dham svayam eva budhyāmānena duṣanāviṣkaraṇāmaukha-
tyāt⁹ prāmāṇiko janah¹⁰ parirakṣita iti kim asyocayte | yat tv

¹ vastuvṛttānusārena G,Hc : vastuvṛttānusārena M || ² asaṃvedyaṃśānasya
Hc : anusaṃvedyaṃśānasya G,M, || ³ Cf. infra, p. 00 || ⁴ Cf. ABh, III,
ch. XIX || ⁵ NS, I, v. 120 || ⁶ 'nukaraṇād : 'nukaraṇādu G,M M ||
⁷ 'a eva Hc : āta eva G, M || ⁸ NS, prose after v. 45 ||
⁹ 'maukharaṇāt Hc : 'maukharaṇāt G, M || ¹⁰ prāmāṇiko janah G,M :
prāmāṇikajanah Hc ||
anyat 1 tatpratītivaišamyaprasāṅgādī tat kiyad 2 atrocyatāṃ | bhaṭṭanāyaṅkas tv āha | raso na pratīyate, notpadaye, nābhivyajyate | svagatatvena hi pratītāu karunē duḥkhit-vam syāt | na ca sā pratītīr yuktā sitāder avībhāvatvāt, svakāntāṃśṛtyasamvedanāt, devatādau sādhārāṃkaraṇāyogyatvāt, samudrollaṅghanāder asādhāranyaḥ | na ca tadvato 3 rāmasya smṛtir anupalabdhavatvāt | na ca śabdānumāṇādibhyas tatpratītāu lokasya yuktā 4 pratyakṣād īva | nāyaka-yugalakāvabhāse hi pratyuta lajjājugupsāṣṭhādisvocitacitta-vṛttyantarodayavyagratayā kā sarasatvakathāpi syāt 5 | tan na pratītīr 6 anubhavasmṛtyādīrūpā rasasya yuktā | utpattāv api tulyam etad dūṣaṇām | saktirūpatvena pūrvaṃ sthitasya paścād abhivyaktuṃ viṣayāṛjanatāratamyāpattīḥ | svagata-7-paragatatvādi ca pūrvaṇa vikalpyam | tasmāt kāvye doṣā-bhāvagunālaṃkāramayatvalaṅkṣaṇena, nātye caturvidhābhina-yarūpeṇa nivṛṇjanimohasanāṃkāṣṭaṭāniṃvāraṇaṅkāriṇā 8 vibhāvadāsādārāṃkaraṇātmanābhīdhāto dvitiyenaṁśena bhāvakatva-vyāpāreṇa bhāvyāmāno * raso 'nubhavasmṛtyādīvīlakṣaṇena rajastamono'nuvedhaṇaicitryabalād | drutivistāra 9 vikāsātmanā | sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayanijanisāṃvidviśrāntiṅkṣaṇena para-brahmāṁśvādāsavidhena bhogaṇa paraṁ bhujyaṇa iti 10 |

1 yat tv anyat tat Hc : yat tv atyantam nah G,M || 2 tat kiyad Hc : tat kim yad G,M || 3 tadvato G, M : tattvato Hc || 4 sarasatā yuktā Hc : sarasatā prayuktā G,M (for sarasatā pī yuktā ?) || 5 kā sarasatvakathāpi syāt Hc : kasarasatvamāhāpyāt G,M || 6 Before tan na pratītīr, etc. Hc adds the following sentence, paragatatvena tu pratītāu tātasthyam eva bhavet || 7 svagata 0 Hc, M : svagatava 0 G || 8 samkāta-tāṇvāraṅkāriṇā Hc : samkātaṅkāriṇā G,M, equally possible || 9 vistārā 0 G,M : vistāra 0 Hc || 10 After bhujyaṇa iti Hc adds the words yat sa evāha, followed by two stanzas, surely borrowed from the lost Hṛdayadarpana, abhīdā bhāvana cāṅyā tadbhogikētīr (alia lectio, tadbhogikētam) eva ca | abhi-dābhānuṁyāte sābdārthālaṁkṛtiṁ tārāḥ || bhāvanaḥbhāvyā eso pī śṛngārādugano mataḥ (alia lectio, hi yat) | tadbhogikētrandepa vyāpyāte siddhimān narāḥ ||
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

tatra pūrvapakṣo 'yam bhaṭṭalollatapakṣanabhyupagamād eva nābhhyupagata iti taddūṣanam anutthānopahatam eva | pratītyādivyatiriktaś ca saṃsāre ko bhoga iti na vid-mah | rasaneti cet, sāpi pratipattir eva, kevalam upāyavai-laksanyān nāmāntaram pratipadyatām, darśanānumitiśrutyupamitipratibhānādināmāntaravat | nispādanābhivyakti-dvāyānabhyupagame ca nityo vā 'san vā rasa iti na tīṭāyā gatih syāt | na cāpratītīm vastv asti vyavahāre yogyam | athocytate pratītīr asya bhogikaraṇam, tāc ca drutyādisvarūpam | tad astu, tathāpi na tāvanmātram | yāvantohi rasaś tāvatya eva rasanātmānah pratītayo bhogikaraṇasvabhāvāḥ | guṇānām cāṅgāṅgivaicitryam anantuṃ kalpyam itī kā tri-tveneyattā |

bhāvanābhāvyā eso 'pi śṛṅgārādīgana bi yat

iti tu yat kävyena bhāvyante rasa ity ucyate, tatra vibhāvā-dijanitacarvanātmakāsvāḍarūpapratyayagocaratāpādanam eva yadi bhāvanam tad abhyupagamyata eva | yat tūktam |

bhāvasamyojanānyaṅyaṅparasamvittigocarāh |
āsvādanātmānubhavo rasah kāvyārtha ucyate

\[1\] 'san Hc : 'sad G,M || \[2\] gatiḥ syāt Hc : gatiḥ asyāṃ G : gatiḥ asyāṃ M || \[3\] asti vyavahāre yogyam G,M : asitāvyavahārayogym Hc || \[4\] pratītīr asya Hc : pratītīr iti tasya G : pratītīr iti rasya (for rasya ?) M, which reading is equally possible || \[5\] drutīyādisvarūpam Hc : bhūtīyādisvarūpam G,M. || \[6\] rasanātmānah G, M : rasātmānah Hc || \[7\] guṇānām G,M : this is explained by Hc by satīvadguṇānām || \[8\] ḍaṇo hi yat Hc : ḍaṇo bhayat G (corrected into hi yat), M || \[9\] iti tu yat Hc : iti yat G,M || \[10\] This stanza is quoted in this form in the Vyaktiviveka, p. 67 (read parasamvittī for parasamvittī). Both in G and M we read in the first pāda samvedanākhyā (corrected into samvedanākhyāyā in G), which is quite nonsensical. Hc quotes a different stanza : samārgādir yathā śāstra ekatvāt phalayośatāh | vākyārthaś tadvad evātra śṛṅgārādi raso mataḥ || iti tad asmākam abhimatam eva ||
iti tatra vyajyamānatayā vyaṅgyo rakṣyate | anubhavena ca tadviśaya iti mantavyam | nany evaṃ katham rasatattvam | āstām, kim kurmah |

āmnāyasiddhe kim apūrvam etat  
samvidvikāse 'dhigatāgamītvam |  
ittham suyayamgrāhyamaharhabhetu-  
dvandvena kim dūṣayitā na lokāḥ ||  

āśā, kim kurmah ||
*ūrdhvordhvam āruhya yad arthatattvam  
dūḥ paśyati śrāntim avedayanti |  

phalam tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānām  
vivekasopānaparamparānāṁ ||  

citraṁ nirālambanam eva manye  
prameyasindhau 2 prathamāvatāram |  
tanmārgalābhe sati setubandha-  

purapratiṣṭhādi na vismayāya ||  
tasmāt satām atra na dūṣitānī  
matāni tāny eva tu śodhitānī |  

pūrvapratiṣṭhāpitayojanāsu  
mulapratiṣṭhāphalam āmananti ||  

tarhy ucyatām parisuddhatattvam 3 | uktam eva muninā,  
na tv apūrvam kimcit | tathā hy āha “kāvyārthān bhāvayan-  
titi bhāvāḥ 4” iti tat kāvyārtho rasah 5 | yathā hi “rātrim āsata 6”, “tām agnau prādāt 7” ityādāv arthitādilakṣitasya-  
dhikārṇaḥ pratipattimātrād atitīvraprarocitāt prathamapra- 

vṛttād anantaram adhikāivopāttakālatiraskāreṇaiva ‘āsai 8’

1 rakṣyate G (in the first ed.): lakṣyate G: labhyate M (corrected into lakṣyate) || 2 prameyasindhau : prameyasiddhau G, M || 3 parisuddhatattvam G,M : parisuddhaṃ tattvam Hc || 4 The entire quotation is kāvyārthān bhāvayanantitī bhāvāḥ (NS, prose at the beginning of ch. VII) || 5 Hc paraphrases tasmāt kāvyārtho rasah || 6 rātrim āsata G: rātrīr āsate M. Untraced source || 7 Taṇṭirīya Saṃhitā, 2, 1, 1 || 8 āsai : āste G (corrected into āse), M ||
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

‘pradānī’ ityādirūpā saṃkramaṇādīsvabhāvā yathādārśanāṃ bhāvanā'vidhiniyogādibhāsābhir vyavahṛta pratipattīḥ, tathaiva kāvyaṭmakād api śabdād adhikāriṇo 'dhikāstī pratipattīḥ | adhikārī cātra vimalapratibhānaśāliḥṛdayaḥ | tasya ca grīvābhangābhirāmam3’ iti “umāpi nilālaka3’ iti “haras tu kīṃcit 4” ityādīvākyebhyo vākyārthapratipattier antaram manāsī sāksāṭkārtātmikā apahastita5 tattadvākyopāttarakālādivibhāgā tāvat pratītir upajāyate | tasyaṃ ca yo mṛgapotakādir bhāti tasya viśeṣarūpatvābhāvād bhīta iti trāsakāsyā6 pāramārthikatvād bhūyam eva param desākālādyanālīṅgītam, tata eva bhūto ’ham bhūto ’yam śatrur vasyayo madhyastho vetyādipratyayebhyo duḥkhasukhādikātahānādibuddhyantarodayaniyamavattaya vighnabahulebhyo vilakṣaṇaṁ nirvighnaprātītigṛhīyam sākṣād iva hṛdaye nīviṣamānaṁ7 cakṣuṣor iva viparītām ādānāṃ bhayānako rasaḥ | tathāvidhe hi bhaye nātmātyantatirakṛto8 na viśeṣata ullaṅkhitāḥ | evam paro ’pi | tata eva na parimitam eva sādhāraṇyam api tu *vitatam, vyāptigraha iva dhūmāngyor bhayakampayor eva vā | tad atra sāksāṭkārāyamāṇatve paripōṣikā naṭādisāmagrī, yasyāṁ vastusatāṁ kāvyaṛpītānām ca desākālapramātrādīnāṁ nyamahetūnāṁ anyonyapratibhandhabalād atyantam apasaranē sa eva sādhāraṇibhāvāḥ sutarāṁ puṣyati | ata eva sarvasāmājikānāṁ9 eka-

1 bhāvanā : pratibhāvanā M (corrected in a second hand into pratibha- bhāvanā) : pratibbāhavanā G. In my opinion prati is simply a note by some reader who has not understood the expression yathādārśanām, which was later incorporated in the text || 2 Kālidāsa, Abhijñānāśaṃkuntalā, I, 2 || 3 Kālidāsa, Kumārasambhava, III, 62 || 4 Kālidāsa, ibid., III, 67 || 5 apahastita0 Hc, M (but corrected in a second hand into apahāsita): apahāsita G || 6 trāsakāsyā Hc, G: grāhakāsya M || 7 nīviṣamānaṁ Hc, G: nībhīyamānaṁ M || 8 atyantarikṛto G,M : atyanta omitted by Hc || 9 sarvasāmājikānāṁ G,M : sāmā-jikānāṁ Hc ||
ghanatayaiva\(^1\) pratipatteh\(^2\) sutarām rasaparipośya sarveśām anādivāsanāvicitrīkṛtacetāsām vāsanāsaṃvādāt lāśāvīhe ca vighnāśamvic camatkāraḥ tajjopī kampapulakollukasanādir vikāraṃ camatkāraḥ yatha

\[5\]
\[a]jja vi hari camakkai
lābhā no mamāreṇa dālāim\(^3\)
camdakalākamadalasac
cambahām lacchāim amgāim \||
tathā hi sa ca trp\(\text{ī}^4\)vyatirekenācchinno bhogāveṣa ity ucyate|
bhuṅjānasayādbhutabhogaspandāvīṣṭasya camataḥ karaṇām\(^5\) camatkāra iti | sa ca sākṣātkārasvābhāvo mānasādhyavasāyo vā samkalpo vā śṛṅtīr vā tathātvenāsphuraty\(^6\) astu yad āha | ramyāni vikṣya madhurāṁ ca niśamya śadbān paryutsukibhavati yat sukhitō ’pi jantuḥ |
tac cetasa śmarati nūnām abodhapūrvaṃ bhāvasthirāṇi janantārasauhṛdāṇi \|

ityādi sarvātha tāvad eṣāsti pratītīr āsvādātmā yasyām ratiḥ eva bhāti tata eva vīšeṣāntarānupahitavāt sa rasanīya satī na laukikī na mithyā nānirvācyā na laukikatulyā na tadāropādirūpā | eṣāiva copacayāvasthāstū\(^7\) deśādyanīyantraṇāt | anukāro ’py astu bhāvānugāmitaya\(^8\) karaṇāt vīṣayasāmagry api bhavatu vijñānāvādāvalambanāt | sarvātha rasanāṃtīmakāvītavighnapratiśṛṅtigrāhyo bhāva eva rasaḥ | tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhṛṣṭayaḥ | tathā hi loke sakalavighnaśrinīmuktā saṃvītīr eva camatkāraṇirveśarasanāśvādanabhogaśaṃā-

\(^1\) ekaghanataya G, M (corrected in a second hand from ekaghanataiva):
ekaghanataiva Hc || \(^2\) pratipatteh Hc, M: G suggests pratipatteh ||
\(^3\) dālāim G,M: kaliāim Hc || \(^4\) sa ca trp\(\text{ī}^0\) (sa vā trp\(\text{ī}^0\) ?) : sa cātrp\(\text{ī}^0\)
G,M || \(^5\) camataḥ karaṇām : ca manabkaraṇam G, M || \(^6\) tathātvenāsphuraty
M : tathātvena sphuraty G : tathātvenāsphuranty Hc || \(^7\) oṣtvāstū Hc :
\(\text{ovast}^0\) bhāvānugāmitaya G,M: anugāmitaya Hc ||

[ 14 ]
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pattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdair abhidhiyate | vighnāś cāsyām 1) pratipattāv ayogyata * saṁbhāvanāvīraho nāma 2) svagatatva 1-paragatatvaniyamena desakālavāiśeśāveśaḥ 3) nijasukhādivivā-śibhāvaḥ 4) pratityupāṣayavaikalyam 5) spuṭatvābhbhāvaḥ 6) apradhānata 7) samśayayogās ca | tathā hi

1) saṁvedyam asambhāvayamānah samvedye samvidam nivesayitum 2) eva na śaknoti | kā tatra viśrāntir iti prathamo vighnāḥ | tadapāsāraṇe hṛdayasyāṃvādo lokāsāmyavastuv- yāsayaḥ | alokāsāmyānyeṣu tu 3) cēṣṭiteṣv akhaṇḍihaprasiddhi- janitagadhrūḍhāpratyaya⁴prasarakāri prakhyātarāmādināma- dheyaparigrahaḥ | ata eva niḥsāmyaṅkarṣopadesavyuttpatti- prayojar nāṭakādau prakhyātavastuvāṣitādī niyamena nirū- payisyaṇe ⁵ na tu praṇahānādaḥ iti ⁶ | tac ca śvāvasara eva vakṣyāma ity āṣāṃ tāvat |

2) śvairgatānām ca sukhahūkhaśaṁvidām āsvāde yathā- saṁbhāvam tadapagamabhūṛutayaḥ vā tatparakṣāvyagratayā vā tatsadīśārjīṣśayā vā tajjīhāṣayaḥ vā tatpracikhyāpaśyāya vā tadgopanecchayā vā prakārāntareṇa vā saṁvedanāntarasamud- gama eva paramo vighnāḥ | paragatatvaniyamabhājām api sukhaduhkhānāṃ saṁvedane niyamena svātmanī sukhaduhkhah- mohamādhyāsthyādiśaṁvidantarodgamanasaṁbhāvanād avaśy- ambhāvī vighnāḥ | tadapāsāraṇe ⁷ "kāryo nātiprasanag’tra ⁸.” iṭyādiḥ pūrvaranāṅgāniḥ anena⁹ prastāvanāvalokanena¹⁰ ca yo nāṭarūpatādhihamat tattvāḥsaraḥ¹¹ pratisīrṣakādinā tat-
R. GNOLI

pracchādanaprakāro 'bhyupāyo 'laukikabhāṣādibhedalasyāṅga-
raṅgapiṭhāmamāṇḍapagatakṣyāṅdiparigrahānātyadharmīsaḥitaḥ |
tasmin hy ¹ asyaivātraivaitarhy eva ca sukham duḥkham veti
na bhavati pratītīḥ | svarūpasya nihnavād rūpāntarasya cāro-
pitasya pratibhāsaṃvidviśrāntivaikalyena svarūpe viśrānty-
abhāvāt satyatadīyarūpanihnavamātra eva paryavasānāt | tathā
hy āsīnapāṭhyapuspapanḍikādi loke na dṛṣṭam | na ca tan na
kiṃcit, kathāṃcit saṃbhāvyatvād iti sa eṣa sarvo muninā
sādhāraṇibhāvasiddhyā rasacarvāṇopayogitvena parikaraba-
ndhah saṃśīrīta iti tatraiva sphaṭībhaviṣyatīti tad iha tāvān
nodyamaniyāṃ | tataḥ sa eṣa svaparaniyatatāvighnāpasāraṇa-
prakāro vyākhyātah |

3) nijasukhādivivaśibhūtaś ca kathāṃ vastvantare saṃvi-
dām viśramayed iti tatpratyūhavyapohanāya pratipadārthani-
ṣṭhāiḥ sādhāraṇyamahīṁnā sakalabhogyatvasa*hisṇubhiḥ
śabdādiviṣayamayair ² ātodyagānačicramāṇḍapapada³vida-
gdhagāṇikādibhir uparaṇāvāni samāśritam yenāṅhādayo 'pi
ṛdayavāimalyaprāptyā saḥṛdayikṣriyate | uktam hi “dṛṣyaṃ
śravyaṃ ca ⁴” iti |

4) kiṃ ca pratītyupāyānāṃ abhāve kathāṃ pratītīḥ |

5) asphuṭapratītiķīrṇiśabdalingasaṃbhave 'pi na pratītir
viśrāmyati sphaṭapratītirūpapratyakṣocitapratyayasyākāṅkṣatvāt |
yathāhuḥ “sarvā ceyāṃ pramitiḥ pratyakṣapara ⁵” iti |
svasākṣātkṛta āgāmānumānaśatair āpy ananyathābhāvasya
svasāṃvedanāt | alātacakrādau sākṣātkārāntaṃaivai balavāta
tavadāhāraṇād ⁶ iti laukikas tāvad ayaṃ kramaḥ | tasmāt
tadubhayavignavighnāte 'bhīnāyā lokādharmaṃvṛttiṃśrūṣtyuspas-

¹ tasmin hy G₃M : tasmin hi saty Hc || ² ⁰mayair Hc : ⁰mayībhir G
(corrected into ⁰mayair), M || ³ ⁰pada⁰ G₃M : omitted by Hc ||
⁴ NŚ, I, v. 11 || ⁵ Nyāyaśītra, Vātsyāyanabhāṣya, I, 1, 3 (the edited text
gives sā for sarvā) || ⁶ tadavadhāraṇāt G, M : tatpramityapāsāraṇāt Hc ||

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6) apradhâne ca vastuni kasya samvid viśrâmyati tasyaiva pratyayasya
drândhântaram praty anudhâvataḥ svâtmâny avi-
śrântatvât| ato 'pradhânatvam jađe vibhâvânubhâvavarge vy-
bhicârinicable samvidâtmake 'pi niyamenânyamukhapreksÌni
sambhavattiti tadatiriktaḥ śthâyyeva tathā
carvanâpâtram | tatra

purusârthaniśthâḥ kâscit samvîda iti pradhânam | tad yathâ ratiḥ
kâmaśtadanusângidharmârthaniśthâh, krodhas
tatpradhânesv arth-
aniśthâh kâmadharmaparyavasîto 'pi, utsâhah samastadharmâdi-
paryavasîtas, tattvajñânajanitanirvedaprâyo 'pi bhâvo

mokṣopâya iti tâvad eśām prâdhânyam | yady api caiśām apy anyonyaṃ
guṇabhâvo 'sti tathâpi tatpradhâne 'pi vâpe tatatpradhânänī
bhavatiti rûpakabhedaparyâyena sarveśām prâdhânyam eśām

lakṣyate | adûrabhâgâbhînivîṣṭadhâsā tv ekasminn api vâpe

prâthaka prâdhânyam | tatra sarve 'mī sukhapradhânänī svasâmvi
carvanârûpasayaikaghanasya prakâśasyânandaśarâtvaṭ | tathâ hy
ekaghanaśokasaṃvîccarvane 'pi loke strîlokasya

hrdayaviśrä-
ntir antarâyaśûnyaviśrântisarâtvaṭ | aviśrântirûpataîva ca duh-
kham | tata eva kâpilair duḥkhasya cānâlyam eva prâñatveno-
ktan rajovrâttam vaddhabhir ity ânandarûpata sarvarasânām | kum
tûparaâjâvikâsyavaâsât keśām api kaṭukîmânâti sparśo 

vîra-
syeva | sa hi kleśasahiṣṭhûndiprâṇa eva | evaṃ ratyâdînâṃ prâ-
dhânyam | hâsâdînâm tu sâtisâyam sakalalokasulabhâvibhâvate-

1 Abb, II, chapp. VIII ff. || 2 pratyayasya G,M: pratyeyasya Hc ||

9reationâ Hc, M: 8sampreksÌni G || 4 tathâ G,M : omitted by Hc ||

kâma9: kâmah G,M (in M b bracketed in a second hand) : kâme
Hc || 6 9prâyo' pi bhâvo (see V. Raghavan, Bhoja, p. 00) : 9prâyo
vibhâvo G,M : ūmaś ca Hc || 7 tatpradhâne M: tatatpradhâne G,
Hc || 8 tattatpradhânām G,M: tatpradhânām Hc || 9 8dr∫as G,M :

dvâ Hc || 10 strîlokasya H,Gc: 'sti lokasya M || 11 vîrasyeva Hc:

vîrasya G,M ||
yoparaṇjaṅkatvam iti prādhānyam | ata evānuttamapratkṛtiṣu bāhulyena hāsādayo bhavanti | pāmaraprāyāḥ * sarvo 'pi hasati śocati bibheta paranindām ādriyate alpaśubhāṣitatvena ca sarvatra vismayate | ratyādyāṅgatāy tu pumarthropayogitvam api syād eśam | etadgunaprathānabhaṅvakṛta eva ca daśarūpākādi-bheda iti vakṣyāmaḥ | sthāyitvam ca iti jāta eva hi jantur iyātībhīḥ sāṃvidbhīḥ parīto bhavati | tathā hi
duḥkhasaṃśleṣavidveṣī sukhāsvādanadāraḥ 3 |

iti nyāyena sarvo rīraṃśayā vyāptah svātmany utkārṣamāṇītayā param upahassābhāṣṭaviyogasāṃtaptas taddhetuṣu kopa-paravasā 'śaktau ca tato bhīrūḥ kiṃcid ārijiṣūr 4 apy anucita-5-vastuvisayavaimukhyātmatāyāṅkṛta kiṃcid anabhāṣṭata-yābhīmāṇāmānā tattatsvākantavyādārśanasamuditavismayaḥ kiṃcic ca jihāsau eva jāyate | na hy etaccittavṛttivāsanāsūnyaḥ prāṇī bhavati | kevalaṃ kasyacit kācid adhikā cittavṛttih kācid ānā, kasyacid ucitaviṣayaniyantītā kiṣyac anayathā | tat kācid eva puruṣārthopayoginīty upadesyā | tadvibhaṅgākṛtaḥ 7 cottama-prakṛtyādiyavahāraḥ | ye punar āmi glāṃjaṅkāprabhṛtayaḥ 8 cīttavṛttiviśeṣās te samucitavibhāvāhāvaj janmamadhye 'pi 9 na bhavanty eva | tathā hi rasāyanam upayuktavato munera 10 glāṃjaḷasyaśramaprabhrātya nottiṣṭhanti 11 | yasyāpi vā bhavantī vibhāvabalāt tasyāpi hetuprakṣaye kṣiyamāṇāḥ samākhāraṃṣeṣatāṁ tāvan 12 nāvaṭyam anubadhnanti | utsāhādayaś 13 tu sampāditasvākantavyāyā pralīnakalpā api samākhāraṃṣeṣatāṃ
nātivartante kartavyāntararavisayasyotsāhāder ¹ akhaṇḍaṇāt | yathāha patañjaliḥ "na hi caitra ekasyāṁ striyāṁ raktā ity | anyāsu viraktaḥ ²" ityādi | tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasūtiḥ | evāṁ vyabhicārināḥ svātmānam udayāstamayavacittyasata- | sahasradharmāṇaṁ pratilabhāmāṇaṁ raktanilādisūtrasyūtavi- | ralabhāvombhāna³sambhāvitabhangīsahasragarbhaspaṭikākāca- | bhrāmaka⁴padmarāgamarakatamahānānilādimayagolakavat tasmin | śūtre svasāṃskaravacittyam aniveśayanto ’pi tatsūtrakṛtam upa- | kārasaṃdarbham bibhrataḥ svayam ca vicitrārthāḥ⁵sthāyisūtram | ca vicitrayanto ’ntarāntarasuddham api sthāyisūtram prāti-bhā- | sāvakāśam upanayanto ’pi pūrvaparāvyabhicāriratnacchāyā- | śabalingam anavaśyam ānayantaḥ prāti-bhāsanta iti vyabhicāriṇa | ucyante | tathā hi glāno’yam ity ukte kuta iti hetupraśnenās- | thāyitāśya suṭryate⁶ | na tu rāma utsāhaśaktimin ēty ātra | hetupraśnam āhuḥ | ata * eva vibhāvās tatrododbhakāḥ sataḥ | svarūpoparaṇaṭakatvam vidadhānā ratyutsāhāder ucitānucita- | tyanātṛtram āvahanti | na tu tadabhāve sarvathāve ca nirupā- | khyāḥ, vāsanātmanā sarvajantunāṁ tanmayatvenoktavāt | vyabhicārināṁ tu svavibhāvābhave nāmapi nāstiti vitanityate | caitdra yathāyogam vyākhyaśvasare⁷ | evam apradhānatahranirā- | saḥ sthāyinīrūpāṇyā⁸ "sthāyibhāvān rasatvam⁹" ityanāyā | sāmānyalakṣaṇāsēṣaḥbhūtayā viśeṣalakṣaṇāniśthāyā ca kṛtah¹⁰ | ⁷) tatrānubhāvanāṁ vibhāvānāṁ vyabhicārināṁ ca prthak | sthāyini nīyamo nāsti, bāspāder ānandāśirogādijatvadārśanād

¹ kartavyāntararavisayasyotsāhāder G,M : vastvantararavisayasya ratyāder Hc ||
² Yogasūtra, Vyāsabhaṣya, 2, 4 ||
³ vīralabhāvombhāna (see, on this passage, R. Gnoli, Further Observations, p. 102) : vīralabhāvavo (go) palambhāna
⁴ G : vīralabhāvo bhana M ||
⁵ bhramaka⁰ G : bhramaka M ||
⁶ vicitrārtha G,M ||
⁷ sthāyītyāśya suṭryate Hc : sthāyī tasya sūtryate
⁸ G : sthāyī tasya sūtryante ||
⁹ Abb, ch. VII ||
¹⁰ nirūpāṇyā Hc, M : nirūpāṇyām G ||
¹⁰ Cf. supra, p. 9, l. 23 ||
vyāghrādeśa ca krodhabhayādihetutvāt śramacintāder utsāha-

bhAYādyanekasahacaratvāvalokanāt | sāmagrī tu na vyabh
cārīnī | tathā hi bandhuvināśo yatra vibhāvaḥ paridevitāśru-
pātādis tv 2 anubhāvaś cintādainyādiś ca vyabhicārī, so

5 'vaṣyaṃ soka eveti 3 | evaṃ saṃśayodaye śaṅkātmaṇakavigh-

naśamanāya saṃyoga upāttaḥ |

tatra lokavyavahāre kāryakāranasahacaratmakaṅdingad-

śane 4 sthāyātmaparacitavṛtyanumānābhyāsatavād adhunā
tair evodyānakatākṣadṛṣṭyādhibhir 5 laukikām kārāṇatvādibhuvan

10 atikrāntair vibhāvanānubhāvanāsamuparaṇajakatvamātraprāṇair
ata evālaukkikavibhāvādivapadesabhāgbiḥ prācyakāraṇādirū-

pasamāskāropajīvanakhyāpanāya vibhāvādināmadheyavyapade-

śyair bhāvādiyāye 'pi vāksyaṃnaṇasvarūpabhedair 6 guṇapra-
dhānatāparyāyena sāmājikadhiḥi śamyagogyāṃ saṃbandham

15 aikāgyāṃ vāśāditavadbhir alaukikaniṇirvighnasamvedanāṅtma-
carvaṇāṅgocaratāṃ nīto 'ṛthaś carvyamāṇataikasāro na tu siddha-
svabhāvas tātākāla eva na tu carvaṇātītikatkālāvalambā sthā-
yivākṣaṇā eva rasaḥ | na tu 8 yathā śaṅkūkādibhir abhyadhī-
yata “sthāyyeva vibhāvādipratyāyī rasyāmānatvād rasa

ucyata” iti 9 | evaṃ hi loke 'pi kim na rasaḥ, asato 'pi hi
yatra rasanīyatā syāt 10 tatra vastusatāḥ kathāṃ na bhaviṣyati |
tenā sthāyipratītir anumitrūpā vācyā, 11 na rasaḥ | ata eva
sūtre sthāyigrahaṇāṃ na kṛtāṃ | tat pratyuta śalyabhūtam
syāt | kevalam aucityād evam ucyate sthāyī rasiṣbūta iti |

20 aucityāṃ tu tatsthāyigatatvena kāraṇādītāyā prasiddhānām

1 0valokanāt | sāmagrīti na vyabhicārīnī Hc : 0valokana...vyabhicārīni

G,M || 2 tv G,M. : ca Hc || 3 soka eveti Hc, M: soka eva (va ve)
ty G || 4 ċaṛśane G,M : 0ṛśanāga0 Hc || 5 0ṛṣṭyādibhir Hc :
vikṣādibhir G,M || 6 ABB, ch. VII || 7 va0 G,M : ca Hc || 8 na tu
Hc : namu G (corrected into na tu), M || 9 iti G,M : omitted by Hc ||
10 syāt G,M. (deleted in a second hand) : omitted by Hc || 11 vācyā Hc :
prācyā (corrected into prāpyā) G : prāpyā (corrected into prācyā) M ||
adahunä carvanopayogitaya vibhāvādītvāvalambanat | tathā hi laukikacittavṛtttyanumāne kā rasatā | * tenālaukikacamatkārātmā rasāsvādaḥ smṛtyanumāna laukikasvasamvedanavilakṣaṇa eva | tathā hi laukikenānumānena samskṛṭaḥ pramadādi na tātasthyena pratipadyate, api tu hṛdayasamvādātmakasahṛdayatvabalāt pūrṇībhaviṣyadrasāsvādaṅkūrībhāvenānumānaṃsmṛtyaādisopānam anāruhyaiva ¹ tanmayībhāvocitacarvanāprāṇatayā | na ca sā carvāṇa prāṇānūnta rād yenaḥdhunā smṛtiḥ syat | na cātra laukikapratyakṣādipramāṇāṇaṃvāpyāpārah | kim tv ² alaukikavi bhāvādisanyogabalopanataiveyam carvāṇa | să ca pratyakṣānāṁgāmopāmnāṭilaukikapramāṇajanitaratyaādya vabodhatas tathā yogipratyakṣajataṭasthaparasaṃvīttijnānāt sakalavaisayiko-parāgaśūnyaśuddhahaparayogigatavānandaikaghanānubhavāc ca viśīṣyate, eteṣām ³ yathāyogam arjanādīvignānāntarodaya- tātasthāyāsphutatvaviśāyaśvaivaśyakṛtasaundavyavirahāt | atra tu svātmaikagatavaniyamāsambhavān svānupraveṣāt paragatavaniyamābāhaśvāt ⁵ tadvibhāvādīsādṛhānyavāsasamprabuddhoci- tanijaratyaādīvāsanāveśaśāc ca na vighṇāntarādīnāṁ samehava ity avocāma bahuṣaḥ | ata eva vibhāvādayo na niśpattiḥetavo rasasya, tadbodhāpagame 'pi rasasaṃbhavapraśaṅgat | nāpi jñaptīhetavaḥ, yena pramānāmadhye pateyuh, Siddhasya kasyacit prameyabhubhūtasya rasasyābhāvaḥ | kim taryeh etad ⁶ vibhāva dāyati | alaukīka evāyam carvāṇopayogī vibhāvādi- vyavahāraḥ | kvānyatrettham dṛṣṭam iti ced bhūṣaṇam etad āsmaķām ⁷ alaukikatvasiddhau ⁸ | pānakarasāśvādo 'pi kim

¹ anāruhya Hc (see infra, p. 00, l. 0 also) : āruhya G,M || ² kimtv Hc, G : kim ca ⁰ M(corrected into kimtv in a second hand) || ³ eteṣām G,Hc : eteṣām M || ⁴ odaya ⁰ : odayat G,M. This passage has been paraphrased by Hc in the following way : yathāyogam arjanādīvignānāntarodaya tātasthyānāmābhāvānantatvam avasāyaśavaśāyaśca samudayavirahāt || ⁵ Hc adds na visayāveśavaśāyaṃ after ⁰ sambhavāt and tātasthāyāsphutatvam after paragatavaniyamābāhaḥ || ⁶ etad Hc : etad dhi G,M || ⁷ etad āsmaķām G,M : āsmaķām etad Hc || ⁸ ⁰ siddhau G, Hc : ⁰ siddbeḥ M ||
guḍamariṇḍisu drśṭa iti samāṇam etat | nany evam raso
'prameyāḥ syāt, evam yuktam bhavitum arhati, rasyataikapranō
hy asau na prameyādisvabhāvaḥ | tarhi sūtre nispattir iti
katham | neyam rasasya, api tu tadviṣaya'rasanāyāḥ | tannipattyā
tu yadi tadekāyattajīvītasya rasasya nispattir ucyate na kaścid
atra dosaḥ | sā ca rasanā na pramaṇavyāpāro na kārakavyā-
pāraḥ, svayam tu nāprāmāṇiki svasamvedaṇaśiddhatvāt | rasanā
ca bodhāntarebhya lauṅkikebhya vil-
ksanaiva, upāyānām vibhāvādīnām lauṅkikavālaṅkaṇyāt | tena
vibhāvādisamyogād rasanā yato nispadyate tatas tathāvidha-
rasanāgocaro lokottaro 'rtho rasa iti tātparyam sūtrasya |

*ayam atra samkṣepah | mukuṭapratīṣṭāṣaṅkādīnā āvan nāta-
buddhir ācchādyate | gāḍhaprāktaṇaṃsamskārāc ca
kāvyabalaṅyamāṇāpi na tatra rāmadhir viśrāmyati | ata evo-
bhayadeśaṅkālātyāgaḥ | romāṇcādayaś ca bhūyasā ratipratīti-
ritayā drśtās tatrāvalokitā desakālāniyamena ratim
 gama-
yanti | yasyām svātmāpi tadvaśanāvaṭvād anupraviṣṭāḥ | ata
eva na tātasthatayā ratyavagamaḥ | na ca niyatākāraṇatayā,
yenārjanābhīṣvaṅgādisambhāvanā | na ca niyataparātmaika-
gatayā, yena duḥkhadveśādyudayaḥ | tena sādhāraṅībhūtā
samtānvrīṭter ekasyā eva vā samvido gocaribhūtā
eriḥ śṛṅgāraḥ | sādhāraṅībhāvanā ca vibhāvādibhir iti |

tadviṣaya G,M : te dviṣayāyā Hc ||
Hc ||

1 tadviṣaya G,M : te dviṣayāyā Hc ||
Hc ||

2 na kaścid G,M : tan na kaścid
Hc ||

3 ata eva G,M : tata eva Hc ||

4 ratim Hc, M : tatra ratim G ||

5 gocaribhūtā Hc,M : gocarabhūtā G ||
TRANSLATION
TRANSLATION

Bharata’s sūtra

1. After explaining the reason for the foregoing succession\(^1\), Bharata states the sūtra defining the nature of Rasa: “Out of the combination (samyoga) of the Determinants (vibhāva), the Consequents (anubhāva) and the Transitory Mental States (vyabhicārin), the birth of Rasa takes place”.

The interpretation of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, etc.

2. This sūtra has been explained by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, etc., in the following way:—The birth of Rasa takes place out of the combination of the permanent mental state—implicit in the sūtra—with the determinants, etc. More precisely, the determinants are the cause of the birth of the feeling, which constitutes the permanent state of mind. The consequents intended by Bharata are not, obviously, those which arise from the rasas—for they cannot be considered as causes of rasa\(^2\)—, but the consequents of the states of mind only. Even if the transitory states of mind, in so far as they are feelings, cannot accompany simultaneously the permanent mental state, still, according to Bharata, this is not absent, but remains in a state of

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1) N. S., vi, vv. 1-33.
2) Rasa will also produce certain effects in the spectators—it will make them mutter in fear, make their hair stand on end, etc. These effects (lit., consequents, anubhāva) cannot, of course, be considered as the causes of Rasa. The causes of Rasa can only be the effects of the permanent mental states.
latent impression. In the example too, some flavourings appear in a latent state, like the permanent state, and others in an emergent state, like the transitory states. Rasa, therefore, is simply a permanent state, intensified by the determinants, the consequents, etc.; but, had it not been intensified, it is only a permanent state. This state is present both in the person reproduced and in the reproducing actor, by virtue of the power of realization (anusamdhāna).

1) It is a general principle of Indian thought that two forms of cognition cannot occur simultaneously (cf. Nyāyasūtra, I, I, 16). To avoid a contradiction of this rule, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa remarks that there is nothing to prevent the assumption that the permanent mental state is presented in the state of a latent impression (samskāra, vāsanā). The word samskāra "means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in a sub-conscious state and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (smṛti). The word vāsanā (Yogasūtra, IV, 24) seems to be a later word... It comes from the root "vas" to stay. It is often loosely used in a sense of samskāra, and in Vyāsabhāṣya they are identified in IV, 9. But vāsanā generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But samskāras are the subconscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Vāsanās are innate samskāras not acquired in this life" (Dasgupta, H. I. Ph., I, p. 263).

2) The example occurs in N. S., just after the mentioned sūtra. "Is there any example? Yes, it is said that as taste, rasa, results from a combination of various spices, vegetables and other articles, and as six tastes, rasa, are produced by articles such as raw sugar, spices and vegetables, so the permanent states, when they come together with various other states, attain the quality of rasa (i.e., become rasa)". I have here adopted, with some changes, the translation of Manomohan Ghosh, The Nātyaśāstra, Calcutta 1951.

3) Cf. the Introd., p. XVIII. The text of Hemacandra is here somewhat enlarged; it runs as follows: "This state is present in both the person
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

This view, again, is the same as that of the ancients. Daṇḍin, for example, in his definition of the ornaments\(^1\), said that in association with a number of other elements, the feeling of delight is transformed into the Erotic Rasa (śṛṅgāra)\(^9\), and “on reaching its extreme height, the feeling of anger is transformed into the Furious Rasa (raudra)\(^{10}\), etc.

The interpretation of Śaṅkuka and his criticisms of Bhaṭṭa Lollāta’s view.

3. This interpretation, says Śaṅkuka, is unsound. Why?—
   a) Because, without the determinants, etc., the permanent mental state cannot be known, for the determinants, etc., are the characteristic signs, i.e., the logical reasons (liṅga) by means of which knowledge of it is made possible\(^2\).  
   b) Because, if the

reproduced and in the reproducing actor, in the person reproduced (Rāma, etc.) in the primary sense (mukhyayā vṛtyā) and in the reproducing actor by virtue of a recollection of the nature of Rāma, etc.”

To sum up, according to Bhaṭṭa Lollāta Rasa is a perception of the permanent mental state of the character represented by the actor. This sthāyibhāva, intensified by the Determinants, etc. is presented to the spectator in the form of a Rasa. The same thesis of Bhaṭṭa Lollāta is met with in the Agnipurāṇa; cf., for example, ch. 339, sl. 4:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{abhimānād ratis sā ca pariṇām upeyusī |} \\
\text{vyabbicāryādisāmānyāt śṛṅgāra iti gīyate} \\
\end{align*}
\]

1) Cp. The Introduction, p. XVII. The ornaments, alamkāra, are figures of speech.

2) Here Hc. adds: na hi dhūmap vinā dharābharāntahstho vabhī rāgamyate || “If there were no smoke, the fire which is within a mountain could not be perceived”. Hence the interpretation of Lollāta, who intended the sūtra, as if Bharata had said: “Out of the combination of the permanent mental state with the determinants”, etc., does not stand to reason.
thesis of Lollaṭa is right, Bharata should first have expounded the permanent states and only afterwards the Rasas. c) Because, the second definition of the determinants, etc. in their state of full development, (put forward by Bharata in connexion with Rasas, which according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, are nothing but permanent mental states), would become a useless waste of words. d) Because, every feeling would come to be subdivided into an infinity of different gradations, weak, weaker, weakest, indifference, etc. e) Because, there would no longer be six varieties of Comic Rasa (bāṣya). f) Because, in the ten states of love (kāma) there would be an infinite number of mental states.

1) If it were true that the permanent mental states exist before the Rasa, why is it that Bharata explained first Rasa (N.Ś., Chap. VI) and afterwards (N.Ś., chap. VII) the mental states?

2) If, as Lollaṭa says, Rasa is no more than an intensified permanent mental state, why should Bharata have taken the trouble to explain the Determinants of this mental state twice over, once in connexion with it in its non-intensified state (N.Ś. chap. VII) and once again in connexion with it in its intensified state (N.Ś. chap. VI)? It is illogical to explain the causes of the same thing twice over, once when it is not far from its nascent state and once when it has reached its full development. H.C. clarifies:

na cœptattau padārthānām kāraṇam abhidhāya pūryatām puṇas tadutpattikāraṇam abhidhātavyam, vaiyarthyāpatteḥ

3) In other words, if, as Lollaṭa says, the Rasa is nothing but a feeling intensified, “then, as intensity admits of many degrees, similarly there ought to be different grades in the Rasa realized” (Sankaran, The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani, Madras, 1929, p. 99).

4) “Or if it is urged that only when the utmost intensity is reached is Rasa realized, then the division of the Comic Rasa into six varieties, made by Bharata, would be wrong (ibid., p. 99). As to the six qualities of laughter cp. Bharata, VI, pp. 314-16. They are slight smile (smita), smile (hasita), gentle laughter (vibasita), laughter of ridicule (upabasita), vulgar laughter (apabasita) and excessive laughter (atibasita). The renderings adopted are those of Manomohan Ghosh, op. cit.
states and of Rasas\(^1\). g) Because we see that what happens is just the contrary, in the sense that sorrow (\(sōka\)) is at first intense and is seen to grow weaker with time, and that in the feelings of anger (\(krodha\)), heroism (\(utsāha\)) and delight (\(rati\)) a diminution is met with when the indignation (\(amarsa\)), firmness (\(sthairya\)) and sexual enjoyment (\(sevā\)) are absent.

Therefore, Rasa is simply a permanent state of mind, and, more precisely, the reproduction (\(anukarana\)) of the permanent state of mind proper to the person reproduced—Rāma, etc.; and just because it is a reproduction, it is called by a different word, that is Rasa. This reproduced mental state is perceived by means of three kinds of elements, viz., causes, here called by the name of determinants, effects, that is, the consequents, and accompanying elements, constituted by the transitory states of mind. Though these causes, etc., are brought into existence by the conscious effort (\(prayatna\)) (of the actor), and are thus artificial and unreal (\(krtrima\)), yet they are not realised to be so. This permanent state is perceived (and this perception is aroused by the characteristic signs already referred to) as lying in the reproducing actor.

The determinants, indeed, can be realized (\(anusamdhā\)) through the power (\(bala\)) of poetry, the consequents through the skill (\(siksā\)) of the actor, and the transitory mental states through the actor’s ability to present his own artificial consequents. But

1) In the Erotic Rasa there are, according to Bharata, (XX, vv. 154-6) ten stages; now, if each of them should have different grades according to their intensity, there would then be endless varieties under that Rasa and feeling alone. Cp. Sankaran, op. cit., pp. 99. The aforementioned ten stages of love (\(kāma\)) are: longing (\(abhilāsa\)), anxiety (\(arthacinta\)), recollection (\(anusmr̥ti\)), enumeration of the loved one’s merits (\(gūnakārtana\)), distress (\(udvega\)), raving (\(vilāpa\)), insanity (\(unmāda\)), fever (\(vyādhi\)), stupor (\(jaḍatā\)), and death (\(marana\)). Cf. Daśarūpa, Haas, p. 132.
the permanent state cannot be realized, even through the power of poetry. The words "delight", "sorrow", etc., as it is to be expected from expressing words, are, indeed, only able to turn the feeling of delight, etc., to which they refer into an expressed thing, but they are not able to communicate (avagam) it [in its fullness], as if they were forms of verbal representation (vācikābhīnaya). For verbal representation does not consist merely in words, but rather in what effect the words produce; in the same way gesticular representation (āṅgikābhīnaya) does not consist merely in the movement of the limbs but in the effect which this movement produces. In the following stanzas, the feeling of sorrow is not an object of representation but simply of verbal expression:

"Great, deep, wide, and unbounded, the ocean is nevertheless drunk by underwater fires: in the same way, sorrow is drunk by anger."

Again:

"He is paralysed by sorrow, motionless in this state, so that he is begged imploringly to move by his companions, who, filled with the fear that tears their hearts, increase their lamentations."

Examples may be multiplied. But the following stanza:

"This multitude of droplets, fine rain of tears falling

1) The meaning appears to be that the permanent state can be ascertained only indirectly, through an inferential process. The determinants, etc., on the other hand, are realized, ascertained, directly. That is why the word "permanent state" (sthāyībhāva) is not mentioned in the sūtra.

2) Unidentified stanza.

3) Unidentified stanza. In both stanzas the word "sorrow" occurs. Thus, in them sorrow is in the state of verbal expression.
while she painted, produces on my body the effect of a perspiration born from the touch of her hand
1 while she painted, produces on my body the effect of a perspiration born from the touch of her hand
1 at the same time that it expresses what is its own sense
2 represents, rather than expresses verbally
3 the permanent mental state of delight consisting in a form of pleasure (sukha) proper to Udayana
4. Representation (abhinayana), indeed, is nothing but a power of communication (avagamanasakti)—this power differing from the one of verbal expression. Precisely for such reasons, Bharata did not mention at all the word "permanent mental state" in the sūtra, not even in a different grammatical case
5. Thus the Erotic Rasa is simply the permanent mental state of delight imitated; so that [what Bharata said, namely] that Rasas are made up of the permanent feelings and are born of them is quite appropriate to
6. It is found furthermore, that even mistaken cognition is, sometimes, not without causal efficiency (arthakriyā).

1) Harṣa, Ratnāvalī, II, 11.
2) I.e., its literal meaning.
3) The word "delight" does not occur in this stanza.
4) The chief character of the Ratnāvalī.
5) In the genitive, cf. supra, p. 25.
6) According to Bharata, the erotic and the pathetic Rasas are born (brabbava) of the sentiments of delight and sorrow respectively; while, instead, the other Rasas are made up of them (ātmaka). Cf. AG, p. 312.
7) To corroborate this statement, Hemacandra quotes here a famous stanza of Dharmakīrti, PV, II, 57: "Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp [without being conscious of what they really are, but] with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of causal efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition. This stanza is also quoted by Mahimabhatta, Vyaktiveka, p. 78. Casual efficiency, the capacity to produce effects (arthakriyā, arthakriyakārtva) is the basic criterion of every form of right cognition, and, therefore, of the real existence of a thing. When, for example, a man
Furthermore, here there is none of the following perceptions:—"The actor is really happy", "Rāma is really that man", "That man is not happy", "Is this Rāma or not?", "This is similar to Rāma",—but rather the perception: "This is that Rāma who was happy". Śaṅkuka himself said: "(Here) there is neither doubt, nor truth, nor error; the notion which appears is, "This is that", not "This is really that". What sort of an argument could disprove an experience evident in and by itself—an experience wherein, being devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error?"

sees a mirage and, on going near it, does not find the water which he expected to find (and cannot, therefore, drink, wash himself, etc.), his perception is a mistaken one; the water which he has seen is not capable of appeasing his desires, of carrying out the functions proper to real water. In some cases, however, even the mistaken perception is endowed with causal efficiency. In the present case, for instance, it allows the observing subject to find a jewel which is real; in other terms, it does not delude the expectations of the perceiving subjects. Even a mistake, observes Dharmakīrti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of right knowledge. Now, if even a mistaken cognition, observes Śaṅkuka, can be gifted with causal efficiency, then it is all the more reason for a reproduced cognition, i.e., the aesthetic cognition, to be gifted with it. The spectators do not, in fact, remain deluded by this, but find in the spectacle the fulfilment of their desires.

1) Here Mammaṭa quotes and clarifies at the same time AG. "The perception we have", he says, "takes the form: "This is Rāma". Like the experience one has when observing a horse in a picture, the afore-mentioned perception is neither valid perception, nor error, nor doubt, nor similitude. These, indeed, take respectively the forms: "This is really Rāma", "Rāma is really this", "This is Rāma" (being, vitiated, in a second time, by the perception: "This is not Rāma"), "Is this Rāma or not", "This is similar to Rāma".
Abhinavagupta, following his master Bhatṭa Tota, criticises the theory of reproduction, supported by Šaṅkuka.

4. This thesis too, my masters say, is without intrinsic value and is incapable of resisting a close criticism. Specifically, from what point of view, may we ask, was Šaṅkuka saying that Rasa has the nature of a reproduction? 1. From the point of view of the spectators' perception, 2. or that of the actor, 3. or that of the critics (vyākhyāṭrī) who analyse the real nature (vastuvṛtta) (of dramatic presentation)—for it has been said that it is in fact, the critics who analyse in this way—4. or, finally, following the opinion of Bharata himself?

1) The expression “my masters”, observes He, alludes to Bhatṭa Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A.G. and, therefore, lived in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th century. Bhatṭa Tota wrote a work of poetry, the Kāvyakautuka, on which A.G. wrote a commentary (vivaranā) which has not yet been found. The confutation of Šaṅkuka, given in the following pages, goes back, therefore, to Bhatṭa Tota.

2) This quotation is taken from the svārūṭti of Dharmakīrtī to the svārthaṇumānapariccheda of the Pramāṇavārtika (cf. supra, p. 5; ed. Gnoli, p. 39): vyākhyāṭaḥ khalv evam viveçayanti na vyabhicāraḥ | te tu svālambanam svārthakriyāyogena manyamāna drśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekākṛtya pravartante |

Practical life (vyavahāra) is based, according to Dharmakīrtī, on the identification of the thing in se (svalakṣaṇa) with its mental image. The mind super-imposes (ārop) on the thing itself the image that it has of it and the subject believes that he is faced with reality. The difference between the thing itself, which is real, and the illusory character of the mental image which has been super-imposed upon it, is a theoretical distinction created by the ‘critics’ and ‘philosophers’ (vyākhyāṭrī, tattvacintaka). In confuting this concept, A. G. asserts that it is impossible to explain a thing in the theoretical moment by an explanation which contradicts one’s awareness of it in the practical moment. In other words, the spectators, while they are immersed in the Rasa aroused by the spectacle, do not know that they are faced with an imitation. The fact automatically confutes those who sustain the theory that there is an imitation. Cf. infra, pp. 40, 41.
1. The first alternative cannot be upheld. Reproduction, indeed, can be said to be only something perceived by a means of cognition\(^1\), as, for example, in the case of a person drinking some milk (this action being directly perceived by the spectators), and saying “Thus did so-and-so drink the wine”. In this case, the action of milk-drinking reproduces the action of wine-drinking. But here what is it that is perceived in the actor, which might seem to be a reproduction of some feeling, as, for instance, delight? This is the problem. His body, the headwear that crowns it, his horripilations, his faltering words, the raising of his arms, the waving of them, his frowns, his expressive glances, etc., certainly cannot be regarded by anyone as the reproduction of delight, which is a feeling. They, indeed, being insentient\(^2\), being perceived by different organs of sense\(^3\), and having different substrata\(^4\) are thus as unlike feelings as it is possible to imagine. Consciousness of a reproduction presupposes, furthermore, perception both of the original and of the copy; but none of the spectators has ever in his life perceived the delight of the hero, say, Rāma. So the possibility that the actor is reproducing Rāma is excluded.

“But (someone might say) what is called erotic Rasa, the reproduction of delight, is simply the feeling of the actor, which, as perceived by the spectators, appears to them in this very

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1) The explanation is given a few lines below.
2) I. e. they are not of a mental or spiritual nature.
3) Mental movements are perceived by the internal sense, manah, mind. All the acts, etc. listed, however, are perceived by the external senses such as sight, etc.
4) The body, etc. The mental states are based on the mind. M. C., p 69, comments: *tathā hi nata vāpūrādīnām jadatvam caksurgrāhyatvam, rater ajadatvam manogrāhyatvam ca | pratīśrīsakūdānām vapur abhikarānaṃ, rates tu mano 'dbhikaraṇam iti |

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form. To this opinion, however, we object: Of what, when perceived, does this feeling appear to consist? This is the problem. It may be urged that the actor's feeling appears to the spectators to consist of just those characteristic signs (causes, such as women, etc., effects, such as expressive glances, etc., concomitant elements, such as contentment, etc.) which serve to render perceptible an ordinary feeling. But lo (we reply), if this were the case, the feeling of the actor would be perceived simply in the form of delight¹, so that for your idea of a reproduction of delight there would be no more place. "But (you can perhaps urge) the determinants, etc., are real in the reproduced characters and here, in the actors, unreal". True. But, even if these determinants, etc., are not the real causes, effects, and concomitant elements of the feeling of the actor, even if, that is to say, they are fashioned solely by the power of the poem, the skill of the actor, etc., and are thus artificial, are they so perceived by the spectators or are they perceived as real? And, if they are perceived as artificial, how would it be possible, through them, to perceive the feeling of delight? If you say that for this very reason what is perceived is not delight but the reproduction of delight, this answer, we reply, could only be made by a man of dull wits².

1) I.e., there would be a perception of ordinary nature, not aesthetic cognition.
2) Bhatta Tota's reply (set out in the following lines) may be summarized: Assuming that the Determinants, etc., are perceived as unreal or artificial (kuśtrimā), they cannot legitimize the inference of either Delight or an imitation of Delight. From a mistaken or apparent logical reason (e.g., a cone-shaped cloud mistaken for a pillar of smoke; the cone-shaped cloud does not stand in any cause-effect relation to fire, and is thus a mistaken logical reason) we cannot infer fire (in this case, mistaken cognition would occur) nor, still less, anything imitating fire (e.g., as A G. says, a
For a thing different from the usual one can be inferred from more apparently similar effects, only if the effect, from which it is inferred is really derived from a different cause and is recognized as such by a person of experience. An inexperienced person can infer from them the usual cause only. From some particular scorpions, for instance, it is legitimate to infer that their cause is cow dung; and the inference, from them, of another scorpion, as their cause, would be nothing but a false cognition. But, when the cognition of the logical reason—e.g., smoke—is erroneous, the inference based on this apparent logical reason will itself be invalid. The inference from mist (whether it be supposed by the observer to be smoke, or whether the latter is aware of its being only a reproduction of the true logical reason) of something which is a reproduction of fire, is, no doubt, unsound. Indeed, a veil of mist—something which reproduces smoke and is recognized as a reproduction—does not legitimate the inference of a heap of red roses, namely something that reproduces fire.

heap of red roses). A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two things, which to the laymen are apparently the same, the respective causes of each of them (example: the scorpions. According to tradition there are two kinds of scorpions, one kind being born from other scorpions and the other kind from dung); but in the present case the logical reason is nevertheless mistaken or apparent (the determinants, etc., are perceived as krtrima) and as such an effect is neither of delight nor of an imitation of delight. Thus, for a person of experience the inference of something which imitates delight is impossible. The inference of delight made by an inexperienced person is a form of mistaken cognition. Hc. explains:

ayam bhavah prasiddhah ratilaksanat karanaad ratyanukaranam nama karananta-ram tatprababhavae ced anubhavah syuh | tathaina ca viitesavidh yadi jnayeyan tadā ratyanukaranalaksanasya vastvantarasayunumanaam samadhyasam syat na caivaam, tat katham iva ratyanukaranaapratitthi | avitesavidh ca tathavudhanubhavadarthah ratir evunumiyate tac ca mithyajnanam eveti |
"Even if the actor (it may be urged) is not himself enraged, still he seems so". True enough, we answer, he is like someone who is enraged. But this resemblance is due to a contraction of the eyebrows, etc.—in the same way, that is, that the resemblance between a real ox and another ox-like species is due to the shape of the muzzle and so on, without that, by this, any reproduction be involved. Again, the spectators are not conscious of this resemblance; the perception of the spectators, while they perceive the actor—it is said—is not without the mental state which he appears to have. Therefore, the thesis according to which what appears is a reproduction is a vain discourse only.

Further, to say that the audience has the perception: "That is Rāma", is not correct. For if this perception, devoid of every doubt during the play is not stultified later by some subsequent cognition which invalidates it (bādhaka), why is it not a true cognition? And, if it is stultified, why is it not a false cognition? In fact, however, even if no invalidating cognition does appear, it will be always a form of false cognition. Thus, Śāṅkuka’s contention, namely, that this is an experience wherein, being it devoid of any contradictory

1) In other words the spectators are not aware of a resemblance between the actor and the character he represents, but only of the fact that the actor is immersed in a certain state of consciousness shared also by them.

2) M. C., p. 71 replaces "iti rikta vācoyuktiḥ" by "iti svavacanavirodhah."

3) M. C., p. 71 simplifies: yac coktam rāmo 'yam ity asti pratiṣṭhā, tatrāpi yad na bādhakodayaḥ tat katham na samyagjñānam, bādhakodayaś cet katham na mithyā. ||

4) According to Śāṅkuka the aesthetic experience consists of an imitation; therefore, he maintains implicitly that it is unreal.
idea, one cannot distinguish any error”, is untrue\(^1\). Furthermore this same perception, namely “This is Rāma” is had in other actors also and hence of Rāma we have only his universal aspect\(^2\). Nor can his other assertion, “The determinants can be recognised through the power of poetry”, be successfully explained. Indeed, the actor does not have the perception, “Sītā is the woman I love”, as if, that is to say, Sītā were a part of his own real life\(^3\). If it is replied that this is the meaning of the word realization, i.e., that this is how the determinants are made perceptible to the spectators, then we answer that there ought more reasonably to be, instead, a realization of the permanent state. Indeed, the perception of the spectators is concerned, in a primary sense, principally with this and is presented in the form: “That man (is) in this (feeling)”. The pompous analysis of the nature of representation made by Śaṅkuka by the expression, “Word...verbal representation”, etc.,—where he emphasizes the diversity [both of verbal representation and of the simple verbal expression]—will be discussed later at the appropriate time and place\(^4\). Therefore, it is wrong to say that from the point of view of the spectators, Rasa is a reproduction of the permanent mental state.

2. Nor again does the actor have this notion, “I am reproducing Rāma or his feeling”. For a reproduction, that

\(^1\) Cf supra, p. 32.

\(^2\) See Sankaran, op cit, p. 101: “and hence the conception of Rāma is only in his universal aspect of a great hero”.

\(^3\) The actor does not identify or unite the determinants taken from the poem with the things which are “causes” in his own real life. In other words, he does not have the perception that they form part of his real life.

\(^4\) Ch. IX of the N. S, in which A.G. discussed it, has unfortunately not yet come to light. Cf. also N. S., chp. XIV.

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is a production of actions similar (sadriakaranam) to those of someone whose nature we have never perceived\(^1\), is not possible. And if you say that the meaning of the term reproduction is after-production (paścātkaranam), such reproduction we reply, would extend to ordinary life also\(^2\). It may be said, perhaps, that the actor does not reproduce a particular being (nyata), and that he has only this notion, “I am reproducing the sorrow of some noble person (uttamaprakṛti). But then, we reply, by what is this reproduction performed? This is the problem. Certainly not by sorrow, since this is absent in the actor. It is undoubtedly not done by tears, etc., for these, as has already been said, are of a nature other than that of sorrow\(^3\). Well, it may be replied, then let us say that, in the actor, the following perception occurs: “I am reproducing the consequences of the sorrow of a noble person”. But in this case again, we observe, which noble person? If you say “any noble person, no matter which”, then we reply that no person can be brought into the mind without a definite idea (vīśītatām vā). If, on other hand, you say that the actor is reproducing a person who should have wept in the manner he does, then his personality (svātmā) also intervenes, so that the relation of reproduced-reproducing no longer exists.\(^5\) Besides, the actor

1) It has not been perceived before. Every imitation presupposes a previous perception.

2) In other words, if imitation is felt in this way, there is an imitation every time someone does something which has already been done by someone else.

3) Cf. supra, p. 34.


5) M.C, p. 71 paraphrases: *ya evam roditśi cet, tarhi svātmānam api pata 'nukarotīty āyātām tasyāpi odamasadbhāvād iti galito 'nukāryānumkari bhāvāh* ||

"If they say, there is the notion ‘he who weeps thus’, then, we reply, we must assume that the actor is reproducing himself as well (for the actor
has no consciousness of carrying out a reproduction. The actor's performance, indeed, takes place only through three causes: his skill in art, his memory of his own determinants, and the consent of his heart, aroused by the state of generality of the feelings; and in virtue of this, he displays the corresponding consequents and reads the poem with suitable accompanying intonations (kāku) of voice. Accordingly, he is conscious of this only and not of reproducing someone. Indeed, reproduction of the deeds of Rāma is different from reproduction of the attire of the beloved being. But all this we explained before in the first chapter.

3. Not can it be said that there is a reproduction from the point of view of the nature of things (vastuvrtta); for it is impossible that a thing of which one is not conscious, has a real nature. We shall explain further in what the nature of things consists.

4. Nor did Bharata ever say in any passage: "Rasa is the reproduction of a permanent mental state". Such an assertion was never made by him even indirectly by means of an indication. On the contrary, the various sub-divisions of women's dance (lāṣya), the various musical tempi (tāla) and the himself would have to be really grieving). Thus the reproduced-reproducing relation would no longer hold.

1) Cf. A. Bb., p. 37 A person in love, according to the Indian rhetors, is sometimes impelled to imitate or repeat every gesture and attitude, etc., of his beloved. The aesthetic act has nothing to do with this imitation. He, p. 424: vāgveseṣṭitaḥ priyasyānukṛtāṁ līlā.

2) A. Bb., ch. I, p. 37.


4) In the statement of his own thesis.
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**dhruva** songs described by Bharata are an indication of precisely the opposite 1. All this will be explained later at the end of the chapter on the sub-divisions of the junctures (sandhyaanga). The expression met with in Bharata every now and again, “Drama is an imitation (of all the forms of existence in) the seven islands”, etc., can have also other explanations 3. And, if even that was a reproduction, then what would be the difference between it and the reproduction of the attire, the walk, etc., of the beloved one 4?

**Other theories**

5. Some people say: “The pigments—orpiment, etc.—undoubtedly compose (samayy) a cow 5”. Now if the word “compose” is understood in the sense of “manifest (abhivyay)”, these people are also in error. For we cannot say that minium, etc., manifest a real (paramarthika) cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp, etc. All they do is to produce

1) They do not imitate anything in ordinary life.

2) N. S., XIX. Dasarupa, Haas, 11: “The Junctures are the structural divisions of the drama, which correspond to the elements of the plot and the stages in the hero’s realization of his purpose”. The Junctures are divided into sixty-four sub-divisions (anga). Cf. Ind. Tè., p. 140, etc.

3) N. S., I, v. 120: saptadvipaunjarakaranaam nātyam etad bhavyaye |. In other words, drama can be an “imitation” of all the forms of existence in the world (the expression “the seven islands”, refers to the world with its oceans, continents, etc.,; cf. A Bh., I, p. 42: saptadvipabhavunjarakaranasañcure nātye...). The term ‘imitation’ must be interpreted as a “re-telling” (anukirtana) and therefore as a “re-perception” (anuvyavasaya).

4) Text and translation both doubtful.

5) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition of different colours mixed together and applied to a given surface.
(nirvṛt) a particular aggregate (samūha) similar to a cow. The only object of the image, "It is like a cow", is simply this minimum, etc., applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement (sammveśa) similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a cow. In the case of the aggregate of the determinants, etc., the situation is different: this—as we have said—cannot be perceived as similar to delight\(^1\). Thus, it is not true that Rasa is the reproduction of mental states.

Again, other people say\(^2\):—Rasa, which is made up of pleasure and pain, is nothing but an external combination (sāmagṛi) of various elements\(^3\)—a combination possessing the power of generating pleasure and pain. This thesis agrees with Śāmkhya's doctrine\(^4\). In this combination, the determinants take the place of petals; and the consequents and the transitory mental states do duty for that which garnishes it. Out of it, again, are born the permanent mental states. These,

1) The visual arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order from poetry: the pigments etc., are material things which imitate a material thing. Very well then, says A.G.; all the same, it is impossible that the poetic expression (consisting of determinants, etc., i.e., of material elements) could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature.

2) The followers of this view (their names are unknown to us) based themselves, according to A G (A Bh, p. 312) on a wrong interpretation of one stanza of Bharata (VI, 46).

3) The determinants, etc., are external (i.e., they are not psychic states). The elements in question are the determinants, the consequents, and the transitory states; the latter are also regarded as external in the present passage.

4) According to the Śāmkhya, external objects are a modification of praṇāma, which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This conception is empathically confuted by Dharmakīrti, P. V, II, 268 ff.
made up of pleasure and pain, are internal. The supporters of this thesis maintain that expressions such as, "We shall bring to the state of Rasa the permanent mental states," etc., must be understood metaphorically, i.e., they are themselves aware that they are in flagrant contradiction with Bharata's text. Thus the student is preserved from falling into error by the fact that the mere statement of this thesis displays garrulously ex ore suo its unsoundness. What use is there in replying to such people? Let us rather state the essential points of the other hypothesis, etc., arising out of this difficult problem, i.e., what is the nature of aesthetic perception.

The view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka

6. Again, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says:—Rasa is neither perceived (pratī), nor produced (utpad), nor manifested (abhivyaj). For if it were perceived by the spectator as really present in himself, in the pathetic Rasa he would necessarily experience pain. Again, such a perception does not stand to reason, because Sītā, etc., does not play the role of a determinant [as regards the spectator]; because no memory of his own beloved one does arise in the spectator's consciousness (while he looks at Sītā); because [the representation of] deities, etc., cannot

1) According to this theory there is no longer any difference between Rasas and permanent mental states. Its supporters are therefore forced to give a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata distinguishes Rasas from permanent mental states.

2) Thus no one would go to see plays on pathetic, etc., subjects any more.

3) The spectators are not Rāma, etc., so that it is impossible to suppose that the fortunes of Sītā can play the role of determinant in their case.

4) At the same time, there is no identification of the image of Sītā with that of his own beloved.
logically arouse (in the spectator) the state of generality (sādhāranīkarana) [required for the aesthetic experience]; because ocean-crossings, etc., [are extraordinary undertakings, and thus] fall short of generality (sādhāranya). Not it can be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rāma, as endowed of such-and-such quality, in so far as the spectator has had no such previous experience. Moreover, even if it is supposed that he is perceived through verbal testimony (śabda), inference (anumāna), etc., logically there cannot be any occurrence of Rasa in the audience—just as it is not aroused by a thing perceived through direct knowledge. For on the appearance of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of anyone present rather becomes the prey of conflicting feelings (shame, disgust, envy, and so on); and we surely cannot say that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa! If, on the other hand, it is supposed that Rasa is perceived as present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference. Therefore, it is not possible to suppose that Rasa can be perceived—whether this perception be a form of direct experience or of memory. The same errors may be imputed to the thesis which maintains that Rasa is produced. If it is supposed that Rasa first preexists in a potential form (saktirūpatvena) and is later manifested, then the determinants must necessarily

1) In this passage Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains that when the determinants etc., are deities, etc., they cannot be perceived as ‘general’; the deeds of gods are too different (from human affairs)

2) Supra, Intr., pp. XXI, XXII. This assertion is confuted by A.G., infra, p. 58.

3) Heroism, etc.

4) In other words, if Rasa could arise from a simple inference, all the more should it arise from a direct perception.
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Illuminate it little by little.1 Besides, the difficulties already encountered would recur: is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self or as present in a third party? Therefore, (our thesis is as follows :) Rasa is revealed (bhāvyamāna) by a special power assumed by words in poetry and drama, the power of revelation (bhāvana)—to be distinguished from power of denotation (abbidhā)—consisting of the action of generalizing the determinants, etc. This power has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor (moha) occupying our own consciousness: in poetry it is characterized by the absence of defects (doṣā) and the presence of qualities (guna) and ornaments (alamkāra); in drama by the four kinds of representation. Rasa, revealed by this power, is then enjoyed (bhuj) with a kind

1) This objection repeats, mutatis mutandis, the objection of the Buddhists and of the māṇḍūkya against the concept of sphota, which, according to the grammarians (vaiyākarana), is a vocality, eternal and without parts, distinct from the letters and manifested (vyaj) by these. This eternal vocality causes the cognition of the meaning. This objection is as follows: is sphota manifested entirely by the first letter of a word or not? a) If sphota is manifested in its entirety, the letters which come after are unnecessary. In other words, the first letter would be capable of rendering perceptible the meaning of the whole world. b) If sphota is manifested gradually, then it could no longer be without parts. This second alternative is, therefore, in contradiction to the very nature of sphota. The same reasoning is applied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka to Rasa and to the words by which it is manifested.

This gradual manifestation of the Rasa has also been criticized by Śaṅkuka, cf. supra, p. 28.

2) One classical definition of poetry (Hc., p. 33) says: adoṣau saguṇau sālamkārav ca sabdārthau kāvyam || “Poetry is word and content without defects, possessing qualities and also (but not necessarily) ornaments”.

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of enjoyment (bhoga), different from direct experience, memory, etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between sattva and rajah and tamah,¹ is consisting of the

1 a) The light of the self, of the consciousness, does not reveal itself, in the säṃsārika existence, in immaculate purity, but is conditioned by the three constituent elements (guna) of mental substance (buddhi), sattva, light, luminous and pleasant, rajah, mobile, dynamic and painful, tamah, inert, obstructive and stupid. These three constituent elements are never present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions. The state of emergence of the element sattva, limpid and mirror-like, coincides with a manifestation, always more distinct and evident, of the light and beatitude proper to the Self—these indeed reflect themselves in sattva. I.P.V.V., I, p. 150 : sattvam prakāśarūpam nirmalanabhprakhyam savata jaladapatālena iva vāraṇātmanā tamaśa samāvṛtam āste | tatra ca mārutas stimulating yam pravṛtisabhāvam rajah kriyāmakataya kramaṇa tamojaladam apasārayati nyagbhāvayati || "Sattva, which is made up of light and is like the immaculate ether, is completely enshrouded by tamah, the principle of obstruction, as by a blanket of cloud, Rajah, which is made up of action and is, therefore, imbued with activity, serves as a wind, which, little by little, brushes away, dissipates, the cloud-bank of tamah". The three constituent elements, sattva, rajah and tamah are associated with three states of consciousness called, respectively, expansion (vikāsa), provoked by an absolute predominance of sattva, fluidity (druti), determined by a contact of sattva with rajah, and dilatation (vistara) determined by a contact of sattva with tamah.

The conception of the three guṇas, belonging, in particular, to the sām-khya and yoga systems, is accepted, without notable modifications, by the whole of Indian thought.

b) Druti, vistara, and vikāsa are each connected with certain Rasas by later Indian theorists. Druti is the proper state of consciousness of śrīgāra, karuṇa and sānta ; vistara of vīra, raudra and bhāvatsa ; vikāsa, of hāya, adbhuta and bhayānaka. Cf. Dh. Ā.L., comm., p. 206. Rajah predominates in druti, tamah in vistara and sattva in vikāsa. M.C., p. 74 : yadā hi rajasa gunasya drutih tamaso vistarāh sattvasatvikāsah tadāntām bhogah svarūpam labbhati "It is when rajah is in fluidity, tamah in dilatation, and sattva in full expansion that fruition is realized".

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states of fluidity (druti) enlargement (visiara) and expansion (vikasa), is characterized by a resting (visraanti) on one's own consciousness (samvit), which due to the emergent state of sativa, is pervaded by beatitude (ananda) and light (prakasha)\(^1\).

\(^1\) The expression sattvodreka is reproduced almost without change by Mammaṭa, p. 74: sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayamvisrāntisatattvena. It has been commented upon in several ways. I have followed, in the translation, the commentary of Vidyācākravartīna (K. P., Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, LXXXVII): sattvodrēkat yau prakāśānandau tantayām samvīt samādhiśivṛtiṣayāyā yā yoginām visrāntir vigalitasakalasramā nistaraṅgeśvānasthitāsatsadṛṣṭena. M. C., p. 74, comments on: sattvodrekaṣa prakāśaḥ prakato ya ānandas tantayā yā samvit tasyām visrāntih, sā satattvam paramārtho yasya sa tatbā. Referring to Rasa A.G. says in Dh.Ä*L., p. 183, that it is rajastamavacitryānuuddhasattvamayajacitsvabhāvanirvīrtivīrāntīlaksṇaḥ. The famous definition of the aesthetic experience given by Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpāṇa, adds nothing to the conception of A.G. and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Viśvanātha says:

sattvodrekaḥ akbandasvaprakāśānandacinmayah | 
vedyāntarasparśasūnyo brahmāsvādānasabodaraḥ || 
lokottaracamatkārprāṇah kāticit pramātrbhah | 
svākāravad abhinnatvenyam āsvādyate rasah ||

"Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons (i.e., qui rationem artis intelligunt). It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of sativa. It is made up of a full Intelligence, Beatitude and Self-Luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twins brother to the tasting of brahman. It is animated by a camatkāra of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very being, in indivisibility". Cf. the translation of A. K. Coomaraswamy, The Transformation of Nature in Art, Harvard, 1934, pp.48ff. Coomaraswamy translates camatkāra with "lighting-flash". According to Viśvanātha, sativa is nothing but the mind or inner sense (manāḥ) devoid of any contact with rajaḥ and tamāḥ.

b) The terminology used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and referred to by A.G. is exactly analogous to that used by Bhoja, in his definition of the sānandasaṁādhi: yadā tu rajastamolesānuddham antakaraṇasātvam bhāvyate tadā guṇabhāvāc cittākāle bhūḥ aparākāśamayasya sātvasya bhāvyamānasyodrekaḥ sānand-
and is similar to the tasting (āsvāda) of the supreme brahman.

\[dah \text{ samādhir bhavet} \parallel (\text{Bhojavṛtti, I, 17}).\] "When the matter of concentration (bhāvanā is commented on by Bhoja bhāvanā bhāvyasya viṣayāntarapaśāryena cetasi punah punar niveśanam) is the sattva tinged by the rajah and tamah proper to the inner sense, then by virtue both of the subordinate state of the self, and of the emergence of sattva, which is made up of bliss and light and is the matter of concentration, that which is called sānandasamādhi occurs." This passage is also quoted by Pandey, I. Aes., p. 189.

1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experience with mystical experience. The aesthetic state of consciousness is no longer associated with the limited "I"; during the aesthetic experience the subject is completely absorbed in the object contemplated, and the whole of the reality which surrounds him disappears from his view. The same thing, mutatis mutandis occurs in mystical experience; in this sense, aesthetic experience is similar (savidha, sabrahmacārin, sabodara) to experience of the Absolute or of the brahman. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and A. G. (A. G. also accepts Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s opinion; Db. A.L., p. 190: parabrahmaiśvādāsabrahmacāri- tvam cāstav asya rasāsvādasya), however, do not fail to emphasize the unmistakable characteristics of each. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says (Db. A.L. p. 91):

\[vāgdhenaḥ dugdha etaṃ hi rasam yād balatṛṣṇayā |
   tena nāṣya samah sa syād duhyate yogībhir hi yāḥ |
\
"This Rasa (aesthetic pleasure) is poured forth spontaneously by the word which is like a cow, for love of her children; for this reason it is different from that which is (laboriously) milked by yogins." Cf. also A.Bh., p. 5. On the opinion of A.G., infra. pp. 82-84. Two stanzas which reflect the same idea and which are certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, are quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa (Vyaktiviveka), p. 94 (see the translation in the Introd. p. XXVI):

\[pāṭhyād atba dhruvāganāt tataḥ sampūrite rase |
   tadāsvādabharākāgro hṛṣyaty antarmukhāḥ kṣaṇam ||
   tato nirviṣayasyaśya svarūpaśvasthitau nyāḥ |
   vyayate blādaniṣyando yena trīpyantī yogināḥ ||
\
The association between these two states also appears in the affinities of the terms which designate them: viśrānti, nirvṛtti, laya, nirveṣa, samāpatti, samatkāra, etc.,
In this exposition, the thesis confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka are accepted even by us—simply because we do not accept the thesis of Bhaṭṭa Lollatā. Thus the errors confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka have been definitely put to death.¹

As for the rest we do not see what kind of enjoyment distinguishable from perception, etc., can exist in the world. If, as you say it is tasting (rasanā), we reply that this too is a perception², and is only called by another name on account of the particular means (upāya)³ by which it is called into existence. The same thing happens in the case of direct perception (darsana), reasoning (anumāna), the revealed word (śruti), analogy (upamiti), intuition, (pratibhāna),⁴ etc., each of which takes a different name. Besides, if we do not admit that Rasa is produced or manifested, we shall be forced to conclude that it is either eternal or non-existent: no third possibility exists. Again, the existence of an unperceived thing cannot be affirmed. The supporters of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka will perhaps reply that the perception of Rasa is just what they call the power of


2) See below, App. III, p. 112.

3) The determinants, etc.

4) The term pratibhā, pratibhāna, is used in several senses (cf. Intr., pp. XLVIII ff. In the present passage, it has the sense of “an inexplicable intuition as to what may occur in the future, for example, ‘Tomorrow my brother will come’”. It also includes the power of understanding all kinds of sounds without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal in the world and also the power of having heavenly visions” (Dasgupta, H.I. Pb., V, 127). This particular form of consciousness is discussed by Jayanta, Nyāyamañjarī (Benares 1936), pp. 97 ff.
bringing about enjoyment (bhogikarana)—consisting in the states of fluidity, etc. Very well, then! But it is impossible that it should consist solely in these three states. For there exist just as many forms of perception—whose nature, according to you, lies in this very power of bringing about fruition—consisting of a relish, as there are kinds of Rasa. Besides, the constituent elements, sattva, etc., can be found set out in an infinite number of different ways: one may predominate at one time and another at another. Thus it is absurd to limit the forms of relish to only three.

However, if the word “revelation” in the expression “the Rasas are revealed by the poem” (what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says is: “The various Rasas—the erotic, etc., are revealed by the power of revelation”), is used in the sense that the poem becomes the matter of a perception, which consists of a tasting made up of gustation, and which is generated by the determinants, etc., it may be accepted without any question.

Again, in the stanza, “Rasa is, it is said, the aim of poetry (kāvyārtha) it is an experience (anubhava) consisting of a tasting

1) If, says A. G., the expression “enjoyment” is understood in the sense of perception (so that the power of generating enjoyment becomes the power of generating the aesthetic perception, the Tasting), it may certainly be accepted. In this sense, the power of generating enjoyment becomes the same as that which followers of the dīvam school call the power of evocation (dhvananavyāpāra). Cf. infra, App. III, p. 113.

2 a) The expression kāvyārtha is borrowed from Bharata, N. S., VII, p. 342 : kāvyārthān bhāvayānti bhāvāḥ”. [The mental states] are called bhāva because they bring into existence (bhāv) the aims of the poem”. Artha, A G. comments (A Bb, p. 344), in this expression does not carry the meaning of sense, something expressed (abhidbeya) but means the final cause, the aim of the poem (arthyaṃ prābhānyenety arthāḥ na tv arthaśabda bhidheyavāci) ; in other words, Rasa.

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and is the matter of cognition by a not ordinary form of consciousness (parasamvitti), manifested (vyāṅgya) by the union of the determinants, etc.,” Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka apparently considers Rasa as manifested—so that the theory of manifestation is rather maintained than discarded1. By the word “experience” we must really understand the object of it2.

But, being it so, what is then the true nature of Rasa? That is enough! Well, what shall we do3?

Four stanzas of intermezzo

7) Why repeat truths disclosed already in the thought of our predecessor and thus behave as no one has behaved before? This double, serious and evident error will certainly be imputed to me by the audience.

Tireless, the mind of man climbs ever higher to gaze on truth. Behold! This is just the fruit of the doctrines which have succeeded each other on the ladder of thought.

In the beginning, the crossing of the river of the knowable is, I know, agitated and supportless: but as we advance

Aesthetic experience is associated with the experience of brahman, with the supreme consciousness, cf. supra p. XXIV.

1) The existence of dhvani is explicitly denied by Bhatta Nāyaka (cf. the passage quoted by Jacobi, ZDMG, 62, p. 296, Pandey, p. 246 ff.). In some passages, A.G. points out, he seems, nevertheless, to admit its existence implicitly. In this stanza, Bhatta Nāyaka uses, for example, the verb vyāj and therefore admits implicitly the theory of dhvani, the sense manifested, i.e., not expressed, that words assume in poetry.

2) That is to say, that Rasa is the object of the afore-mentioned experience.

3) At this point A. G. interrupts his examination of rejected doctrines with the four following stanzas, which serve as a sort of prelude to the exposition of his own thesis.
doggedly along this road, we cease to be amazed by built bridges, city foundations, or anything else.

A rich and fruitful harvest may be culled by posterity from the inheritance of thought left to it by its predecessors. Thus the doctrines of the sages of antiquity will only be refined by us here and not refuted.

The correct view

8. Let us then state what is the true nature of Rasa purified of previous mistakes. It has already been stated by Bharata, and we shall add nothing new. For he has said: “The mental states are called feelings because they make us feel the aims of poetry.” Therefore, Rasa is simply the aim of poetry. For instance, immediately after the first perception of the literal sense of the following expressions, “They lay by night”, “He gave it (scil., the omentum) to the fire” there occurs (in a qualified person (adhikārīṇ) characterized by a certain pragmatic requirement (arthitā) and so on, and possessed of a keen interest in the object of perception involved) a second perception eliminating the temporal data, etc., contained in the first. This second perception consists in a transfer (samyakramaṇa), etc., of the literal sense and is presented in the form: “I will lay,” “I will give”, etc. According to the various schools, this perception is called propulsion (bhāvanā), command (vidhi), order (niyoga), etc. Now, a similar thing may be said

1) See the literal translation of this quotation at p. 50, n. 2 a.
2) Two quotations taken from revelation (śruti).
3) The past tense of the two expressions in question.
4) In other words, some scriptural sentences (e.g., those quoted) awaken in the believer the need to give the omentum to the fire himself,
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to happen in the case of poetry: there occurs in a qualified person a perception transcending the words of the poem. The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a spotless power of intuition (pratibhāṇa). In such etc. In this sense, their literal meaning undergoes a transformation: the past tense and the third person, etc., used in these sentences are turned into the present tense, etc. There arises in the heart of the believer the form of consciousness (pratipatti), "I will give the omentum to the fire", etc. This passing from one sense to another is given the names of propulsion (bhāvanā), order and command (vidhi, niyoga). The terms bhāvanā, vidhi, and niyoga are proper to the liturgical speculations of mimāṃsā (the term bhāvanā used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was probably taken from the terminology of the pūrvamimāṃsā). The terms vidhi and niyoga, observes J., T.Ā., I. p. 167, are used above all by the followers of Prabhākara; Kumārila’s disciples prefer instead the word bhāvanā. The shift of sense involved, of course, presupposes the adherence of the subject to the sacred writings, his desire to attain certain ends, etc. This shift of sense is clearly explained in three ślokas quoted by H. C., p. 98 (no doubt taken from a work on poetics existing prior to A. G., perhaps the Hṛdayadārpaṇa of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka):

ärogyam āptavān śaṃbhaḥ stutvā devam abarpatim |
syād arthāvagatiḥ pūrvam ityādi vacane yathā ||
tatāś copāttakālādīnā yakkāreṇopajāyate |
pratipattur manasy evam pratipattir na samśayah ||
yah ko 'pi bhāskaram stauti sa sarvo’py agado bhavet |
tasmād abam api staudi roganirnuktaye ravim ||

"In the sentence ‘Śamba regained his health when he praised the Sun God’, etc. there occurs at first the perception of its literal sense, and then (and on this there is no matter of doubt) there arises in the mind of the perceiving subject a perception which eliminates the temporal data, etc., assumed by the sentence in question. This perception is presented in the following form: “Everyone who praises the Sun regains his health; so I too will praise the Sun, so as to free myself from disease”. Cf. I.P.V.V., I, p. 24; I.P.V., I, p. 27.

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a person hearing the following phrases, "There i.e. (scil., the deer) is now, gracefully by the bending of his neck...".

"Even Umā, dropping the golden karnikāra...", "The firmness of Hara...", there appears, immediately after the perception of their literal sense, a perception of a different order (an inner [mānasī] perception, consisting in a direct experience [sāksātkaśā]) which completely eliminates the temporal dis-

1) Kālidāsa, Abhyāṣaṇa-sakuntalā, I, 2 : "There he (scil. the deer) is now, gracefully by the bending of his neck casting a glance ever and anon at the chariot which pursues him, by [the contraction of] the hinder half (of his body) repeatedly drawing himself into the fore [part of his] body, through fear of the descent of the arrow; strewing the road with grass half-chewed which drops from his mouth kept open from exhaustion. See by reason of his lofty boundings he goes chiefly in the air, and little on the ground" (Monier Williams, Sakuntalā, Hertford, 1853, p. 9).

2) Kālidāsa, Kumāra-sambhava, III, 62 : "Even Umā, dropping the golden karnikāra flowers which glowed among her black tresses, deeply bowed her head (while the flowers which adorned them fell from her ears) before Śiva".

3) Op. cit., III, 67 : "The firmness of Hara, even, was somewhat shaken—like the sea when the moon is just about to rise; he cast his eyes in desire towards the face of Umā, towards her lips, red as the fruit of the bimba".

4) Like to sensations of pleasure, pain, etc., the aesthetic experience is an inner or mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa), i.e., it is perceived through the mind or inner sense. Such a perception is self-knowing (svasamvedana, siddha). In the A.Bb., p. 291, A. G. observes that the fact of tasting (āsvadana; aesthetic perception being conceived as a particular form of tasting) is of a mental order : it differs from the fact of eating, which is a purely material act (rasanayāpāraṇa bhajanād adhiko yo mānasasvāpārah evāsvādananam). The mind of him who tastes must be ekāgra, absorbed in the object of the tasting to the exclusion of all else. On the contrary, he who eats may be also anayacitta: he can also think of other things, etc. Aesthetic tasting is of a non-ordinary nature (alaukika), sui generis.
The mind is the organ of tasting; during the tasting, the mind must be free of all obstacles, devoid, that is to say, of any other sensory perceptions, etc. The subject is immersed in a camatkāra set apart from any distinction of "self" or "others". Aesthetic tasting is a 'generalised' perception and free, therefore, of obstacles (in the A.Bh., I, p. 291 the expression āsvādayanti manasā N.Ś., VI, v. 36, is commented upon in the following manner: ā samantāt sādharanībhāvena nirvighnaprattipattvāsān manasā indriyāntaravighnasaṃbhāvanāśīnyena svādayanti svaparavivekaśīnyena-vādacamātkāraparavastā...).

1) In other words, the spectator (and hence the state of consciousness by which he is pervaded) is not in the real time and space either of the deer or of the actor as such. In the aesthetic experience, these two temporal and spatial orders cancel each other out. On the one hand, therefore, the deer, etc., is without any temporal or spatial determination (viz. it is not felt as an element of ordinary life but is perceived in a generalized form); similarly, the actor, and hence the impression of fear which he suggests, is not perceived as a constituent element of practical life. The state of consciousness which does occur is, therefore, unaffected by space and time; it is a generalized permanent mental state, a Rasa.

2) "Shunning, etc", i.e., shunning, accepting and disregarding.
the contrary, is the matter of cognition by a perception devoid of obstacles (nirvighna), and may be said to enter directly (nivīś) into our hearts, to dance (viparivṛt) before our eyes: this is the terrible Rasa. In such a fear, one’s own self is neither completely immersed (tiraskṛ) nor in a state of particular emergence (ullikā), and the same thing happens with the others. As a result of this, the state of generality involved is not limited (parimita), but extended (vitata)—as happens at the moment in which is formed the idea of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between smoke and fire or, in fact, between trembling and fear. Therefore, this idea to be confronted.

1) Viparivṛt—means to move, to revolve, etc. The use of the word is ancient. It is to be found in Bhartṛhari (I, 125, tīkā, p. 125 (ed. of Lahore): buddhau viparivartate. In the same sense (that is, with buddhau) it is used by Dharmakīrti and Kumārila also. A.G. comments on the word viparivartamānasya in the following way (I.P.V., II, p. 140): vicstratvena viśaya bhedabhedātmānā parvartamānasya spandanena sphurato...

2) In the first case there would be no aesthetic cognition, but mystical cognition, characterized by the total absence of discursive thought and distinct apprehensions (yikalpa). In the second case, ordinary discursive cognition would occur. In both these cases, then, the ubhayadesākāyalatāgab required by the aesthetic experience would be absent. Cf. the Nātyadarpaṇa by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, Baroda, 1929, p. 161. For the antithesis between ātmān and para cf. PTV, pp. 71-72: atra hi madhyamapāde ātmāvam sam śyutate nāparah... ātmāna eva śravaṇām syāt na parasya...

3) The best explanation of this passage is to be found in I.P.V., II, 4, 12: iba in darśane vyāptigrābaṇāstbhāyām yāvantasaścādbhāvyāmānasadbhāvaḥ pramātāras tāvatām eko 'san dbhāmbhāsā ca vabnyābhāsā ca babhanaye iva, tāvats teśām paramesvarapraśaṇīṣkyaṁ nirmitam/K. Ch. Pandey, Bhāskari, vol. III, p. 178. translates: “But, according to this system, at the time of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the images of smoke and fire are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existence at that place [i.e., in the kitchen, etc.], as according to those who admit the existence of an external objective world. For, in relation to these images, the Lord [i.e., Isvara, the unlimited Ego, etc.] has made the subjects one”.

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with a real experience is nourished by the combination of

A.G. observes that the pleasure given by a spectacle increases when there are a large number of spectators. In other words, when each spectator is conscious that the spectacle is being seen at the same time by a number of other people. T. A., X, v. 85 ff.:

"The spectators who watch, absorbed, a performance of dancing, of singing, etc., feel that it is a real sea of nectar (J. comments: "anyone, in fact, can observe that spectacles seen by many people at the same time generate a greater pleasure than those which are seen by a single individual). It is for this reason that those who teach the true nature of performances of jostling and acting, say that, in these, a real state of identity of all knowing subjects takes place; this state generates a perception of a full and perfect beatitude (J. comments: pūrṇarūpeta iyad eva hi pūrṇaṁ rūpaṁ yad vigalitaye dhyanantarayā tatraśvāmanyākāṅkṣatvena parāmarśanāṁ nāma). If the mere consciousness of what they see on the stage (without, that is, the realization that the performance is seen by other people) were sufficient to satisfy the spectators taken one by one, how then can the different state of consciousness, which arises when they are together, be explained? And how could it still be sustained that a state of identity of knowing subjects exists? When, instead, the spectator is aware that the spectacle is seen at the same time by all others also, one can say with reason that it appears in a different form from the arid aspect it had before (this spectacle, then, observes J., takes on another nature which generates a very high cematkāra "). See on all that the Introd., pp. XXXVII ff. In A.G. the expression vitatavyāpti, etc., occurs elsewhere also, and not always in a technical sense (see f.i., Dh. A.L., p. 378; Bh. G.A.S., pp. 110, 136).

1) The aesthetic perception, which is not dependent on the concepts of reality and unreality, cannot be spoken of as a real experience (that is,
actors, etc. In this combination, indeed—in that the real limiting causes (niyamahetu), (time, space, the particularized cognizing subject, etc.) on one side, and those afforded by the poem on the other, neutralize each other and then completely disappear—the afore-mentioned state of generality is readily nourished; so that by virtue of the very uniformity (ekaghanatā) of the spectator’s perception, it being so nourished, readily nourishes the Rasa in all of them: and this occurs because the latent impressions of their minds concord with each other, the minds being varied by beginningless latent impressions.  

The direct experience, perception of something real, pratyakṣa, sāksāt karā, but, A.G. says, it is “like” a real experience (sāksāt kārāyamāna = sāksāt kārākalpa, pratyakṣa kalpa). See A.Bh, I, p. 43: the drama is pratyakṣa kalpanij vyavasāyaviṣayo lokaprasādhasatyādīvilakṣaṇatvāt. In other terms, the aesthetic experience is a direct perception sui generis, free of every relation with practical reality, etc.

1) The word ekaghanatā derives from ghana. “Ghana, from ghan, to strike, hinder, etc., has a primary sense of “dense mass”, implying a condensation of multiple factors without extension in space” (A. K. Coomaraswamy, The Transformation of Nature in Art, Harvard 1934 p. 209). Hence ekaghaṇa comes to mean “dense”, “compact”, “uniform”, etc., in the sense of a state of consciousness which does not allow the interference of “obstacles” (vighna).

2) A.G. replies with this argument to the objection of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka according to whom the spectator can identify himself only with a person similar to himself but not with a being of a non-ordinary nature, as Rāma, deity, etc. The identification and therefore the state of generality required for the aesthetic experience postulates an affinity of nature (latent impressions, tendencies, instincts, etc.) between the spectator and the person represented. A G. replies to this objection saying that no being (animal or deity) exists with which man has no affinity of nature. The sāṃśāra is
This (form of) consciousness without obstacles is called *camatkāra*; the physical effects of it, that is to say, trembling, excitation, joyful motions of limbs (*ullukasana*), etc., are also *camatkāra*. For example: "Viṣṇu is still today in a state of *camatkāra*: how, oh how is it that the limbs of Lakṣmī, which are as beautiful as a piece of the moon, have not been taken to pieces by mount Mandara?" Indeed, *camatkāra* may be likewise defined as an immersion in an enjoyment (*bhogāvesah*) which can never satiate and is thus uninterrupted (*trptivyatrekenācchinnah*). The word *camatkāra*, indeed, properly means the action being done by a tasting subject (*camataḥ karanam*), in other words, by the enjoying beginningless and every man, before being that which he actually is, has been all the other beings as well. The consciousness of the spectator thus possesses (in other words, is varied by...) the latent impressions of all the possible beings and he is therefore susceptible of identifying himself with each of them. The same concept is expounded in the *Dh.A.L.* p. 187; see below, App. III, p. 112.

1) See the Intr., pp. XLV-XLVI.

2) The term *ullukasana* is explained by A. G. (*A. Bh.*, I, p. 330) *gātrasyor-dvam sāhlādam dhūnam*.

3) *A.Bh.*, III, ch. XXII, p. 152: *ibā cittavṛttir eva saṃvedānabhūman samkrāntā debam api vyāpnoti* || "The mental movements, which are phenomena of consciousness, are also transmitted to the body and pervade it".

4) Unidentified stanza. This is an allusion to the churning of the ocean. The gods and demons took Mount Mandara for a churning stick and various precious objects were churned from the deep, amongst which the moon and Śrī (Lakṣmī), the goddess of beauty. The aesthetic experience of *camatkāra* reappears in the consciousness every time the determinants, etc. (the poetic expression), by which it is aroused, are evoked. Cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 37 (App. II). The example offered by A.G. (of Viṣṇu who is still under the influence of a *camatkāra*) exemplifies this very character of aesthetic pleasure.
subject, he who is immersed in the vibration \( (\text{spanda}) \)
\(^1\) of a marvellous enjoyment \( (\text{adbhutabhoga}) \)
\(^2\). It may be thought of either as a form of mental cognition
\( (\text{mānasādhyavasāya}) \) consisting of a direct experience
\(^3\), or of imagination \( (\text{samkalpa}) \) or of remembrance, which nevertheless, is manifested in a
different manner to its ordinary nature. For as Kālidāsa
said: “Often a man, though happy, becomes uneasy of mind
on seeing beautiful objects and hearing sweet musics. Surely,
he remembers in his soul, though vaguely, associations of
former births deeply implanted in him
\(^4\). In any case, however, it is a form of perception—a perception in which what

1) \( \text{Spanda} \) means movement, vibration, energy, etc. According to the
\( \text{śaiva} \) schools of Kashmir, consciousness is vibration, the ceaseless force from
which springs all that exists. The modes of discursive thought are the
fruits of the solidification of this first, incandescent principle. This force
manifests itself in the instinctive motions of consciousness (fear, joy, etc.).
It is the energy that consents to go from word to word, from thought to
thought. It is the first moment of will \( (\text{sechā}) \), the initial motion of the
spirit, which is presupposed by any form of consciousness. The terms
‘heart’ \( (\text{hrdaya}) \), thought \( (\text{vimarśa}) \), bliss \( (\text{ānanda}) \), vibration, \( (\text{sphurati},
\text{gṛṇi}) \), etc., express the same concept. On consciousness as movement, etc., see, above all, the
\( \text{Spandakārikā} \) by Kallaṭa, \( \text{passim} \); Somānanda,
\( \text{Śivadarśī} \), p. 11; \( \text{I.P.V.V.} \), I, 5, v. 14. In the present case, \( \text{spanda} \) is the
movement, the inner rhythm of the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic
experience is an inner perception like pleasure, pain, etc., and, in this
sense, is not of a discursive order \( (\text{vikalpaka}) \).

2) Cf. \( \text{supra Intr.} \), p. XXXIII.

3) I.e., it is a mental or inner perception.

4) Kālidāsa, \( \text{Śakuntalā} \), V, 96. This stanza is quoted by A.G., also
in \( \text{I.P.V.V.} \), III, p. 252. The disquiet, to which Kālidāsa alludes, is,
observes A.G., an unobjectified desire; it corresponds to what is, metaphysi-
cally, the desire which induces consciousness to deny its original fullness.
appears (is just a feeling, for instance) delight, consisting of a tasting. For this reason, i.e., because it is not conditioned by further specifications, this perception is apt to become the object of a relish, and, as such, it is neither a form of ordinary cognition, nor is it erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary perception, nor does it consist of a super-imposition. To

and to crumble in time and space, i.e., the ānava

ca

märū

hi bhunjäna
tatā svätmaviśrändolakṣaṇā sarvatra icchā | kvacit tu svätmaviśrändir bhäväntaram anägūritaviśeṣam āpeksya utthäpyate yatra sa icchā räga ity ucçate, āgūritaviśeṣatyām tu kāma iti | ādgrahaṇād abhiläśamalo yatra bhäväntaram sāmänyäkäraṁ api vāsänäväsamäträṇaṁ yathäha “bhänasthiräṇī janänäntarasahyädiṇi” iti : “The fact of being in a state of camatkāra, of being on the point of enjoying something (characterized by a rest in one’s own Self) is, without any exception, a form of will [the will is the first moment of Consciousness, before it crystallizes in the forms of the discursive cognition]. Sometimes such a rest in one’s own self appears in connexion with an object in general, without any further determinations ; in this case, the will is called ‘attachment’. At other times it appears in connexion with a determined object and, in this case, there is what is called ‘love’. By the word, ‘etc.’, Utpaladeva hints at the maculation of the desire (the ānava, etc.; cf. supra) ; it is obtained when the objectiveness considered is not only indefinite, but in a state of latent impression (that is, when it is not yet developed and appears in a state of potentiality ; the ānava is therefore an unobjectified desire, akarmakam abhiläśamättram. T.S., p. 75 : “The maculation is an eager agitation consisting in the presumption of one’s own non-fullness, a mere desire without an object, a predisposition to the future limitations ”]. For example : “... the associations of former births deeply implanted in him”.

1) In other words, a perception characterized by the presence of a generalized feeling (delight, anger, etc.)

2) By no temporal, spatial, individual, etc., specification. In other words, by no obstacle.

3) I.e., a reproduction of it (Śankuka’s doctrine).

4) “As when wrong knowledge follows after the right one is vitiated”.

See below, App. I, p. 93.
conclude we may say equally well that it consists of a state of intensification—using this term to indicate that it is not limited by space, etc.; that it is a reproduction—using this word to mean that it is a production which repeats the feelings; and that it is a combination of different elements—this conception being interpreted in the light of the doctrine of the vijñānavādin. From whichever point of view it is examined, Rasa is, in any case, simply and solely a mental state which is the matter of cognition on the part of a perception without obstacles and consisting in a relish.

The obstacles to the realization of Rasa

9. In this connection, the elements which eliminate the obstacles are the determinants, etc. Also in the ordinary world, indeed, the different words camatkāra, immersion (nirveṣa), relish (rasanā), tasting (āsvādana), enjoyment (bhoga), accomplishment (samāpatti), lysis (laya), rest (vīrānti), etc., mean nothing but a [form of] consciousness completely free from any obstacles whatever. Now, the obstacles to the perception in question are—a) the unsuitability, that is to say, the lack of verisimilitude; b) the immersion in temporal and spatial determinations perceived as exclusively one’s own or exclusively those of another; c) the fact of being at the mercy of our own sensations of

1) Lollata’s doctrine.

2) Tentatively, I have so rendered the linguistic explanation of anukāra by bhāvāngāmitayā karanāt. Lit., “to mean that it is an operation temporally following the feelings”.

3) See above, p. 41. Well, says A.G. here, this theory is also true if it is interpreted in the light of the vijñānavāda, the idealistic Buddhism, according to which everything that exists is pure consciousness or perception.
pleasure, etc.; d) the defective state of the means of perception; e) the lack of evidence; f) the lack of some predominant factor; g) and the presence of doubt.

a) Indeed, if one considers the things presented as lacking in verisimilitude, he cannot obviously immerse (vimnuṣ) his consciousness in them, so that no rest—no rest, I say, in them—can take place. This is the first obstacle. The means by which it is eliminated is the consent of the heart which takes place at the view of ordinary events\(^1\). When extraordinary incidents have to be portrayed, it is necessary to choose personages whose names are famous, like Rāma, etc., who make us give belief to their undertakings—a believing (pratyaya) indeed, deeply rooted in ourselves, aroused by the uninterrupted fame (prasiddhi) which they have enjoyed since antiquity\(^2\). Just for this reason, it will be said that nāṭaka\(^3\), etc., whose purpose is the learning (vyutpatti) and teaching (upadesā) of deeds transcending the ordinary life, necessarily requires to deal with famous events and so on. This requirement, however, is absent in the case of farces (prahasana). But all that will be explained

1) An event of an ordinary character finds a more ready response in the spectator’s heart.

2) If the same extraordinary events (crossing of the ocean, etc.) which are, in fact, attributed to a legendary figure (Rāma, etc.) where referred to an ordinary man, they would arouse the incredulity of the spectators. Dhr. Ā.L., p. 331: rāmādes tu tathāvidham api caritam pūrvaprasiddhiparam-
popacitasampratyayopārūdhham atasyatayā na cakāṣt i||“But when such undertakings are referred to Rāma, etc., they lose all appearance of falsehood; for they are rooted in the spectator’s confidence, the cumulative result of the uninterrupted fame enjoyed from antiquity by the character in question”.

3) Cf. p. 64, n. 1.
at a suitable time and place. For the time being this is enough.

b) One of the principal obstacles regularly occurs when the spectator is at the mercy of the tasting of pleasures, pains, etc., inhering in his own person. This obstacle consists in the appearance of other forms of consciousness, due variously to the fear of being abandoned by the sensations of pleasure, etc., to concern for their preservation, to a desire to procure other similar sensations, to the desire to get rid of them, give them open expression, hide them, etc. Even when someone perceives pleasures, pains, etc., as inhering exclusively in other persons, other forms of consciousness inevitably arise in him (pleasures, pains, mental stupor, indifference [mādhya-sthāya].

1) A.Bh, ch. XVIII. The appropriate subjects for the ten kinds of play are described and commented upon in N.S., XVIII. Nāṭaka are plays on elevated subjects. Daśarūpa, Haas, p. 4: “The ten chief varieties (of drama) are: the Nāṭaka, the Prakaraṇa, the Bhāṇa, the Prabasana, the Dīma, the Vyāyoga, the Samavakāra, the Vīthi, the Anka (=Utsṛṣṭi-kāṅka), and the Ībāmṛga”. Cf. Ind. Tb., p. 139 ff. In the A.Bh., p. 27, A.G. makes the general remark: na ca vartamānācaritānukāro yukto vinyānam tatra rāgadveṣanadhyasthatādina tanmayībhāvabhāve prīter abhāvena vyutpatte abbhāvāt, vartamānācāriṣe ca dharmārthikarmaphalasambandhaya prayākṣatve prayogavāyartham | “It is not fitting to imitate an event of actual life; for in this case the spectator would be affected by passions (hatred, partisanship, indifference, etc.) [extraneous to the aesthetic experience] and would thus be unable to identify himself with the event represented. Pleasure being thus absent, instruction would be absent as well. Besides, in the case of an actual event, the relation between the action (its merit etc.) and the fruits which result from it is discerned by direct experience, it is, therefore, useless to set it on the stage”.

The word imitation (ānukāra) must be understood in a broad sense. Teaching or knowledge is an accessory aim (prayojana) of art; its principal aim is aesthetic pleasure (prīti, ānanda etc.) Cf. App. III, p. 114.
which naturally constitute an obstacle. The means of eliminating this obstacle are the so-called theatrical conventions (nātyadharmi), which include a number of things not to be found in ordinary life, as, for instance, the zones (kaksyā) dividing the pavilion (mandapa) the stage (rāngapītha), the various types of women's dance, the various dialects (bhāṣā), used, etc.; and last but not least, also the different dress of the actors—the headwear, etc.—by which they hide their true identity. However, this is revealed to the spectators during the preliminaries (pūrvaranga), (see the stanza : “It is best not to insist too much on dance and song”), as well as in the initial presentation (prastāvanā), defined in the stanza: “The actress, or the jester...”. Indeed, the presence of the afore-mentioned elements eliminates the perception: this particular individual in this particular place, at this particular moment, feels pain, pleasure, etc. This eli-


2) The “preliminaries” (pūrvaranga) include the whole body of rites, ceremonies, etc., celebrated at the beginning of the play. They end with the benediction stanza, nāndi. There is a risk of distorting or boring the audience by a long-drawn-out performance of these rites. Bharata himself recommends that they should not be too much insisted on (N.Ś., V. 165-166). “It is best not to insist too much on ritual dances and songs for the very reason that if the songs, the instrumental music and the dances are performed far too long, the actors as well as the spectators will get tired of them and, in this case, they will not be able to seize, with all their evidence, the Rasas and the mental states which will be represented”). The nāndi stanzas are immediately followed by the “prologue” (prastāvanā), giving the name of the play, of the author, etc. The prologue generally consists of a dialogue between the producer of the play and an assistant (pāripārvikā); the latter may be replaced by an actress, by the jester, etc.
mination takes place in so far as in the theatrical performance, there is on the one hand the negation of the real being of the actor, and on the other—since the spectator’s consciousness does not rest entirely on the represented images—there is no rest on the real being of the superimposed personage; so that, as a result of all this, there is eventually just a negation both of the real being of the actor and of the real being of the character he is playing. Indeed, even if dances such as āśinapāṭhya, puspagnāḍikā, etc., are not seen in ordinary life, it cannot be said that they do not exist at all—for it is undeniable that they exist in some way.

1) Here the reading is uncertain; see the Crit. App. I read pratibhā, sasaṃsvastivrāntvayākyena and take pratibhāsa as image, etc., that is, the represented images.

2) In other words, the character of Rāma, etc., who is super-imposed to the real being of the actor.

3) Dasarūpa, Haas, 99: “The tenfold enumeration of the sub-divisions (anga) in the Gentle Dance (lāśya; I translate: women’s dance) runs as follows: the Gevapada (Song), the Sthitapāṭhya (Recitation by one standing), the Āśinapāṭhya (Recitation by one seated), the Puspagnāḍikā, the Pracchedaka, the Triguḍba, the one called Saṃdhava, the Dvugūḍha, the Uttamottamaka, and the Uktapratyukta (Amoebean Song)”.

Each of these terms is defined by Bharata, N. Ś., XIX, vv. 119-135. The dance, A.G. remarks, does not imitate anything in real life but is a self-subsistent creation, free from any practical aim. It is the natural expression, through the movements of the limbs, of a given state of mind. A.Bh., I, p. 21, nartanam nittam gātrānām angopāṅgānām vilāsena kṣepe na te kenacit kartavyāmsena | The dance of Śiva is the natural expression of his complete and perfect bliss, free of all obstacles (nirvāra—nirvighna): sāṅkara-Śyāva bhagavatāh pari-pūrṇānandamūrbarībhūtadeboccala tāntaranirvārasundarā-kāśaya... A.Bh., I, p. 21.

4) Thus, even if the character represented is a negation of the actor as such and of the real character represented by the actor, it cannot be said that he does not exist, that he is a nonentity, his existence in fact is a datum of one’s own consciousness.
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

To conclude, all this system of relative and connected matters has been adopted by Bharata, in so far as by virtue of the state of generality produced, it promotes the gustation of Rasa. All this will be clarified in the chapters which explain these dances, etc.¹ and so for the time being, it is of no use we strive after it. And thus we have explained the way to eliminate this obstacle, consisting of the perception of temporal, etc., data as inhering exclusively in one's own person or in others.

1) Again, how can any one who is overpowered by his own happiness, etc., make his consciousness rest on something else? To avoid this obstacle there have been adopted various means to be used at suitable times and places, such as music, vocal and instrumental, well-decorated halls, well-accomplished courtesans, and so on². In virtue of the afore-mentioned state of generality these expedients—phonic, etc.,—are such as to be enjoyed by all the spectators and possess such a charming power (vparāṇy) that even an unaesthetic person (abhṛdaya) reaches limpidity of heart and becomes “possessed of heart”. Indeed it has been said, “poetry is visible or audible³”.

2) Moreover, if the means of perception are absent, perception itself will also naturally be absent.

1) N.S., XIX, ff.

2) The term pada after mandapa is not clear to me, and it is not represented in the translation.

3) N.S., I, v.11. The empirical division of aesthetic beauty into visible and audible is not unfamiliar to Indian thought. Only sense-data taken through hearing and sight can be tasted independently of any association with the ego, in a generalized way (sādhārāṇikṛta). The other senses ferment solely in one’s own Self (svātmay evocchalanāt; P.T.V., p. 48), i.e., are unable to break the barrier of the limited “I”.

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e) Even if there may be such verbal testimonies and inferences, as to provoke an evident perception, perception, however, does not rest (in them), because there is, in it, the expectancy of the certainty proper to direct experience, which consists in an evident perception¹. For as Vātsyāyana has said: “All valid knowledge depends upon direct experience²“. It is well-known, indeed, that a thing which has been directly perceived, cannot be proved to be otherwise by any number of inferences and verbal testimonies. In cases like the imaginary circle of fire created when a burning stick is swiftly revolved, our knowledge is disproved only by a more powerful direct perception. This is quite an ordinary process. Therefore, to remove these two obstacles, there are—consecrated by tradition—the four modes of representation, furnished with the styles (vṛtti)³, the local usages

1) “Even though—thus A. Sankaran, op. cit., p. 106, paraphrases this passage—there may be clear and unmistakable verbal testimony and inference, we do not completely rest content with the knowledge derived therefrom; for therein is lacking that perceptual cognition which alone makes for clear, direct and definite knowledge”. With A. Sankaran, I have read here, sphūtapatītīkāśabdalingasamabhāve 'pi. Should I have preferred the reading asphūta, the translation would have been: “Even if there may be verbal testimonies and inferences—which, as a rule, do not provoke an evident perception—” etc.

2) Nyāyaśūtra, Vātsyāyanabāṣya, I, I, 3: sā (A.G. reads sarvā) iyaṃ pramitibhūtapi pratyakṣaparā |

3) The Styles (vṛtti) are four in number: kaiśikī, sāttvati, ārabhatī and bhārati. Dasarūpa, Haas, p. 74: “The Gay Style (kaiśikī) (is to be used) in (expressing) the Erotic Rasa; the Grandiose Style (sāttvati) in (expressing) the Heroic Rasa; the Horrific Style (ārabhatī), on the other hand, in (expressing) the Furious and Odious Rasa; The Eloquent Style (bhārati) everywhere”. On the vṛtti see The Vṛttis, by V. Raghavan, J.O.R., Madras, vol. VI, pp. 346 ff.; vol. VII, pp. 33 ff.
The aesthetic experience, etc.

1) The local usages (prāvr̥tti) are four in number: āvantu, dākṣiṇātyā, andrāmāgadhi, pāncali, Cf. NŚ, VI, v. 26, 27; XIII, v. 37 and prose, pp. 205-207. Ind.Th., p. 16: “Local usages regarding costumes, languages, manners and professions differ in the different countries of the world. They are the prāvr̥tti or local colours in drama”.

2) For the best explanation, see A.Bh., I, 292: tatra ye svabhāvato nirṇālamukurahṛdayās ta eva sāṁśārocitakrodhāmaḥbhābhilāṣa-pravāsāntamanaso na bhavanti | teṣāṁ tathāvidbhadāśāśattipakāś-karvanam-samaye sādhravyārasanāntimaka- 

caranāgrāhīyo rasasamceya nātyalakṣaṇah (G: lakṣaṇa) spuṣta eva | ye tv aśābdhābhātās teṣāṁ pratyakṣocitatathāvidhacarvanālābhāya nātādiprakriyā svaga-

takrodhāsokādisaṅkataḥahrdayagranthābhaṅjanāya gītādiprakriyā ca muninā 

varastā | “In this connexion, the mind of those who have by nature hearts like an immaculate mirror is not at the mercy of the desires, anger, or stupor proper to sāṁśārika existence (that of everyday life). The mere fact of hearing the play read is sufficient (in itself, independently of any acting) to induce in them with the greatest clearness the perception of the various Rasas which animate it; this perception consists in a Sampling animated by a generalized Tasting. To make this Tasting (which needs a direct perception) available to people who are deprived of this faculty, Bharata has, on the one hand, explained the discipline of the actors, etc., and, on the other—to cut the knots of the heart obscured by Anger, Sorrow, etc., inherent in one’s own Self—has explained the discipline of vocal music, etc.”. Representation (and therefore drama in general which is founded upon Representation) consists of a form of direct perception, is an adhya-

tāsāya (mental cognition, etc.; also vyavāsāya, anuvyavāsāya, cf. App. I) that is like the direct perception (sāksāṭkāra-kalpa, pratyakṣa-kalpa). A.Bh., 

XXI, 150: abhinayanam hi cittavṛttisādhravañatrañ̄atimśaśāsavāsāṭkāraka-kalpa-

dhyāna-sāmpādañam | “Representation arouses a mental cognition which is like a direct perception; it consists in causing the generalization of mental movements”. A.Bh., XXII, 148: vighnasambhāvānāśa透视 śāddhāraṇa-

bhashāvāsāksāṭkāraka-kalpa-dhyāyasāya-saṃpattaye sarveṣāṁ prayoga ity uktam | 

“IT is said that the acting (prayoga=parśadi prakatikarāṇam, A.Bh., I, 16) of the four forms of Representation aims just at arousing a mental cognition, which is like a direct perception. It consists of a generalized state of evi-
presentation, indeed, is a different operation from that of inference and verbal testimony; and, as we will expound later on, it is almost equal to direct perception.

f) Does there exist a man whose consciousness rests on anything of a secondary order (aprädhanä)? Indeed, such a perception would find no rest in itself and would thus run (anudhär) automatically towards the predominant thing. This is the reason why the Permanent State only can be the object of Tasting; because, I say, the Determinants and the Consequents, which are insentient (jaḍa), and the Transitory Mental States, which, though not insentient, nevertheless are necessarily depending on the Permanent States, are all equally subordinate. Now, among the various sentiments, some are conducive to the end.

dence common to all the spectators and devoid of every possible obstacle” Drama is the object of cognition by an anuvyasāya (about this word cf. App. I) which is like a direct perception, A.Bh., I, 43.

1) Cf. Db.Ā.L., p. 177: taccarvanāpi cittavṛtti eva paryavasātaḥ rasabhāvebhyo nādhikām carvāṇīyam | "The Tasting of the Determinants, etc., necessarily terminates in the mental movements; thus, apart from the bhāva (the matter of the Rasas) there is nothing else which can be tasted.

A.Bh., I, p. 268: sa ca yady apy anantavibhāvātmā tathāpi sarvesaṁ jaḍānāṁ sanvadi tasyāt ca bhoktāri bhoktrvargasya ca pradbhe bhoktāri paryavasānāṁ nāyakābhiḥ bhānabhoktrvīśṣasthāyacittavṛttiśvabhāvaḥ | "Though [drama, etc.] is constituted by an infinite number of determinants, etc., all the elements, which compound it, rest, however, in the consciousness (the permanent mental state). This rests in the enjoying subject (the limited enjoying subject, the practical Self) and the whole of the enjoying subjects rest in their turn, in the principal enjoying subject [the generalized knowing subject]. Therefore, we may say that drama consists in a permanent mental state of a particular enjoying subject, called an actor, etc." Such a mental state, continues A.G. is unique, generalized, devoid of the notions “own”, “of others”, etc. and, therefore, it pervades also the spectators: ata eva sādhāraṇībhūtatayā sāmañjikam api svātmasadbhāvena sāmañjayantī...
of life¹: these are the predominant ones. To specify, delight is conducive to pleasure, and to the forms and profit connected (anusaṅgi) with it. Anger, in people in which it predominates, is conducive to profit—but can also end in pleasure and merit. Energy ends in all three, merit, etc. Eventually, another sentiment—consisting above all in the disgust aroused by the knowledge of reality²—is the means of liberation. These four sentiments only are the predominant ones. Even if they are not to be found in a predominant position all four together, and the emergence of one of them naturally postulates the subordination of the other three, nevertheless someone of them is always predominant in each drama, so that all of them are clearly recognised as being, in turn (that is, one in

1) According to a pan-Indian conception, human life is motivated by four purposes: kāma, artha, dharma, and mokṣa. Kāma is pleasure and love. Artha is material property (economics, politics, etc., are directed to the fulfilment of this end). Dharma embraces moral and religious duty. Mokṣa is the liberation or redemption of the soul from the flow of existence; it is the paramārtha, the supreme purpose of man. For an excellent account of the four artha, see H. Zimmer, Les Philosophies de l'Inde, Payot, pp. 35 ff. The principal forms of consciousness (sthāyibhāva) are those which are necessary to the fulfilment of these purposes; they are delight (rati), anger (krodha), energy (utsāha), and serenity (sama). The end of delight is pleasure; however, through pleasure, it can bring us to the achievement of profit and right action (Bharata, N.S., XVIII, v. 72 ff., distinguishes three kinds of Erotic Rasa, kāmaśṛṅgāra, arthaśṛṅgāra, and dharmaśṛṅgāra). Anger and Energy are associated with artha and dharma respectively, but both of them may also contribute to the realization of all three purposes (cf. Dh.Ā.L., p. 309: vīraraudrayos tv atyantavrodho 'pi nāsti | samānān | rūpam ca dharmaśṛṅgāraśāsanām). Spiritual Freedom is the fruit of serenity.

2) The characteristics of this sthāyibhāva are discussed by A.G. in the A.Bh., pp. 333-42. Abhinava Gupta's text is edited with a commentary by V. Raghavan, The Number of Rasas, Adyar, 1940.
this drama and the other in another one), equally predominant. Moreover, if things are more closely examined, all four of them will be seen to be present in the same drama, in various passages, in a pre-eminent position.

In this connection, all these Rasas are dominated by pleasure (śukha), for the essence of the closely dense (ekaghana) light consisting of the gustation of our own consciousness, is beatitude\(^2\). Indeed, in ordinary life also, women, even when they are immersed in the compact (ekaghana) gustation of the form of consciousness called sorrow, find rest in their own

1) Uniform, without obstacles (vīghna).

2) The intimate essence of consciousness or the “I”, according to the saiva is beatitude. The absence of beatitude and suffering are due to a need, privation, or desire for something separated from the Self. Beatitude is the absence of this desire, the resting in oneself to the exclusion of everything else. The “I” contains all things; everything that exists arises from its unconfined liberty. It cannot be the seat of any deprivation and can desire nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one’s own consciousness and, therefore, of one’s own essential beatitude. In this sense, Rasa is single. This Tasting is coloured (anuralāṭita, rūṣṭa) by latent impressions (vāsanā, saṃskāra) of the mental process of Delight, etc., aroused by the determinants, etc., i.e., by poetic expression. From this point of view the plurality of the Rasas is due to the diversity of the vibhāva (vibhāva-bhedam rasabhede hetutvena sūcayatu...A.Bb., I, p. 290). Cf. A.Bb., I, p. 292.

Asmanmate tu sampvedanam evānandagbhaṃ āsvādyate | tatra kā duḥkha-śankā | kevalam tasyaiva citrākaraṇe ratiṣokādivāsanāvāpyāras tadbhāvane cābhīnayādvāpyāraḥ | “According to us, that which is tasted is consciousness alone which is saturated with beatitude. This fact excludes, therefore, any suspicion of pain. This consciousness which is single in itself, is nevertheless differentiated by the operation of the latent traces of delight, sorrow, etc., which are awakened by the operation of the Consequents, etc. (abhīneya=anubhāva). For the nature of this “colouring” infused into the consciousness by the feelings of delight, etc., cf. infra., p. 82, n. 4.
heart, for this very sorrow consists of, and is animated by, a rest without obstacles. Pain, indeed, is simply and solely an absence of rest. This is precisely the reason why the disciples of Kapila, in explaining the activity of rajah, say that the soul of pain is mobility (cāñcalya). All the Rasas thus consist in beatitude. But some of them, on account of the objects by which they are coloured, are not free from a certain touch of bitterness; this happens, for example, in the Heroic Rasa. For this consists of, and is animated by, precisely the firm endurance of misfortunes.

Thus delight, etc., occupy a pre-eminent position. Laughter, etc., on the other hand, also occupy a pre-eminent position, on account of the fact that these—whose determinants are easily accessible to all type of people—possess an extremely high power of winning the heart (uparañjakatvam). For this very reason, laughter, etc., are mostly to be met with in people

1. The concept is as follows: women, even when they are being bitten, scratched, etc., by their lovers (and therefore experiencing pain) find in the pain itself the fulfilment, the realization of all their desire: “they rest in their hearts” or consciousness to the exclusion of everything else. Therefore, this pain is pleasure, beatitude. Pain occurs only when the consciousness finds no rest in what it contemplates, is not totally absorbed in the object of contemplation, i.e., when it desires something different from the thing in which it is and from what it is. These desires, etc., which interrupt the homogeneity and compactness (ekaghanata) of consciousness, are the na, the obstacles.


3. The Determinants, etc.

4. I.e., they are widely diffused, easily make an impression on the consciousness.
of inferior nature \((anuttamaprakrti)\). Every man of low caste
laughs, grieves, is afraid, tends to despise others, and is aston-
ished at the poorest attempts at a fine saying. All the same
even these depend on delight, etc., and as such may be of help
in attaining the ends of man\(^1\). The division between the ten
types of drama is itself based on the different positions occupied
by these mental states. All this will be explained later. The
mental states of permanent nature are solely these nine. In-
deed, every creature from its birth possesses these nine forms
of consciousness. In fact, on the basis of the principle that
all beings "hate to be in contact with pain and are eager to
taste pleasure\(^2\)", everyone is by nature pervaded by sexual
desires [delight]; believes himself to be superior to others, whom
he is thus led to deride [laughter]; grieves when he is forced
to part from what he loves [sorrow]; gets angry at the causes
of such separation [anger]; gets frightened when he finds
himself powerless [fear]—but still is desirous of overcoming the
danger which threatens him [heroism]; is attacked, when judg-
ing a thing to be displeasing, by a sense of revulsion directed
just towards this ugly object [disgust]; wonders at the sight
of extraordinary deeds done by himself or others [astonish-
ment]; and, lastly, is desirous of abandoning certain things
[serenity]. No living creature exists without the latent im-
pression of these sentiments. All we can say is that some of
them predominate in some people and others in others, and
that in some people they originate from the usual causes and
in others from causes different from the habitual. Thus,
only some sentiments are able to promote the ends of

1) The Comic, Pathetic, Marvellous and Terrible Rasas depend on the
Erotic, Furious, Heroic and Odious Rasas respectively.

2) Unidentified verse.
man¹, and, as such, they are rightly the object of teaching². The current division of men into men of elevated nature, etc., is determined by the different position occupied by these sentiments. Other sentiments, as weakness, apprehension, etc.³, on the other hand, can never possibly be manifested if the correspondent determinants do not exist: so, for example, a muni who practises rasāyana⁴ is immune from weakness, indolence, weariness, etc. Even in one in whom, by virtue of the determinants⁵, these are present, they regularly disappear without leaving any trace of themselves when the causes of manifestation cease⁶. Heroism, etc., on the contrary, even when they apparently disappear after their tasks are completed, do not cease to remain in the state of latent impressions—for other forms of heroism, concerning other tasks, remain intact. Indeed, as Patañjali has said, "The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others", etc.⁷ Thus these transitory sentiments being, so to say, threaded on the thread of the permanent one, appear and dis-

1) Only the nine Permanent Mental States are able to contribute to the realization of the four ends of man. The Transitory Mental States do not have this faculty. Cf. H.C., Viveka, p. 139 (no doubt a quotation from A.G.): ayam ca nirvedah svayaṁ puruṣārthaśiddhay e vā utsāharatyaśvat, atyantāntumāraṇāyaḥ hāśavismayaḥāvin na prabhavatīty atyantāntukhaḥāreśvān svabhajīry eva.

2) The object of the play is to illustrate and teach the means of realization of the four ends of man.

3) The Transitory feelings.

4) Rasāyana (the science of art, of the rasas, or of vegetable juices, etc.) is more or less, the Indian equivalent of alchemy.

5) I.e., by virtue of the presence of their causes.

6) I.e., without remaining in the state of latent impressions.

7) Yogasūtra, Vyāsabhāṣya, 2, 4. Caitra stands for any name whatever. The same quotation is used in the I.P.V.V., II, p. 178; cf. supra, Intr., p. XLII.
appear an infinity of times. In some sense, they are like the beads of crystal, glass, magnet, topaz, emerald, sapphire, etc., which filling the thread on which they are threaded no matter if red, blue, etc.—so as to be set rather far apart from each other and continuously changing their position, do not leave it is true, trace of themselves on this thread, but, all the same, nourish the ornamental composition made by it; and, being themselves various, and varying in turn the permanent thread, let it no doubt appear at intervals, in its nudity, though, at the same time, they affect it by their polychrome reflections—the reflections I mean of the transitory jewels: it is for this very reason that these sentiments are called “transitory”. When, that is to say, someone says, “This is a form of weakness”, it is natural to ask: by what is it provoked? This question shows up precisely the instability of this mental movement. But in the case of the expression, “Rāma is full of heroism”, one does not ask for the cause. The determinants (the elements which awaken the mental states) are limited, therefore, to bringing to actuality the permanent sentiments (delight, heroism, etc.) corresponding respectively to their nature—

1) These still allow the thread of the permanent mental state to appear here and there. For a similar image, see A.Bh, I, p. 340: viralombhitaratnantarālanurbhāsamānasitatarasūtravat... The colours (red, blue, etc.) of the thread allude to the sthāyibhāva. The various Rasas are each one associated by Bharata with a different colour (the Erotic with green, the Comic with white, the Pathetic with ash-grey, the Furious with red, the Heroic with orange, the Terrible with black, the Odious with dark blue, and the Marvelous with yellow).

2) In other words, they are the ornamental elements of the thread. Bhr-pus, nourish; cf. the often-quoted stanza (e.g., Kāvyapradīpa, comm., p. 61):

sraksūtrabhāvād anyesām bhāvānām anugāmakah
na tirodhīyate sthāyī tair ascu pusyate param
and they do this by infusing into them their own colouring. Even when their corresponding determinants are absent, it cannot be said that the permanent sentiments are non-existent, for it has been said that these, in the state of latent impressions, are present in all beings. Of the transitory sentiments, however, when their corresponding Determinants are absent, not even the names remain—all this will be explained more extensively at the suitable time and place.¹

Such a refutation of the subordinate elements has been made by Bharata also through the description of the permanent sentiments, introduced by the words: “We shall now bring the permanent sentiments to the state of Rasas²”. This description follows on the definition of the general marks and concerns the particular ones.

g) The consequents, the determinants and the transitory sentiments considered separately are in no definite relation to any specific permanent sentiment; for, e.g., tears, etc.³, may arise out of bliss, some disease in the eye, etc., a tiger⁴, may arouse anger, fear etc., and, as we know, weariness [śrama], anxiety (cintā), etc.⁵, may accompany many permanent feelings,

¹ In the ch. VIII of the A.Bb. (which has not yet come to light).
² N.I. VI, prose after v. 50 (in a note). In this sentence, Bharata says implicitly that only the sthāyibhāva (i.e., the elements of principal order) and not the vibhāva etc., are brought to the state of Rasa. The general definition (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) begins with the sutra : vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicitā-rsāmyogād rasanispattih. The particular definition (viṣeṣalakṣaṇa) consists of the description of the characters of each Rasa. Cf. I.P.V.V., I, 57. A.Bb., 300 : ye sthāyino bhāvā loke cittavṛtyātmano bahuprakāraṇāpīramapraśāśanībandhanakartavyatāprabandhābhidhāyinas tān api nāma rasatvān viśrāntiśāyatanatvānōpadesādīsāneṣvāyāmāḥ
³ Tears are consequents.
⁴ The tiger is an example of a determinant.
⁵ Weariness, etc., are the transitory mental states.
as f.i., heroism, fear, etc. But the combination of these elements has an unmistakable signification. Thus, where the death of a close relation is the determinant, wailing, shedding tears, etc., the consequent, and anxiety, depression (dainya), etc., the transitory feelings, then the permanent sentiment cannot be other than Sorrow. Therefore, considered (such a possible) arising of doubt, combination is used, just to remove this obstacle.

The nature of Rasa

10. Rasa, in this connexion, is just that reality (artha) by which the determinants, the consequents and the transitory feelings after having reached a perfect combination (samyoga yoga), relation (sambandha), conspiration (aiakagrya)—where they will be in turn in a leading or subordinate position—in the mind of the spectator, make the matter of a gustation consisting of a form of consciousness free of obstacle and different from the ordinary ones. This Rasa differs from the permanent feelings, consists solely in this state of gustation and is not an objective thing (siddhasvabhava), lasts exactly as long as the gustation and does not lian on any time separate from it. The determinants, etc., (which consist of garden, expressive glances, feelings of contentment (dhrti), etc.), transcend on their side the state of causes, etc., as these are understood in ordinary life. Their function consists solely in the fact that they colour (the consciousness of the spectator); this function is called vibhavana.

1) I.e., it is not an already realized, self-subsistent thing which can exist independently of this tasting. Rasa is simply the particular form of perception called tasting. Cf. infra, p. 85.

2) Cf. Dh. A.L., supra, Intr., p. XXXIV.
Thus, these take the name, of a non-ordinary character, of determinants, etc. and this denomination aims at expressing their dependence on the latent traces left by the corresponding preceding causes, etc. The particular nature of the various determinants will be explained later.

The operation of the determinants, etc., presupposes, of course, that the spectator, in the course of his ordinary life, has not neglected to make a close observation of the characteristic signs (effects, causes and concomitant elements) of other people's mental processes, in other words to deduce the one from the other. [But let us return to Rasa. This is, as we have said, different from the permanent sentiment] and it can-

1) The determinants, properly speaking, awaken in the spectator the latent traces of the mental movements corresponding to their nature. Aesthetic experience or Rasa is coloured by these latent traces. The exact meaning of vibhāvanā, etc., is explained by Viśvanātha as follows, S.D., III:

\[ \text{vibhāvanam ratyāder viśeṣeṇa āsvādāṅkaraṇayogatānayanam | anubhāvanam} \\
\text{svanabhītasya ratyādeḥ samanantarām eva rasādirūpatatāḥ bhāvanam | saṃcāraṇaṃ} \\
\text{tathābhītasya astasya samyak cāraṇam |} \]

In other words, according to Viśvanātha, vibhāvana is the first manifestation of the germination of Rasa; anubhāvana is the gradual corroboration of the Rasa which is on the point of appearing; and saṃcāraṇa (which is not mentioned by A.G.) is the intensification or consolidation of the Rasa. Saṃcāraṇa according to Viśvanātha, is the specific operation of the vyabhicārībhāva (saṃcārī=vyabhicārī). The elaboration of these three stages is due, of course, to the necessity of allotting specific functions to the vibhāva, etc. Rasa is, in reality, single, and its manifestation does not have earlier and later stages. This division is of a purely didactic nature.

2) In so far as they are different from ordinary causes.

3) The determinants, etc. arouse the latent traces of the mental process of delight, etc., provoked by ordinary causes. They, thus, demand the presence of these traces and depend upon them.

4) N.Ś., VII; Abhinava Gupta's commentary on this chapter has not yet come to light.
not absolutely be maintained, as Śaṅkuka did, that what is called Rasa is simply a permanent sentiment, brought to our knowledge by the determinants, etc., and that, because this is the object of a relish, it takes the name of Rasa¹. For, if things were so, why should Rasa not exist also in everyday life? For if an unreal thing is capable of being the object of relish, a real thing has all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus, it is legitimate to say that the perception of a permanent mental state consists in an inference; but we certainly cannot rightly say that Rasa is also of this nature. This is the real reason why Bharata has made no mention in the sūtra of the word “permanent sentiment” ; on the contrary, the mention of it would have been a source of difficulties⁴. Such expressions as “The permanent sentiment becomes Rasa⁵”, are due to

1) Rasa, says A. G., does not consist in the inference (in inferential cognition) of someone else’s mental state (in which case it would be a cognition of a discursive order, sankalpa) but is a personal experience, the spectator identifies himself with this mental state and lives it himself. This observation is aimed at Śaṅkuka, who maintained that Rasa is simply a permanent mental state deduced by the spectators by means of the determinants, etc., and that the mental state perceived in this way is nothing but an imitation by the actor of the permanent mental state of the character he represents.

2) Therefore, the imitated permanent mental state is unreal.

3) I.e., Śaṅkuka’s reason is not the real one; cf. supra, p. 31.

4) Bharata did not say “The production of Rasa is provoked by the union of the permanent mental state (of someone else, i.e., the character represented), with the determinants, the consequents, and the transitory Mental Movements”. If he had, Rasa would simply be a perception of someone else’s permanent mental movement.

5) Bharata says sometimes (cf. e.g., N.Ś., VI, prose after v. 50 in a note) that the Permanent Mental State becomes Rasa; such expressions, A.G. remarks, are only due to the “correspondence (analogy, etc.)”. Cf. the next note.

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the correspondence (aucitya) only. This correspondence, to specify, is due to the fact that the very same things which were previously considered to be causes, etc., related to a given permanent sentiment, now serve to realize the gustation, and are thus presented in the form of determinants, etc. What kind of a Rasa is there indeed, in the inference of an ordinary sentiment? Therefore, the tasting of Rasa (which consists in a camatkāra different from any other kind of ordinary cognition) differs from both memory, inference and any form of ordinary self-consciousness. Indeed, he who possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential processes, does not apprehend a young woman, etc., as if he were indifferent to her, but, by virtue of his sensibility—which quality is consisting in a consent of heart—, he rather apprehends her, without mounting on the steps of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with this young woman, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness. This gustation, again, is not already born in the past, from some other means.

1) Dh.Ā.L., p. 89: soke hi sthāyibhāve ye vibhāvānubhāvās tatasmcita cittayatiś carvyamānātmā rasa ity aucityāt sthāyino rasatāpattir ity ucyate | "Rasa is simply the tasting of the mental movement, corresponding, for example, to the determinants and the consequents of the mental state of sorrow. The expression: "the permanent mental state becomes Rasa", arises solely, therefore, by correspondence".

2) Forms of "ordinary self-consciousness" are, e.g., pleasure, pain, etc.

3) "A young woman" is a determinant; "etc." here includes the consequents and the transitory mental states.

4) Impersonally, Tātasthāya or mādhyasthāya, indifference, is the exact opposite of annapravesa, personal or active participation.
of knowledge, so that it is, now, a form of memory; nor is it the fruit of the operation of ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, etc.); but it is aroused solely by the combination (samyoga) of the determinants, etc., which, as we have said, are of a non-ordinary nature.

This gustation is distinguished a) from perception of the ordinary sentiments (delight, etc.) aroused by the ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, inference, the revealed word, analogy, etc.); b) from cognition without active participation (tātasthā) of the thoughts of others, which is proper to the direct perception of the yogins; c) and from the compact (ekaghaṇa) experience of one's own beatitude, which is proper to yogins of higher orders (this perception is immaculate, free from all impressions [uparāga] deriving from external things). Indeed, these three forms of cognition, being in due order (yathāyogam) subjected to the appearance of obstacles (practical desires, etc.), lacking evidence and at the mercy of the (adored) object, are deprived of beauty (saundarya).


2) Telepathy, the knowledge of other people's minds, is one of the yogin powers (Yogasūtra, III, 19: pratyayasā paracittayānām; this sūtra is quoted and commented by A.G. in I.P. V., I, 2, 4, 5). This phenomenon, observes A.G., is of an order entirely different from the aesthetic experience. In it, in fact, the distinction between one's own self and the self of others (svaparavibhāga) continues to exist, while the aesthetic experience postulates the generalization of the mental states and therefore the suppression of every limited self.

3) Abhinava Gupta alludes, in this passage, to the highest degree of mystical experience which is free of any trace of ordinary things.

4) Mystical experience involves the annihilation of every pair of opposites; everything is reabsorbed in its dissolving fire. Sun and moon,
Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [ of sensations of
pleasures, pain, etc. ] as inhering exclusively in our own per-
night and day, beautiful and ugly, etc., no longer exist in it. The limited
I] is completely absorbed into Śiva or Bhairava, the adored object;
everything vanishes from the field of consciousness. Aesthetic experience,
on the other hand, requires the presence of the latent traces of delight, etc.,
(roused by the operation of the determinants, etc.). In other words,
the aesthetic experience presupposes a pre-constituted knowledge on the
part of the spectator, of the psychic reactions, etc., which are normally
felt before a given situation. This knowledge is, in part, innate (it forms,
that is, an integral part of human nature) and is, in part, acquired through
the experience of one’s own reactions and one’s own observation of the
reactions of others.

Aesthetic experience, Rasa, manifested by a poetical description of a
beautiful woman, is, for example, coloured by the mental state of delight,
which is aroused by the description itself. Such a mental state is supposed
to preexist in the spectator in a latent state, in the form, that is, of saṃskāra
or pāsanā. The Determinants which manifest aesthetic experience awaken,
implicitly and of necessity, these latent traces also.

The beauty, the pleasantness proper to the aesthetic experience are due
to the colouring of these mental processes ; cf. A.Bh. I, p. 290. laukikāt
prātyayād upārjanādīvighnahabulād yogiprātyayāc ca viṣayāsvādāśayatāparuṣād
vīlakṣānākārasukhadvāsāśarvānānumedhapanatadyatātiśyasamviccaśarvānāt-
manā bhuṣyate budhāḥ... [ “Aesthetic enjoyment consists in the tasting
of one’s own consciousness; this tasting is endowed with extreme pleasant-
ness (beauty), which it obtains from a contact with the various latent traces
of pleasure, pain, etc. It differs both from ordinary perception, which is
full of obstacles (pragmatic requirements, etc.), and from the perception of
the yogins, which is not free from harshness, on account of the total lack
of any tasting of external objects ”. Thus by comparison with the aesthetic
experience, the compact homogeneity (ekaghanatā) of mystical experience
possesses a certain harshness. Its pursuit, that is to say, calls for uncommon
force and energy (cf. the concept of vīra, hero). Aesthetic experience, on the
other hand, is easily attained. It is particularly suitable to people endowed

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son, of an active participation in our own self (svātmānupravešāḥ), of the absence [of the afore-mentioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons, and the immersion (āveśa) in the latent traces of our own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalized—because, I say, of all these causes, the appearance of obstacles is impossible.¹ And all this has been said over and over again.

For this reason (ata eva) the determinants are not the causes of the production (nispotti) of Rasa; otherwise, Rasa should continue to exist even when they no longer fall under cognition. Nor are they the cause of its cognition (jñāpti) (if with a ‘gentle mind’ (sukumāramati). In the Dh.Ā.L., p. 51, A.G. defines Rasa in the following terms: śabdasmartpyamāṇānbrdayasanvādasundaravibhāvānubhāvasamucitapraṅgvinivirastatāḥśivaśānaṁurājaśukumārasvāsanvidānandaçaravānśyāpārasaṁjñāyaṣṭu rasaḥ | “Rasa is tasted through the act of tasting the beatitude of one’s own consciousness. This tasting is pleasant (and not paraśa as in mystical experience) in that the consciousness is coloured by the latent traces of the mental states of delight, etc., pre-existing (in the minds of the spectators). Such traces are aroused by the corresponding determinants and consequents, which—pleasant (beautiful, etc.,) by virtue of the consent of the heart—are afforded by the words”. Cf. Dh.Ā.L., p. 81: anubhāvabhāvāvahodhanottaram eva tanmayībbhanayuktyā tadvibhāvānubhāvocitacittavijnāvāsaṁanurajjasvāsanvidānandaçaravānśagocaro ’rtho rasātmā sphuraty eva...

¹) This passage has been somewhat modified and enlarged by Hemacandra (see the critical Apparatus): “Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [of sensations of pleasure, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively in our own person, we are not at the mercy of the [adored] object; because of an active participation in our own self [and] the absence [of the afore-mentioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons, there is no lack of evidence; and because of the immersion in the latent traces of our own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalized, there is no possible appearance of obstacles”.

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they were, they would have to be included among the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), because Rasa is not an objective thing (siddha), which could function as a knowable object. What is it, then, that is designated by the expressions, “determinants etc.?" We reply to this question that the expressions “determinants etc." do not designate any ordinary thing, but what serves to realize the gustation (carvaṇā opinī). Does any such thing appear elsewhere? But the fact that it does not occur elsewhere, we reply, can do nothing but strengthen our thesis of their non-ordinary character. Does the taste of the rasa of pānaka perhaps occur in molasses, peppers, etc., (of which, however, it consists)? The case is perfectly analogous. “But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (aprameya)’” That is what really occurs, we reply and suitably. Rasa, indeed, consists solely of a tasting and has not the nature of an object of cognition, etc. “But how then do you think that the expression which Bharata uses in the sūtra can be justified when he says: “The production of Rasa (rasanispatti)? This expression, we reply, must be understood in the sense of a production not of the Rasa, but

1) See the N.S., 287 ff. The example of pānaka is to be found fairly frequently in Indian philosophy. Cf. for example, N.M., p. 341: evam pādārthebhyo 'nya eva vākyārtbath pānakādi vat, yathā pānakam sarkarānāgakeśa- tamārīcādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva yathā ca sindūrabhartālākāśādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva cītram, yathā vā śadjarśabhagāndhāradhaivatādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva grāmārāgab tathā padebhbyo vākyam, pādārthebhyo vākyārtbath | “The meaning of a sentence differs from the meaning of the words (as happens with pānaka, etc.). Just as pānaka is different from sugar, spice, pepper, etc., just as a painting is different from minium, orpiment, lake etc., or as a piece of music is different from the various notes of which it is composed, so is the meaning of a phrase different from the meaning of the words”.

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of the tasting which refers to the Rasa (*tadviśayarasana*). Likewise, if the expression "The production of Rasa" is understood in the sense of a production of a Rasa whose subsistence is exclusively depending on the said tasting, our thesis is not be set by any difficulty. Besides, this tasting is neither the fruit of the operation of the means of cognition nor of the means of action. On the other hand, it can be said that, in itself, it is not ascertained by any means of acquire (apramāṇika), for its real existence is an inconfutable datum of our own consciousness (svasamvedanasiddha). This tasting, moreover, is, no doubt, solely a form of cognition, but a form of cognition different from any other ordinary perception. This difference is due to the fact that the means of it, that is, the determinants, etc., are of a non-ordinary character. To conclude: what is produced by the combination (*samyoga*) of the Determinants, etc., is the tasting (*rasana*); and the Rasa is the non-ordinary reality, which is the matter of this tasting. This is the sense and purport of the sūtra.

All this may be summarized in the following way: in the first place, the identity of the actor as such is concealed by tiaras, headwear, etc.; in the second place, the idea that he is Rāma, etc., aroused by the power of the poem, nevertheless does not succeed in imposing itself upon the idea of the actor, for the latent traces of the said idea are strongly impressed on the spectator's minds. For this very reason, the spectator is no longer living either in the space and time of Rāma, etc.,

1) I.e., this expression might lend itself to interpretation in the sense that Rasa is something different from the act of cognition by which it is known, so that it would be an object of cognition. A.G.'s reply to this objection is that Rasa is the perception itself, and that the word Rasa does not denote anything distinct from the perception by which it is known.
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nor in the space and time of the actor as such. Acts of horripilation, etc., which have repeatedly been seen by the spectator in the course of everyday life as indexes of delight, etc., serve, in this case, to make known a delight, etc., uncircumscribed by either time or space. In this delight, just because he possesses the latent traces of it in himself, the Self of the spectator also actively participates. For this very reason, this delight is perceived neither with indifference, from the outside, nor as if it were linked with a particular [ungeneralized] cause—for in this case, intrusion by pragmatic requirements, interests of gain, etc., would occur—, nor again as if it exclusively belonged to a defined third person—for, in this case, sensations of pleasure, hatred, etc. would occur in the spectator. Thus, the Erotic Rasa is simply the feeling of delight—a feeling, however, which is both generalized and the object of a consciousness, which may be either single or develop consecutively. The task of generalization is carried out by the determinants, etc.

1) Cf. supra, Intr., p. XXII, n. 1.

2) In the case of a play, long poem, etc. various moods of the soul occur in alternation with each other (Delight, Sorrow, etc.); in the case of a short poem there is generally speaking only one dominant motif.

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Commentary on *N.S.*, I, st. 107 (*A. Bb.*, I, pp. 35-38):

nanu caivam apy asmātpṛṣṭhe kim etad yojitam ity aha
naiṅkāntato 'tra bhavatāṁ devānāṁ cānubhāvanam |
trailokyasyāya sarvasya nātyam bhāvānukīrtanam ||

āyam bhāvaḥ | na yuṣmatpṛṣṭhe kenaḥ etad yojitam |
devāśurasya bahir yathāsvastham avasthānam | atreti nātyavede
na devāsuraḥ āṃkāntenaḥ nātabhāvanam | naiva te' nubhāvyante
kenacit prakāreṇa | tathā hi teṣu na tatvena dhīḥ | na
sāḍṛṣyena yamalakavat | na bhrāṇatvena rūpyaṁśtipūrvaka-
śuktirūpyavat | nāropeṇa samyagjñānabādhānāntaraṁ mithyā-
jñānarūpavat | na taddhāyasāya gaṛ vahika itivat
notprekṣyamāṇatvena candramukhavat | na tatpratikṛtītvena
citrapustavat | na tadanukāreṇa guruśiṣyavyākhyāhevacavat |
na tātkalikanirmāṇenendrajālavaḥ | na yuktiviracitatadābhāsa-
tayā hastalāghavādīmāyaḥ | sarveṣv eteṣu paḵeṣv asādha-
raṇāyatāṁ draṣṭuḥ audāśiṃye rasāsvādāyogāt | kaveś ca niya-
tavaraṇāniyaniścītave kävyasyaiśvāṃpatte anaucaityaṁvarjan-
yogāt | laukikamithunadṛśīva sāṃśārikaharṣaṅkrodhānvaiva-
tāppatetrubhayadarṣānākukatayaṁ mukhyadṛṣṭau prayoktṛdṛṣṭāv
anuṣaṃdhisampattyabhāvāt | kim tarḥy etat | aha traill-
kasyeti | etad uktaṁ bhavati |

1 0nantara G : 0nantaram M || 2 mithyājñānarūpam G : mithyājñānarūpyam M || 3 gaṛ vahika itivat M : gaṛ vahika M || 4 0nayitāppat G : 0nayitāppat G (corrected in a second hand into 0nayitāppat) || 5 0darṣānākukataya G : 0darṣānākukataya G (corrected into m (sic) layā G : 0darṣānākukatayaym M || 6 mukhyadṛṣṭau G : mukhyadṛṣṭau M || 7 anuṣaṃdhisampattyabhāvāt is a doubtful correction of mine : taddhā-
sampattyā (corrected into avisaṃvātīya) bhāvā G : skandhisampattyabhāvāt M ||

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'Āṣṭākṣaṃ te rāmādayo na kadācana pramāṇapatham avātaraṇaḥ | te 1 yadāgamena varṇyante tadā tadviseṣabuddhir 2 yady api rāmāyaṇaprayāyād ekasmān mahāvākyād ulassati tathāpi vartamāṇatayaiva viśeṣānām saṃbhāvyamānārthakriyāsāmarthyaṃtakṣālakṣaṇaṃ paryavaśānān na ca teṣām vartamāṇatety upagataḥ 4 tāvad viṣeṣabuddhīḥ | kāvyeyaṃ api śrīdaya eva tāvaṃ sādhāraṇībhāvo vibhāvādīnāṃ jātāḥ | tātāpi kathāmātre sādhāraṇībhāvah saṃbhavati yady api tathāpi 'evaṃ ye kuryanti teṣām etad bhavati' itivākyavad rājanātiśayābhāvān na cītavṛttiḥ 6 nirnayagataḥ bhavati | kāvyeya tu guṇālambikāramanoharasadbāsāśīre lokottararasaṃprāṇake 7 śrīdayasaṃyadāvāśān nimagnākārikā 8 tāvad bhavati cītavṛttiḥ | kīṃ tu sarvasya pratyakṣasākṣāt kārakalpaḥ tatra na dhīr udeśi 9 naṣṭe tu pāramārthikam kīṃcid adya me kṛtyan bhaviṣyātītyeṃ bhūtābhhisampādhaṃskārābhāvār sarvapariṣadsādhanapramodsārṇaparyantavirasaṃnāḍaṃphalottarakarāśaṃsāra - vanayogī bhaviṣyāmītyabhhisampādhiṃskārād uciṭāgitaḍaḥcārvaṇāvismṛta 10 saṃsārīkabhāvataya vimalamukurakalpibhūtanaiḥ śrīdayaḥ śucādyabhinayāvalokanobhinnapiṣadādaksakata ṭrāntarapravēṣavasāt samutpanne desaṅkāvīśeṣāveśānlīṅgīte samyaṁmithyāsam-śarvasampādhanādiṣṭānāvijñeyavaparāmarśāsāpade rāmarā- vaṇādīviṣayādhyaḥvāśāye tattsāṃśkāraṅuvṛttikārāṇabhūtata tathaḥcārāḥṛdyavasturupagītātodyagramadānuḥ bhavaṃskāraṃśūcita-

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samanugataduktarūparāmādhyyavasāyasamśkāra eva bhavya
pañcaśair divasaiḥ sacamatkāras' tadiyacaritamadhyapraviśtaśva
tmarūpamatiḥ svātmadvāreṇa viśvaṃ tathā pasyan prate
kaṃ sāmājiko deśakālaśeṣaṇaparāmarṣena "evaṃkāriṇāṃ
idam" iti liṅātmaka'vidhisamarpaka'saṃvijjātiyam eva
saṃvidviśeṣaraṇjakam'prāṇavallabhāpratimam'saṃvād
raramyagītātodyādisamśkāraṃ' rasānubhavavatena' hṛdayā
bhyantraranikhatam tata evotpūṃsana'satait api mānima
tram apy abhajamānaṃ bhajams tattacchubhāsubhāpreśa
sājīhāsāsatasyūtavṛttitvād eva śubham ācaraty aśubham
samujjhati |
idānīm upāyaśaṃvedanālābhāt tad idam anukārantam
anuvyaśavāyaśeṣo nātyāparaparyāyaḥ | nānukāra iti bhrami
tavyam anena | bhāndena rājaśutāsānyasya vānukṛtāv
yāyādibuddher abhāvāt tad vikaraṇam' iti prasiddham
hāsamātraphalām madhyasthānām | yadabhiprāyēna munir
vakṣyati "paraceṣṭānukarāṇād dhāras samupajāyate"' tā |
tatpaksyaṇāṁ tu tad eva dveśāsūyānuvṛttyā'diphalām |
tadbuddhaiva hi dāityānāṃ hṛdayakṣobhāh evambhūtā
vayam upahāsabhājanam iti | upahāsatabhīravaś ca nivart\
tante tataḥ | na tūpadeśena | nāv evam tāvata niyatanukāro
mā bhūt | anukāreena tu kim aparāddham | na kimcid
asaṃbhavādṛte | anukāra iti hi sādakaraṇaṃ | tat kasya | 

1 sacamatkāra : sacamatkāra G,M || 2 liṅātmaka G (corrected
from līṅātma) : līṅātma G,M || 3 śamarpaka : śamarpitam G :
śamarpaka M || 4 raṇjaka : raṇjaka G,M || 5 pratimam : pratima:
G,M || 6 rasāsvādā G : rasāsvāde M || 7 saṃskāra : saṃskāra G,M
|| 8 rasānubhavavatena G (corrected from rasāvāsena) : rasā...
vāsena M || 9 tpunṣa : tpunṣa G | 10 nyasa vānukṛtāv (corrected from
(corrected from vikaraṇaṃ) G : tad bi kāraṇaṃ M || 12 "N.S., VII, 10 |
13 tatpaksyaṇā M : tatpaksyaṇā G || 14 nivṛtta (corrected from
nivṛtya) G : nivṛtya G,M ||

[ 90 ]
na tāvad rāmasya | tasyānanukāryatvāt | etena pramadā-

divibhāvānām anukarāṇam parākṛtam | na cittavṛttīnām

sokakrodhādirūpāṇām | na hi naṭo rāmasadṛśaṁ swātmanah

śokam karoti | sarvathaiva tasya tatrābhyāvāt | bhāve

vānanukāratvāt | na cānyad vastv asti yac chokena sadṛśam

syāt | anubhāvāms tu karoti | kim tu sajātiyān 1 eva | na tu
tatsadṛśān | sādhāraṇarūpasya kah kena sadṛśyārthas

trailokyavartinaḥ | sadṛśatvām tu na viśeṣātmanā yauga-

padyenopapadyate kadācit | kramena niyata evānukṛtaḥ

syāt | sāmānyātmakatve ko' nukārārthāḥ | tasmād aniyatā-

tanukāro 2 nātyam ity api na bhramitavyam | asmadupā-
dhyāyakṛte kāvyakautuke 3py ayam evābhīprāyo mantavyaḥ | na tv aniyatanukāro 3pi | tenānuvyavasāya 4viśeṣaviśayīkātyam

nātyam | tathā hy āhāryaviśeṣādinā nīvṛtte taddeśakāla-
caitramitrādinaśatiśeṣapratyakṣābhīmaṇe viśeṣaleśopakra-

meṇa ca vinā pratyakṣāpravrītter āpate 4 rāmādiśabdasyātro-
payogāt prasiddhatadarthatayādaraṇīyacaritavācakasyāsambhā-

vanāmātranirākarāṇenānuvyavasāyasya pratyakṣakalpatā, 5

ḥṛdayagītādyanusyūtatayā camatkārsthānātvaḥ dhṛdayā-
nupraveśayogyatvam, abhinayacatuṣṭayena svarūpapraccchā-
danam, prastāvanādīna nāṭajānānajasamskārasācīvyam, tena

raṇjakaśamagrīmadhyānupraviṣṭena pracchāditasvasvabhāvena

prakṛpravṛttalaikkapratyakṣānumādijanitasamskārasahāyena 6

nāṭajānānasamskārasacīvena ṣhrdayasamvādatanmayībhavana-

sahakārīṇā pravoktā dṛṣyāmānena yo ṇuṇyavasāyō janyate

sukhaduḥkhādyākāratattaccattavṛttirūṣita 7nijasamvidānandapra-
kāśamayō ta eva vicītro rasanāsvādanacamatkārācavāna-

1 sajātiyān G : jātiyān M || 2 tasmād anityataG : tasyāyata M ||

3 0nuvyavasāya : 0nuvyavasāyavat G,M || 4 0āpyāte : 0āyāte G, M ||

5 pratyakṣakalpatā : pratyakṣakalpanātye G : pratyakṣakalpanā M ||

6 0tanmayībhavanaG : 0tanmayībhavanā 0, G,M || 7 0rūṣitaG : 0rūṣarūṣita

G : 0ruparūpita M ||
nirveśabhogādyaparaparyāyah, tatra ya avabhāsate vastu,  
tan nātyam |

tac ca jñānakāramātram āropitam svarūpam sāmānyātmakam  
tatkālanirmitarūpaṇ cānyad vā kimcid astu | nātrāprastu- 
talekhanenātmano darśanāntarakathāparicayaprakāṣṭanaphalena  
prakṛtavastunirūpaṇavighnam ācarantaḥ sahṛdayān khedayāmān  
tasmād anuvyavāsāyatmakam kīrtanāṁ rūṣitavikalpaśaṃve-
danam nātyam | tadvedanavedyatvāt | na tv anukaraṇa-
rūpam | yadi tv evam mukhyalaukikakaraṇānusāritaya  
'nukaraṇam ity ucyate tan na kaścid doṣāḥ | sthite vastuto  
bhede śabdapravṛtte avivādāspadatvāt | etac ca yathāvasa-
raṃ vítaniśyata ity āstām tāvat | yataś cedam nānukaraṇam  
tato yat kaiśic coidtam tad anavakāśam |
TRANSLATION

"But how is it that this burden (viz. the defeat) has been imposed on our back?" To this question the author replies: Here, by no means, is there a representation of you and the gods (N. Í., I. v. 107 a).

The sense intended in this verse is that nobody has imposed such a burden on your back. Both the demons and the gods stay outside, at ease. Here, that is, in the Nátyaveda anyway, those who are seen are not the real demons and the gods. As to them, indeed, there arises neither the idea of reality, nor of similitude, as in the case of twins; nor of illusion, as in the case of the illusion of a piece of mother-of-pearl, preceded by knowledge of a piece of silver; nor of super-imposition, as when wrong knowledge follows after vitiating the right one; nor of identity, as when one says 'this peasant is a cow'; nor of a poetical fancy, as when the moon is fancied as the face of the night, etc.; nor of copy, as in the case of a painted model; nor of reproduction, as in the case of the counterfeit representation of the instruction imparted by a teacher to his students; nor of sudden creation, as in magic; nor of an appearance effected by tricks, as in sleight of hand, etc. In all these cases, indeed, there is a lack of generalization so that the on-

1) According to N.Í., vv. 99-106, Drama has not been instituted by Brahmā to cast an unfavourable light on the demons (Daitya, Vighna etc.), but to represent impartially acts and ideas both of gods and demons. Demons have no reason to be afraid of it and to spoil the dramatic performance. Here the objector is a hypothetical daitya and the "burden" is the defeat of the demons by the gods, which was the argument of the first dramatational production. (see N. Í., vv. 54 ff.).
looker, being consequently in a state of indifference, will not logically be able to be pervaded by the relish of Rasa. Again, if the poet aims at a too specific (niyata) subject-matter, poetry will not be accomplished, and he will not be able to avoid the fault of impropriety (anaucitya). Further, as it happens at the sight of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of onlookers will rather become the prey of the ordinary, actual feelings of delight, rage, and so on. Eventually, (we may here add) that whenever the mind of the spectators is troubled by the sight of two different individuals, viz. the represented personage and the actor, the (necessary) unification (anusamādhū) between them cannot take place.

What is then drama? The author answers:

Drama is the re-narration of the things of all the three worlds (N. S., I, v. 207 b).

The sense intended in this verse is as follows. These personages, i.e., Rāma, etc., have never come down into the path of our means of knowledge. Now, when they are described in the scriptures there is no doubt, it is true, that the Rāmāyaṇa-like narrations, that is to say, these unique great sentences, give rise to the idea of the individual essence

1) See, on the idea of aucitya, V. Raghavan, Some Concepts of the Alamkāra Sāstra, Adyar, 1942, pp. 194-257. “Proportion and harmony”—says V. Raghavan, ib. p. 208—“form an aspect of Aucitya, which is propriety, adaptation, and other points of appropriateness. From the point of view of the perfect agreement between the parts and the chief element of Rasa, from the point of view of this proportion and harmony, I think, Aucitya can be rendered in English into another word also viz., ‘Sympathy’, which as a word in art-criticism means ‘mutual conformity of parts’.

2) See supra, p. 44.

3) “The principal clause and the subordinate clauses which are mutually connected together by expectancy, consistency and proximity form a
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(\textit{viśeṣa}) of each of them. This idea, however, is not contrasting with the concept of generalization and its presence causes therefore no difficulty. The individual essences, indeed, amount to a real individuality (\textit{svālakṣanya}), possessed of a corresponding causal efficiency (\textit{arthakriyā}), only when they are contemporary with us—which contemporaneity, in this case, does not exist.\footnote{1} This state of generalization of the determinants, etc., arises even in poems proper and, in this case, it penetrates directly into the heart. Even then, although the generalization can occur in mere tales (\textit{kathā}), nevertheless there


1) a) The perception of the particular names and shapes of Rāma, etc. (therefore of their qualifications of time, space, etc.), does not involve that they cannot be perceived in a generalized form. A personality, etc., inserts itself into our practical life (develops, so to say, its causal efficiency) only when it is contemporary with us, i.e., connected with the present and therefore with the practical interests, etc., of our own Ego. When these personalities are not contemporary, they cannot develop their natural causal efficiency. In the aesthetic perception, they are independent from the concepts both of reality and non-reality, and are thus perceived as “generalized”. In this sense, their particularity (\textit{viśeṣa}) is not contrasting with the concept of generality.

b) In this context, \textit{svālakṣanya} is simply a synonym of \textit{svarūpa}, one’s own form or shape, one’s own peculiar nature, hence individuality, etc. \textit{Svālakṣanya} is commented on by A.G. in this way in the \textit{Dh.Ā.L.}, p. 538. The causal efficiency (\textit{arthakriyā}; on this concept, cf. p. 31, n. 7) in the sense of practical or pragmatical functionality belongs to the real individuality (i.e., contemporary with the spectator) only. The generalized image of the aesthetic experience has no practical efficiency, i.e., does not insert itself in practical life. The concept of causal efficiency in connexion with the one of individuality (in the sense of a particular essence contrasting with the general essence, the \textit{sāmānyalakṣaṇa}) has a Buddhist origin and, freely interpreted, became part of the common philosophical vocabulary.
lacking a great impressive feeling (rañjanā), as in the case of the sentence, 'Such and such a thing happens to them who do such and such a thing '), the corresponding state of mind is not well decided. In poetry, on the contrary (and let us remember here that the body of poetry is made up of words embellished by qualities and figures of speech, with Rasa as its life, the Rasa of a non-ordinary nature) every state of mind is, so to say, completely immerged, thanks to a consent of heart. This idea, to be confronted with a kind of direct perception or experience (pratyakṣasāksātārkākalpa) does not arise, however, in every person [who is hearing or reading a poem].

In drama this difficulty does not arise. The nature of it may be resumed as follows. Firstly, in drama there is the absence, within us, of the intention: 'Today I must do something practical' and the presence, in its place, of the intention: 'Today I am going to enjoy sights and sounds of a non-ordinary nature deserving of attention, which will arouse, at the end, no sensation of disgust and whose essence is a generalized pleasure shared by all the spectators. The relish of suitable vocal and instrumental music makes then the spectator forget about his practical existence (sāṃsārikabhāva), and, his heart consequently being turned as clear as a spotless mirror he becomes capable of identifying himself with the mental states

1) Some individuals whose aesthetic sensibility (consent of the heart, etc.) is poor, need visual illustration of what is suggested by the power of the poem; such visual illustration (consisting of the actors, etc.) contributes to bring about the immersion of the spectator in the events represented to the exclusion of everything else.

2) In other words, at the end of the performance and therefore of the state of pleasure caused by it, there is no such sensation of disgust, as accompanies all ordinary pleasures.
of sorrow, delight, etc., sprung from the sight of the gestures and of the other species of representation. Listening to the recitation makes the spectator enter into the life of a character different from himself, and, as a result, there grows up in him a cognition whose object is Rāma, Rāvana and so on. This cognition is not circumscribed by any limitation of space and time, and is free from all those forms of thought concerning which is the matter of knowledge, which is either mistaken, or uncertain, or probable, etc. That is not all. The spectator is accompanied by the impressions of this cognition (whose object was Rāma, etc.) and then by a kind of camatkāra for several days. These impressions are evidenced, in their turn, by other ones, deposited within him by the direct perception of the various pleasure-producing things—women, vocal and instrumental musics—which accompanied the performance. These last impressions are the very cause of the continuation of the first ones. But let us revert to the spectator. His own self continues to be merged in the represented exploits, and through it, he goes on seeing everything in this light. This impression of the vocal and instrumental musics and of the other delightful things—that, as we have seen, accompany the relish of Rasa, are not to be compared to [the pleasure given to us by the sight of] our beloved one, and colour the consciousness in a special way—gives birth, within him, to a kind of injunction suitable to be expressed by the optative mode, that is: ‘Such and-such a thing (must happen) to those who do such-and-such a thing’. This injunction is free of every spatial and temporal specification. The afore-mentioned impression by virtue of

1) Cf. Mṛcchakatikā, III, 5: yat satyam virate 'pi gītasamaye gacchām śṛvann iva | “To tell the truth, although the song is ended, I seem to hear it as I walk.”
the Rasa-experience, remains deeply fixed in the heart, like an arrow, in such a way that by no possible effort can it be eased, let alone extracted.¹ Thanks to it, the desires of attaining the good and abandoning the bad are constantly present in the mind of the spectator, who accordingly does the good and avoids the bad.

Now then, as there is no awareness of (the actor being) a means, the meaning of the term re-narration, found in the stanza, is a particular re-perception (the word "drama" is but a synonym for it), and not a reproduction. We deserve not to be deceived by the latter. When, indeed, a prince or some other personage is reproduced in jest, the spectators do not have the idea that the actor is some one other, etc. Such a performance is known, indeed, as a "deformation", and, as such, gives rise to nothing but laughter in the onlookers. This was just the purpose of Bharata, who said: 'Laughter arises from a reproduction of other people's actions (N.S., VII, 10). In the reproduced personages, on the other hand, this mimicry gives rise to feelings of hatred, indignation and so on. The agitation of heart in the Demons was caused, indeed, by this very thought: 'We have thus become a vessel of derision².' Their abstention too [from spoiling the drama] is caused by this fear of becoming an object of derision and not by the teaching (of Brahmā).

'Well', someone might say, 'let me even admit that drama is not a reproduction of specific things; however, of which is

¹) A similar expression is to be found in the I.P.V.V., I, p. 37: prasiddhiśatapūrṇa jīvaloke kasyacit kācid eva prasiddhiḥ "lineva pratibimbyeva ikhitevāntarnīkhāteva ca (Mālatīmādhava, v. 10)" iti nyāyena hṛdayabhāttaḥ upātanakatār api hṛdayam anumāya nāpasarpatai

²) Cf. supra, p. 6.
reproduction tout à fait guilty? To this question we answer that, surely, it is guilty of nothing, with the only exception of a logical impossibility. The word reproduction, indeed, means the production of similar things. But similar to whom? Surely, not to Rāma, etc., because it is not possible to reproduce him. And, by this very argument, the reproduction, too, of his particular determinants (women, etc.) is refuted. Further, even his state of mind, as, f.i., sorrow, anger, etc. The actor, indeed, does not produce, within him, a sorrow similar to that of Rāma, because such a sorrow is totally absent in him; and, if it were actually in him, it would no more be a reproduction. Nor, again, is there some other thing which may be similar to the sorrow of Rāma. ‘Perhaps’, some might say, ‘the consequents he produces are similar to those of Rāma’. But to this question too we answer that they are not similar, but of the same species. As to a universal thing (sādhāraṇa), common to all the three worlds, what is, in fact, the sense of this term ‘similarity’—similarity to what? Similarity, indeed—similarity to a particular thing—cannot ever take place simultaneously; only a specific thing may be reproduced, and that also only gradually. What is then the sense of reproduction, as to a generic thing? Therefore, we deserve not to be deceived by this theory viz., that drama is a reproduction of non specific things. This is what our master intended to say in his Kāvyakautuka too, and not, surely, that drama is a reproduction of non specific things.

Drama is then a matter of cognition by a special form of re-perception (anuyāvasāya). In the first place, indeed,

1) And therefore simultaneously present in all individuals.
2) Consequents are a universal reality, common to all people.
thanks to garments, make-up and the other forms of representation, the presumption to be confronted with the direct perception of a particular actor (Caitra, Maitra, etc.) and of his particular space and time ceases to exist; in the second place, since direct perception cannot take place without at least a minimum of particularization, recourse is had to such names as Rāma, etc. The fact that these are the names of famous personages eliminates indeed the possibility that one who declaims their exploits deserving of attention might provoke in the spectators the hindrance of unverisimilitude. Owing to all this, this re-perception is like a form of direct perception. Further, because the scene represented, being accompanied by pleasure-giving vocal musics, etc., is a source of camatkāra, it is possessed of a natural suitability to penetrate into the heart. Again, the four forms of representation hide the true identity of the actor. Eventually, the prologue, etc., give to spectators the [constant] impression that they have to do with an actor. The actor, being seen, arouses, then, in the spectators, a re-perception (called, too, tasting, sampling, camatkāra, relish, immersion, enjoyment, etc.), which, though consisting in the light and bliss of our own consciousness, is still affected by various feelings, and is therefore varied. Drama is only what appears in this re-perception. In this connexion, the actor is immersed in the afore-said colouring combination (of determinants, etc.); his real identity is hidden; he possesses mental impressions arising from direct, inferential and other forms of ordinary perception which have occurred in the past; he is provided with mental impressions of the awareness of being an actor, and he partakes in creating the identification of the spectators with the representation, and that through their heart's consent. But let us revert to what appears in the aforementioned re-perception. This may equally be considered either as
an inner image of our own knowledge, or as a generic superimposed image, or again as a sudden creation, or even as some other thing. Anyway, we have no intention of boring here our sensible readers with these discussions, removed from the chief subject-matter. They, indeed, would only amount to showing off our acquaintance with other systems, and to be a hindrance to the subject under discussion.

To sum up, drama is only a ‘narration’ (kārtana), made up of a re-perception, a form of consciousness affected by discursive cognitions (vīsitavikalpasamvedana)—it is, indeed, thus perceived—and not a form of reproduction. If, however, you say that it is a reproduction, in the sense that it follows the “production” of real, ordinary life, there is no fault. Once facts have been clearly determined, words do not deserve to be a source of disagreement. But we will expound that later. For the time being, this is sufficient.
APPENDIX II

Commentary on Dh. A., I, 18.

As to poetry, which conveys the determinants and the consequents, there is no possible appearance of any element which could provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning; and therefore, there is in this sense little room for metaphor.

"But"—someone might argue—what has it to do with unsuitability? The nature of metaphor has indeed been defined as follows. "The metaphor is said to be the apprehension of a sense connected with the sense directly expressed." Now in poetry, we see that the Rasas are connected with the determinants, the consequents etc., which are directly expressed, indeed, the determinants and the consequents are respectively the causes and the effects of Rasas, and the transitory states co-operate with them." Your objection, I reply, does not stand to reason. If it be right, indeed, when, thanks to the word

1) See, on the nature of the metaphor, the study of K. Kunjunni Raja, op. cit., pp. 229-273. "The three essential conditions—he says, pp. 231-32—generally accepted by the later Ālaṃkārikas as necessary in lakṣāṇa of transfer are (a) the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context, (b) some relation between the primary and the actual referent of the word, and (c) sanction for the transferred sense by popular usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer. Of these three conditions, the first two are accepted by all writers; but the motive element justifying the use of a metaphor which has not received the sanction of established usage is not stressed by the earlier writers; even later writers belonging to the other school of thought are not interested in the motive element in lakṣāṇa; it is only the literary critics who give great prominence to it.

2) Kumārila, Tantravārttika, I, 4, 23. See on all that, R. Güoli, Udbhata's Commentary on the Kavyālaṃkāra of Bhāmaha, Roma 1962, pp. XXXIV-XXXV.
'smoke', the smoke has been apprehended, there would arise also the idea of fire, just effected by the afore-said metaphor; and again, from fire, there would arise the idea of removing coldness, and so on, so that words could no more have any fixed meaning. On the other hand, if you answer to this, saying that, since the word 'smoke' is reposed in its own sense, its power cannot actually extend to fire and so on, then the consequence of your argumentation is one only, namely, that the seed of the metaphor is the unsuitability of the primary meaning, because, only if this is present, the afore-said repose of a word in its own sense can be lacking. Now, in the conveying of the determinants, etc., there is no element which can provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning.

At this point, someone might perhaps urge that the apprehension of the feelings of delight, etc., immediately follows the apprehension of the determinants, etc., just as the idea of fire immediately follows the perception of smoke, and that, being so, there is little room, in this case, for a power inherent in words. But, instead of answering to this objection, I will pose a question to this clever logician, who knows so well the nature of perception, and it is the following: Do you think that the apprehension of Rasa is merely the apprehension of the feelings of some other person? You do not deserve to fall into such a mistake. In this case, indeed, the said apprehension would be but an inference of the feelings proper to such and such people; what sort of a Rasa could it then possess? But the tasting of Rasa, which is made up of a non-ordinary camatkāra and is animated by the gustation of the determinants, etc., proper to poetry, cannot certainly be so contemned as to be placed on the same level as the ordinary processes of memory, inference, etc. Rather, the truth is that he whose heart possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential process from the
effect to the cause, etc., does not apprehend the determinants and so on, as if he were indifferent; being instead at the mercy of his own sensibility—which quality is also called consent of heart—, he rather apprehends them without mounting on the path of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with the determinants, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness. This tasting, again, is not already born in the past, from some other means of knowledge, so that it is, now, a form of memory; nor is it arisen now from some other means of knowledge, for as to a non-ordinary thing, the direct perception, etc., are devoid of any power. Hence, the expressions ‘determinant’, etc., are of a non-ordinary nature; for as Bharata himself has said: “The word ‘determinant’ is used for the sake of clear knowledge”\(^1\). In everyday life, they are called causes, not determinants. The term ‘consequent’ is, it too, non-ordinary. ‘Because the representation’—Bharata says—“by means of words, gestures and the temperament, makes one experience (the mental states) it is called ‘consequent’”\(^2\). This experiencing, provoked by the consequents, is nothing but an identification with the said feelings. In everyday life, they are called effects, not consequents. Therefore, just with this view in mind, namely, that we do not apprehend a feeling of others, Bharata has made no mention of the permanent mental states in the sūtra: “Out of the union of the determinants, the consequents and the transitory mental states, the birth of Rasa takes place”. On the contrary, the

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1) N.S., VII, prose after st. 3.
2) N.S., VII, prose after st. 4.
mention of it would have been a source of difficulty. Such expressions as “The permanent mental state becomes Rasa” are due to correspondence only—because, that is to say, the gustation arises, beautiful as it is, thanks to the trace, latent within us, of the feeling correspondent to the determinants and the consequents; and because in worldly life, in the stage, that is, of the knowledge of the feelings of others—a knowledge, let us say, truly indispensable as regards the consent of heart—we are able to apprehend the permanent feelings of delight, etc., from things as gardens, bristling of the hairs, and so on. The transitory mental state, is no doubt a feeling, but, since it is enjoyed in so far as it is entirely dependent on the principal one, it is reckoned by Bharata amongst the determinants and the consequents.

Therefore, the ‘birth of Rasa’, mentioned in the sûtra, must be intended as the birth of a relishing—which relishing is a sort of immersion in a gustation, appearing as superior to all the other ordinary feelings of delight, etc., that may be aroused by different causes, as, f.i., meeting with a friend, and appear to develop gradually. This gustation, therefore, is only a manifestation, not a revelation—which is the operation of the means of knowledge—and not even a production—which is the operation of the means of action.

“But”—at this point someone might argue—“if this gustation is neither a cognition nor a production, then what is it?” But we reply—have we not said that this Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature? What are, then, these determinants?

1) The mention of it, therefore, gives rise to no difficulty.

2) If we take literally the expression of the sûtra, the result would be that the Rasa is no more a non-ordinary reality. The birth indeed, requires some means of action, and these, as such, are of an ordinary nature.
Are they revealing causes or producing causes? We reply to this question that they are neither revealing nor producing, but only something which serves to realize the gustation. Does any such thing appear elsewhere? But for the very reason why it does not appear we say that it is of a non-ordinary nature. But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (aprameya). Let us admit it, we reply—and what of it? For, since from its gustation, pleasure and instruction derive, what other do you desire? But, you might say, it is not ascertained by any means of knowledge. This is untrue, we reply, because its real existence is an unconfutable datum of our own consciousness; besides, this gustation is only a particular form of knowledge. And that is enough! Therefore, the said Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature—so that even alliterations of harsh or soft sounds can be suggestive of it, though they are of no use as to meaning. Here, then, there is not even the shadow of the metaphor.
APPENDIX III

Commentary on Dh. A., II, 4.

Now, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says—If the Rasa were perceived as present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference. On the other hand, the poem—which, f.i., might describe the story of Rāma—does not make the reader to perceive it as really present in him, because that would imply this admission, namely that there is a birth of Rasa in his own self. Now this birth does not stand to reason, because Śītā does not play the role of a determinant as regards the spectator. “But”—someone may perhaps say—“that which causes her to be a determinant is the general idea of loverness, which, shared by her, is the cause of the awakening of the latent impressions.” But—I reply to this objection—how can that happen as regards a description of deities, etc.? Further, no memory of his own beloved one does arise in the spectator’s consciousness (while he looks at Śītā). Again it is possible that the construction of a bridge on the ocean and the other determinants of this kind, proper to some extraordinary personages as Rāma and so on, may become general? Nor it can be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rāma, as endowed of heroism, etc., in so far as the spectator has had no such previous experience. Even assuming that he is perceived through verbal testimony (śabda), there cannot be any birth of Rasa, just as in the case of a pair of lovers united together, perceived through direct knowledge. Moreover, according to the thesis which maintains that Rasa is produced, the birth of the Pathetic

1) See, on the exposition of Bhatta Nāyaka’s theory, supra, Introd., p. XX, ff.
Rasa would make the perceiver to experience pain, and, consequently, he would go no more to pathetic representations. Therefore, that is not a production and not even a manifestation. Indeed, if it is supposed that a Rasa—f.i., the Erotic one—first pre-exists in a potential form and is later manifested, then (the determinants must necessarily) illuminate it little by little. Besides, the difficulties already met with would recur: is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self, or as present in a third party? Therefore, Rasa is neither perceived, nor produced, nor manifested by the poem. The truth is that the poetic word is different from the other ones. This happens thanks to three distinct powers, which are so to speak, its parts (anśa): that is to say, the power of denotation, which has as its object, the expressed sense; the power of revelation, which has, as its object, the Rasa; and the power of bringing about enjoyment, which has, as its object, the individuals who are possessed of heart. If in poetry there were, indeed, one power only, i.e., the power of denotation, without the other ones, what a difference would still remain between the various ornaments, as alliteration, etc., and the treatises illustrating them? And together with the ornaments the various styles also would result useless. And, again, what would be the purpose of avoiding cacophony, etc? Therefore, there is a second power, called 'revelation of Rasa', thanks to which the language of poetry is different from any other. This power, the so-called revelation, proper to poetry is nothing but the faculty of generalizing the determinants. Once the Rasa has been revealed, there is the enjoyment of it. This enjoyment, which is different from any other kind of perception, as direct knowledge and memory, consists of the states of fluidity, enlargement and expansion, is characterized by a resting, by analysis, in our own consciousness, constituted by sattva and
Intermixed with rajaḥ and tamah, and is similar to the tasting of the supreme brahman. The chief member of poetry is only this, quite perfect. The so-called instruction has only a secondary place.

This is only one of the theories. The critics indeed do not agree about the true nature of Rasa. Indeed, some of them say that, in the first stage, we have only a permanent state of mind, which, being later nourished by the transitory states of mind, etc., is experienced as Rasa. This Rasa, they add, is perceived as really present in the reproduced personage only; and, being displayed in the theater, is called “theater-rasa”\(^1\). This theory is criticized by others in the following way. What is indeed, they say, the sense of this intensification of a state of mind by another one, as regards a mental state, which naturally develops in a succession? Surely, neither astonishment, nor sorrow nor anger, etc., are seen to grow more intense with time! Therefore, your thesis, viz. that Rasa is [perceived as really] present in the reproduced personage, does not stand to reason. If you, on the other hand, say it is in the reproducing actor, obviously he could not follow the tempo, etc.\(^2\) If, finally, you say that\(^3\) it is in the spectators, what a camatkāra would still subsist? On the contrary, in front of a pathetic scene, the spectators would necessarily feel in pain. Therefore, this thesis is not sound. Which is then the right one? Here, because of the infinitude of gradations, no reproduction of a defined (niyata) permanent feeling must be made\(^4\); this, besides, would be purposeless, because at the sight of this excessive

1) This is Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa’s theory. Cf. supra, Introd., pp. XVII ff.
2) Cf. supra, p. XVIII.
3) Namely, The Rasas and bhāvas.
4) That is, characterized by a particular stage.
particularity, the spectators would remain indifferent, so that there could not be any useful teaching. The true nature of Rasa is therefore the following. When the determinants, the consequents and the transitory states are joined together with reference to a permanent state of mind, devoid of any defined stage (aniyatavasthātmaka), there arises a perception different from memory, viz. "This is Rāma who was happy". This perception has, as its object, the permanent feeling, is made up of a tasting, is ultimately founded on the reproducing actor and is to be found in theater only. Rasa is nothing but that. It does not require any separate support, but, on the contrary, the spectator is tasting it in the actor, who is considered as identical with the reproduced personage. This is, in brief, the nature of aesthetic experience. Therefore, Rasa lies in the theater only, not in the represented personage, etc. 2.

Some others say: "The image of the permanent state of mind appearing in the reproducing actor is produced by the assemblage of the different forms of representation, etc., just as the image of a horse, appearing on a wall, is produced by the various pigments, as orpiment, etc. This image is tasted by a perception of a non-ordinary nature, named also sampling, and is therefore called Rasa. The meaning of the expression 'theater-Rasa', is then 'the Rasas which are caused by the theater'.

According to others, Rasa is nothing but the whole of the determinants and the consequents, supplied by a particular assemblage, connected with determinate latent impressions suitable to the permanent state of mind—which is the object of the acting of the afore-mentioned determinants and conse-

1) That is to say, in the naṭas, actors, only.
2) This the theory of Saṅkuka.
characterized by an intimate relish or lysis. According to this theory, the Rasas, are nothing but the drama.

Some others say that Rasa is the mere determinant or, again, the mere consequent; according to others it is nothing but the permanent state of mind; others say that it is the transitory mental state; to others, it is a combination of these; others say that it is the situation to be reproduced; and others, finally, that it is an aggregate of all that. But enough of these lucubrations!

The afore-mentioned Rasa occurs in poetry also, which, in the place of the realistic representation and of the theatrical conventions, possesses the natural and the extraordinary mode of speech. The combination of the determinants, etc., by which it is produced, is, in poetry, afforded by words of a non-ordinary character, endowed with the qualities of clearness (prasanna), sweetness (madhura) and powerfulness (ojasvin). Even if it be admitted that in poetry the Rasa-perception is someway different from drama, because of the means which are different, the process, however, is the same.

Being it so, these faults concern the prima facie view only, for, according to it, perception is subjected to the distinctions proper to oneself to others, etc. Anyhow, no matter which the thesis is, Rasa results to be a perception. This is unavoidable. Indeed, the existence of an unperceived thing, as, for instance, a goblin, cannot be affirmed. The fact that this perception is called by the names of relish, tasting, or enjoyment, does not amount to any difficulty. We know indeed that the direct cognition, the inference, the tradition, the intuition, the supernormal experience, under their different names—caused by the different means which manifest them, are equally but forms

of perception. Nothing then forbids us to admit that the same occurs in the case of Rasa also, for the very reason that the means by which it is manifested, viz. the combination of the determinants, etc., assisted by the consent of heart and soul, are of a non-ordinary nature. The use of the expression, 'The Rasas are perceived', is just like the one 'the porridge is being cooked'. The Rasa, indeed, is merely perceived. The relishing is only a particular perception. This perception, in drama, is different from an ordinary inferential perception; yet, in the beginning, this is required, as a means. Likewise, the afore-said perception, in poetry, is different from the other verbal perceptions; yet, in the beginning, these are required, as a means.

Therefore, the *prima facie* views are put to death. But if you say that the exploits of Rāma, etc., do not earn the consent of heart of everybody, that, I answer, is a great mark of rashness! Everybody's mind is indeed characterized by the most various latent impressions; for as it has been said, "As the desire is permanent, these are beginningless"; and, "On the ground that the remembrances and the impressions are homogeneous there is an uninterrupted succession of latent impressions, even if they are separated by birth, space, and time". Therefore, it is established that Rasa is perceived. This perception, in its turn, presents himself in the form of a relishing.

This relishing is produced by a new power, different from the power of denotation, which the expressed sense and the expressing words come to possess, that is the power of tune, of suggestion. The so-called power of bringing about enjoyment, proper to poetry, according to you, consists, actually, of this power of suggestion only, and has, as its object, the Rasa. The other power also, viz, the power of effectuation,

1) *Yogasūtra*, IV, sūtras 10 and 9.
is actually based on the usage of appropriate qualities and ornaments. We shall explain it diffusely. It is nothing new. On the other hand, if you say that poetry is effecting the Rasa, then you, by this very statement, resuscitate the theory of production. Besides, this power of effectuation can be proper neither to the poetical words only, because, if the express sense is not known, the afore-said power cannot logically exist; nor to the express sense only, because, this being conveyed by other words, it does not longer exist. We, on the contrary, maintain that this power of effectuation pertaining to the two of them, as it is confirmed in the stanza: “That kind of poetry, wherein either the sense of the word suggests the implied meaning”, etc.¹ Further, the effectuation-process (let us here remember) is endowed with three distinguished parts, that is, the means, the necessary measures, and the end. Therefore, if we make the power of manifestation correspond to the means, the appropriate qualities and ornaments to the necessary measures, and the Rasas to the end, produced by the effecting poem, it is quite clear that the power of suggestion will correspond to the first part, viz. the means. The enjoyment, in its turn, is not produced by the poetical word, but by this non-ordinary power of suggestion only, through the suppression of our thick pall of mental stupor and blindness. This enjoyment consists, according to you, of the states of fluidity, enlargement and expansion, is called also “tasting”, and is of a non-ordinary nature. In other words, having once established that Rasa is suggested, the afore-mentioned power of bringing

¹) Dh.Ā., I, 13. “That kind of poetry, wherein either the (conventional) meaning or the (conventional) word renders itself or its meaning secondary (respectively) and suggests the Implied meaning, is designated by the learned as dhvam or ‘Suggestive poetry’”. (Translation of K. Krishnamoorthy, ed. cit).
about enjoyment is, it too, fatally established. The enjoyment, indeed, is identical with the *camatkāra*, arising from the Rasa-experience itself. Further, as the constituent elements *sātva*, etc., can be found set out in an infinite member of different ways, according to the predominance of the one or the other, it is absurd to limit the forms of tasting to fluidity, etc., only. As to the theory, according to which the tasting of Rasa is similar to the tasting of the supreme *brahman*, we have nothing to object. Moreover, the teaching to be derived from poetry is different from the injunctions and instructions imparted by religious treatises and historical narratives. However, to them, who maintain that poetry produces at the end a teaching which differs from usual analogy, viz. “as Rāma, so I”, and consists in an enrichment of our own power of intuition—the instrument which allows the tasting of Rasa—, we have nothing to reproach. Therefore, this is definitely established—namely, that Rasas are manifested and are tasted through a perception.

1) See, in this connexion, the *A.Bb.*, I. p, 41: *nānu kim gurud upa-deśam karoti, netyāha, kintu buddhim vvardhayati, svapratibbām evam tātask vitarati* || Elsewhere (*Db.Ā.L.*, p. 40) A.G. says that the principal element is not knowledge (for in that ease there would be confusion with works on ethics and historiography) but pleasure (*prīti, ānanda*). The pleasure and knowledge, both *sus generis*, aroused by poetry are not distinct from each other but are two aspects of the same thing (*na caste prītwyutpatti bhinnarup eva, dvayor apy ekaviṣayatvāt*, *Db.Ā.L.*, p. 336).
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